Be sure to really understand what the employee is asking before turning them down. Click to Share: [1] 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).[2] 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (9).[3] 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111 (10).[4] EEOC Enforcement Guidance: “Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,” http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html#N_101_(last visited Mar. 11, 2013).

blic sector employers with at least 15 employees and applies to all employees and applicants for employment. The law exempts certain religious organizations.Employees and applicants may now file EEOC charges against employers who fail to comply with the new law. Like the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, an employee may sue for money damages but first must exhaust administrative remedies through the EEOC before filing suit. The EEOC has until December 2023 to issue regulations, but one of the law’s original sponsors, Senator Bill Cassidy, sent a letter on June 8 urging the EEOC to move more quickly on this important new law.What Does the PWFA Require?Employers must provide “reasonable accommodations” for the “known limitations related to the pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions” unless the accommodation would impose an “undue hardship” on the operation of the employer’s business. The PWFA borrows the term “reasonable accommodation” from the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12111(9), along with the now familiar “interactive process” that will typically be used to determine appropriate accommodations.But the PWFA is broader than the ADA. Unlike the ADA, which applies only to disabilities, the PWFA’s “reasonable accommodation” requirement applies even if the employee’s condition or limitation does not rise to the level of a disability. It applies to any “physical or mental condition” that is “related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” The normal or routine complications of pregnancy—which typically do not constitute a “disability” under the ADA—do receive protection under the PWFA. In addition, the PWFA applies to more than just pregnancy but includes postpartum conditions and events such as miscarriage, stillbirth, and termination of pregnancy. As noted by a recent report from the Congressional Research Service, the term “related” condition previously has been interpreted by some courts to include abortion.As

An “undue hardship” is defined as “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(10). There are a number of factors courts review when determining whether adopting a reasonable accommodation poses an undue hardship, including: “the nature and cost of the accommodation,” the employer’s “overall financial resources,” and the employer’s “type of operation.”

A “qualified individual” is entitled to protection under the ADA if they are able to “perform the essential functions of the employment position” “with or without reasonable accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The ADA requires employers to provide “reasonable accommodations” to “qualified individuals,” which may include “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, [and] reassignment to a vacant position.”

These factors include the nature and cost of accommodation, the financial resources of the employer, the number of persons employed at the facility, and the type of operation of the business, among other subjects. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B).1242 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5).

Fact that disability may not have impaired employee at the workplace itself does not mean that employee is not disabled. Part-time work may be reasonable accommodation, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). Genuine issue of material fact that employee could have performed all essential functions of job at the time of his firing-which is the relevant time for purposes of the ADA if offered opportunity to rest and recover after long shift.

but they are certainly one of its lasting legacies. Since such requests have skyrocketed, courts have found telework to be a reasonable accommodation more often, but not as often as one might assume following the pandemic, which demonstrated that many businesses and organizations had the ability to function with a large part of their workforces teleworkingThe ADA guides the assessment of whether an accommodation is reasonable under the above federal laws. The ADA states:The term “reasonable accommodation” may include (A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).Per a Bloomberg Law analysis of the issue, between 2017 and 2019, courts ruled in favor of employers denying telework as a reasonable accommodation at a rate of 70%. Between 2021 and 2023, that percentage fell to 60%.Significant to employers in Pennsylvania is Oross v. Kutztown University, wherein the Court examined the question of telework as a reasonable accommodation. The plaintiff, a tenured professor at Kutztown University, underwent a heart transplant in February 2021 which required him to take life-long immuno-suppressants. In the spring, Kutztown required faculty to return to in-person instruction at the start of the fall semester. Given his immune-suppressed state, the professor asked to conduct his courses online to reduce the risk of contracting COVID-19, but Kutztown denied the request. The plaintiff filed suit, alleging various violations under and related to the Rehabilitation Act. This led to a lawsuit for, among other things, Kutztown’s denial of the professor’s reques

