Thus, in the context of this case, there is simply no reason why foreign sales information should be considered. And Olaplex provides none, other than its erroneous belief (as explained above) that, while the Switzerland-based hairdresser would not be liable for direct infringement under Section 271(a), a person who induces the Switzerland-based hair dresser to act would be liable for induced infringement under Section 271(b). V. CONCLUSION Olaplex provides no legitimate reason for the Court to compel L’Oréal USA to produce worldwide sales data that bear no relationship to any of Olaplex’s claims.

Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2009). To the extent WesternGeco asserts infringement of its method claims under § 271(f), summary judgment must be granted against those claims as well. CONCLUSION

For all infringement claims, identify the accused “products and/or services” and the patents they allegedly infringe; For direct infringement claims, specify what actions the Defendant performed to infringe (i.e., selling, making, using, etc.) and the patents in suit that were thereby infringed; For induced and contributory infringement claims: o specify the patents in suit that are alleged to be infringed; o identify the third parties that directly infringed patents in suit and the actions they performed to infringe the patents; o identify the Defendant’s actions that induced or contributed to the third parties’ direct infringement; o allege facts sufficient to show that the Defendant had the requisite state of mind; For contributory infringement claims, identify the material or apparatus that the Defendant sold, offered for sale, or imported and allege facts sufficient to show that the material or apparatus had no substantial non-infringing use; and For claims under §271(g), specify the patents in suit that are alleged to be infringed and the entity that allegedly performs the patented process. 14 In the alternative, based on the deficiencies in MPT’s Complaint that Defendants have identified herein, Defendants respectfully request that the Court order MPT to provide a more definite statement to Defendants that includes all the factual details listed in the bullet points below.

FAC, ¶20. The BMC and Muniauction cases relied upon by Gracenote do not address or apply to these claims and do not foreclose such claims. Tune Hunter therefore has valid claims under the “offers to sell” and “sells” prongs of § 271(a) regardless of BMC/Muniauction’s affect on the “use” of a method. This is yet another reason that Gracenote’s motion to dismiss should be denied.

None of these three circumstances exist here. 1. The Third Amended Complaint will not prejudice either defendant. Both Qualcomm and Apple have known since the beginning of this case—or, at the very latest, since ParkerVision served its Preliminary Infringement Contentions in August of 2017—that ParkerVision is claiming that Qualcomm has indirectly infringed the ’528 Patent under 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(b) and (c) (Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 70-77; Winger Dec. Exhibit 2 at 5). ParkerVision is not asking the Court to assert a new infringement theory against Qualcomm that might require Qualcomm to adjust its legal strategy or put Qualcomm at a disadvantage because of prior filings or arguments in the case.

Front Row provides no information about how any Case 1:10-cv-00433-JB -KBM Document 50 Filed 01/06/11 Page 17 of 22 16 indirect infringement occurred or who was involved in that infringement. Instead, its indirect infringement allegations are limited to the following: 21. MLB Defendants have been and are continuing to induce infringement of the ’426 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) and contribute to infringement of the ’426 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), in conjunction with such acts of making, using, offering for sale, selling, and/or importing in or into the United States, without authority, instrumentalities that practice one or more claims of the ’426 patent, including but not limited to MLB Defendants’ AT BAT MOBILE application. The infringing instrumentalities have no substantial non-infringing uses.8 (Third Am. Compl. at ¶ 21.)

This is fatal to Gelfand's claim. Gelfand has not stated a claim for relief under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) and his Third Claim for Relief must be dismissed. 12 285486 1/02519-0003 Case 1:08-cv-02018-LAK Document 31 Filed 06/30/2008 Page 16 of 17 III. CONCLUSION Once again, Gelfand has needlessly multiplied these proceedings by the assertion of frivolous claims.

IV. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, ASUS respectfully requests the Court to strike the portions of the Taylor and Afromowitz Reports relating to: (1) opinions on doctrine of equivalents; (2) opinions on indirect infringement, including opinions in the Taylor Report on infringement of the ’053 patent based on products not sold with DDR3 memory or, for claim 24, processor; (3) ’053 patent infringement opinions in the Taylor Report relating to the “BUS_WIDTH bit” and “Tran_Speed [103:96]”; (4) opinions in the Afromowitz Report based on reverse engineering analyses not included in Round Rock’s Infringement Contentions; (5) opinions in the Afromowitz Report relating to the BARC limitation of the ’276 patent; (6) opinions in the Afromowitz Report relating to ASUS’s alleged infringement of the ’353 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g); (7) opinions in the Taylor Report relying on documents produced by Kingston pursuant to subpoena; and (8) opinions relating to infringement theories first introduced in Round Rock’s proposed supplemental contentions. To the extent the Court declines to strike any of the above opinions, ASUS requests in the alternative that the Court issues an order permitting ASUS to serve supplemental expert reports responding to these opinions.

Contributory Infringement 257. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) states in pertinent part: Whoever sells a component of . . . manufacture . . . or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer. 258.

with respect to TSMC Ltd.’s and TSMC NA’s direct infringement liability is whether the transactions between the TSMC entities and OmniVision constitute sales or offers to sell ‘within the United States.’”). As such, Ziptronix is inapplicable where there is substantial evidence that the infringing product is made in the U.S. Similarly, nothing in Fr. Telecom S.A. v. Marvell Semiconductor Inc. extends the holding in Microsoft in a way to discredit all the evidence of infringement by GIN within the U.S, as the accused product in Fr. Telecom was never made, used or sold within the U.S. 39 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1102–03 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (recognizing that accused infringer established “undisputed evidence that the manufacturing, sale, and delivery of the accused chips all occurred outside the United States”). Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 405 Filed 11/05/17 Page 6 of 7 6 FINJAN’S RESP. TO BLUE COAT’S NOV. 2, 2017 OBJS. CASE NO. 15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK RE: INFRINGEMENT UNDER § 271(A) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Respectfully submitted, Dated: November 5, 2017 By: /s/ Paul J. Andre Paul J. Andre Lisa Kobialka James Hannah KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL LLP 990 Marsh Road Menlo Park, CA 94025 Telephone: (650) 752-1700 Facsimile: (650) 752-1800 pandre@kramerlevin.com lkobialka@kramerlevin.com jhannah@kramerlevin.com Attorneys for Plaintiff FINJAN, INC. Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 405 Filed 11/05/17 Page 7 of 7