See, e.g., Ward v. City of Erie Sch. Dist., 2014 WL 546708 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (dismissing pro se plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 12203 claim, among others, under Rule 12(b)(6)); Manuel v. City of Philadelphia, 2010 WL 3566767 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (same).

Compare Cable v. Dep't. ofDev. Servs. of the State ofCal. 973 F.Supp. 937, 943 (C.D.Cal.1997\"individuals cannot be held liable under Title V of the ADA") and Stern v. California State Archives, 982 F.Supp. 690, 691 (E.D.Cal].1997)("the court holds that individuals who do not qualify as ‘employers’ are not subject to personal liability under section 12112(a)" with Ostrach v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 957 F.Supp. 196, 200 (E.D.Cal.1997) ("[p]laintiff may sue the individual defendants under the anti-retaliation provision of the ADA"). *5 Nonetheless, even if the Ninth Circuit were to determine that individuals can be held liable under § 12203(a) and (b), the court finds that the actions allegedly engaged in by defendants Carichoff and Coleman do not fall within the "retaliation," "coercion," "intimidation," "threats," or “interference” contemplated by Congress in enacting § 12203. A motion to compel plaintiff's deposition within the context of a civil lawsuit initiated by plaintiff, and after at least two unsuccessful attempts to secure plaintiff's deposition testimony, can hardly be characterized as retaliation.

C. Section 503(b) of the ADA Section 503(b) of the ADA prohibits interference with an individual’s exercise or enjoyment of a right granted by the ADA: It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.206(b).

the Civil Rights Act should not be dismissed at the pleading stage unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff 2:15-cv-13285-GAD-APP Doc # 24 Filed 12/07/15 Pg 18 of 24 Pg ID 408 13 would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of [her] claim." Lucarell v. McNair, 453 F.2d 836, 838 (6th Cir. 1972) The Plaintiff demonstrates a plausibility in the Complaint that entitles her to relief and raises a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of Defendants’ wrongful conduct. Here, Pro se Plaintiff, Dr. Hawthorne-Burdine, has alleged enough facts in her Complaint to adequately state all of the elements of the claim that multiple Defendants worked in concert to violate her civil rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C 2000e, et seq.; (See Exhibit S)21 Title 1 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C, 12111, et seq.; Title V, Section 503 of the Act, 42 U.S.C 12203; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended; the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA,” MCL 37.2101); and the Michigan Persons with Disability Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA,” MCL §37.1101 et seq.). Plaintiff has also demonstrated enough statements of facts in her Complaint to adequately put Defendants on notice of the claims against them.

5(b) do not rise to the fundamental public policy purposes of FEHA.”); Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th at 1042; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); Kimbrough v. Cincinnati Ass’n for Blind and Visually Impaired, 986 F.Supp.2d 904, 917 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (disagreement with internal leave policies, such as accrued sick time, does not constitute protected activity under the ADA). Moreover, such opposition must be both subjectively and objectively reasonable, when “measured against existing substantive law.”

3. That the defendant, including all officers, director, agents, employees and successors of the defendant, be permanently enjoined from retaliating against any individual in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 794 and 42 U.S.C.§12203. 4.

The Court reasoned that “[t]he ADA's retaliation provision states: “No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). See also Alston, 561 F.Supp.2d at 39.

Therefore, all Title II of ADA claims should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. V. TITLE II AND SECTION 12203 OF ADA, AND THE REHABILITATION ACT DO NOT PROVIDE FOR INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY A. ADA Individual co-defendants are not liable for under Title II and Section12203 of ADA. The ADA forbids discrimination by any “covered entity” defined as “an employer, employment agency, labor, organization, or joint labor-management committee.”

Standard for Retaliation Claim The ADA provides: No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to ADA and Title VII retaliation claims.

The ADA prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any individual because he or she has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter,” or who has filed administrative proceedings to protest such an action as Charging Party did in this case. 42 U.S.C. §12203(a). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, Plaintiff must establish (1) Charging Party engaged in protected activity; (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that a causal connection existed between the protected activity and 5:11-cv-13742-JCO-MAR Doc # 60 Filed 06/29/12 Pg 29 of 33 Pg ID 1019 22 the adverse action.