the conduct of the employer's business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j), 29 CFR §1605.2(b & c). The Supreme Court’s 1977 decision stated that “[t]o require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.” This wording was the basis upon which most courts since then said that an employer is not required to incur more than a small (i.e., “de minimis”) cost to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs.That precedent contrasts with employers’ obligations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) to accommodate employees with qualifying medical impairments (physical and mental). Accommodations under the ADA are required unless the employer “can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the [organization].” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). While Title VII did not define “undue hardship,” the ADA, since its enactment in 1990, has defined it as “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A). This is a much greater requirement on employer disability accommodation requirements than the de minimis limit courts applied in religious accommodation cases.Thus, for over forty-five years employers have had a much lower obligation to accommodate religious practices than medical impairments. During this time Congress never modified Title VII to add a definition of undue hardship and the EEOC’s regulations under Title VII followed the de minimis wording in Hardison (while in other areas, such as other aspects of the ADA, Congress enacted amendments to increase employee protections in response to Supreme Court decisions with which Congress disagreed). The accommodation standards are now similar for disability and religion. The Supreme Court, in Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023), reversed the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (whose jurisdiction includes Pennsylvania) that applied the Hardison decision’s de minimis cost standard in this recent litigation. The Supreme Court stat

him in violation of the ADA by failing to provide him with reasonable accommodations. Among other things, the employee had requested text messages summarizing mandatory nightly meetings where important safety information was provided, and a sign language interpreter in progressive disciplinary meetings so that he could explain his absences, which he claimed had been authorized, and resolve the discipline he received, which adversely affected his performance reviews and pay.The district court granted summary judgment to the employer, finding the plaintiff failed to show his requested accommodations would have enabled him to perform essential job functions. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding the two requested accommodations at issue did involve essential job functions. When determining what job functions are essential, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized the language of the statute: “[C]onsideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Applying this standard to the plaintiff’s request for text messages summarizing the pre-shift meetings, the court noted that attendance at the meetings was mandatory. A company manager had also testified about the importance of the meetings, stating it would be a “failure” if a team member didn’t receive the meeting’s safety information. The court also found the plaintiff’s ability to participate meaningfully in the disciplinary meetings about his attendance was an essential aspect of his employment, citing testimony of a company HR representative and a manager about the importance of communication between supervisors and employees at disciplinary meetings. Thus, the court held, “even though disciplinary meetings were not part of [the employee’s] day-to-day functions as an inbound materials handler, they were an essential part of the job… [and] the result of his disciplinary proceedings directly affected the amount of the pay raise he received.”Based on these factors, the Eleventh Ci

four-factor test used in the Title VII context to determine that two separate entities comprised an integrated enterprise.The Ninth Circuit OpinionThe plaintiff in Buchannan brought discrimination and retaliation claims against her employer, W&L Nevada, for allegedly failing to accommodate her medical conditions by requiring her to work over 20 hours per week and retaliating after a request for time off by placing her on indefinite leave. The plaintiff alleged that the employer’s actions violated the ADA and argued that although W&L Nevada did not have 15 employees, the ADA nevertheless applied since the managing partners of the firm also managed and controlled Watkins & Letofsky, a California limited liability partnership (W&L California), and together the two entities had over 15 employees. The district court rejected the plaintiff’s argument citing the language of the ADA which defines “employer” as a “person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees.” 42 U.S.C § 12111(5)(A).The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and held that W&L Nevada and W&L California comprised an integrated enterprise under the ADA. In overruling the district court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit observed that Title VII has a similar 15-employee requirement, but when a defendant has fewer than 15 employees, a plaintiff can bring a statutory claim if they can establish that the defendant is “so interconnected with another employer that the two form an integrated enterprise.” The panel also noted that the statutory scheme and language of the ADA and Title VII are “identical in many respects,” since both statutes define employers as entities with 15 or more employees and both statutes incorporate similar powers, remedies, and procedures. The panel thus concluded that, since Title VII and the ADA both include the same 15-employee threshold and statutory enforcement scheme, the integrated enterprise doctrine used in the Title VII context “applies equally under the ADA.”The Four-Fact