LMRA § 301 provides federal jurisdiction for “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ….” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (emphasis added). Mojave Solar is not a party to any contract with Plaintiffs and therefore LMRA § 301 does not apply to Plaintiffs’ claims.

21. Plaintiffs are entitled to confirmation and enforcement of the Award and entry of judgment in conformity with the Award pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. Case: 1:09-cv-00738-SSB-KLL Doc #: 58 Filed: 06/28/12 Page: 10 of 66 PAGEID #: 25889 654 -11- NY:1440572.1 ANSWER: Paragraph 21 states legal conclusions to which no response is required.

(ECF 32.) The venue provision under the LMRA is found in § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), which provides as follows: Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. Similarly, GE has conceded that this District has jurisdiction over it.

See Complaint ¶¶ 26-27 (requesting declaration as to Section 301 preemption’s impact on all collectively bargained employees, without regard to whether they are subject to a CBA, in the private sector, or covered by the RLA). See also 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (Section 301 covers suits for violations of “contracts between an employer and a labor organization”); 29 U.S.C. § 142(3) (LMRA’s definition of “employer” and “labor organization” derived from 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169’s definition of “employer” and “labor organization”); 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (excluding federal and state governments and employers covered by the RLA from definition of “employer”). IV.

It makes no difference that a plaintiff pleads his claim as a tort because Section 301 “has been broadly construed to cover most state-law actions that require interpretation of labor agreements.” Aguilera v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 223 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)); see also Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. 3 The Court may take judicial notice of the arbitration precedent discussed above. See, e.g., Jones v. United Steelworkers, No. 1:12-cv-01463-JLT, 2013 WL 5423687, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept.

Only § 301 of the LMRA empowers the federal courts to hear “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization,” including suits to vacate or confirm labor arbitration Case 2:12-cv-01963-GMN-CWH Document 10 Filed 01/02/13 Page 12 of 26 8 awards. 29 U.S.C. § 185; Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers, Local 1802, 353 U.S. 550, 551 (1957) (cases under the FAA were inapposite because “[t]he right enforced here is one arising under § 301(a)”); Poweragent Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 358 F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[I]n this circuit CBAs have been held to be outside the coverage of the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’).”)

The CBA provides for the provision of health and life insurance as described, above. 4 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) provides: Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. “An individual employee alleging breach of a CBA may file a lawsuit against his employer under § 301.”

The LMRA requires substantially more. The LMRA provision bearing the heading “venue, citizenship, and amount in controversy” restricts a “labor organization” seeking judicial review of a labor arbitration award to “district court[s] . . . having jurisdiction of the parties . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (emphasis added). Thus, LMRA venue analysis in confirmation suits properly 4 The SAC’s exclusive reliance on an ERISA venue provision to rationalize laying venue in southern West Virginia with respect to the Union’s LMRA confirmation count is misplaced. (See ECF No. 78, SAC ¶ 4) (“Venue with respect to the wholly owned subsidiaries of [CONSOL Energy] . . . lies in this judicial district pursuant to ERISA 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2).”)

Thus, Plaintiff’s new common law breach of contract claim would be preempted by LMRA § 301 and would fail for the reasons set forth herein and in ZeniMax’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff incorrectly cites Karo v. San Diego Symphony Orchestra Ass’n, 762 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1985), as authority for his proposition that third-party beneficiaries have “standing to enforce promises made for their benefit both in common law breach of contract actions and Section 301 LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185 claims.” (Opp.

[Doc. 32 ¶ 5, p. 3] Case 3:16-cv-00346-B Document 34 Filed 03/03/17 Page 15 of 26 PageID 196 Memorandum Brief in Support of Defendant Unions’ Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint – Page 11 A hybrid claim under Section 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185, is composed of two distinct causes of action: (i) a claim that the employer breached the CBA, and (ii) a claim that the union breached its duty of fair representation. Gibson v. United States Postal Service, 380 F.3d 886, 889 (5th Cir. 2004).