Under the ADEA, a plaintiff must file suit within 90 days after receipt of the right- to-sue letter. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e); Welch v. S. Cal. Edison, 378 Fed. Appx. 621, 622 (9th Cir. 2010).

Prompted by the difficulties that the EEOC was having in timely prosecuting age discrimination cases, Congress, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, amended the ADEA to delete the incorporation of § 6 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 255, which had prescribed a statute of limitations for ADEA claims. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (superseded 1991) with 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(e), & Historical and Statutory Note on 1991 Amendment. In doing so, Congress imposed the same statute of limitations on claims brought by the EEOC under the ADEA as those claims brought by the EEOC under Title VII.

2009 WL 3367071 at *3. Here, the EEOC makes no such concession about its claims under 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(4) or the preclusive effect of Whitehead.2 CONCLUSION. The Supreme Court’s decision on April 29, 2015 in Mach Mining represented an important change in the law, both with respect to the standards for reviewing conciliation challenges and the available remedies for any identified failure to conciliate.

at 12.) The EEOC also asks the Court to: Order Defendant Employers to reform their form Separation and Release Agreements so as to conform with the provisions of Section 7(f)(4) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(4), both as to former and current employees who are subject to such agreements and any future such agreements. (Id.)

Under the ADEA, a plaintiff must file with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); Bauer v. Bd. of Supervisors, 44 Fed. Appx. 194, 199 (9th Cir. 2002); .

Under the ADEA, a plaintiff must file suit within 90 days after receipt of the right-to-sue notice. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e); Welch v. S. Cal. Edison, 378 Fed. Appx. 621, 622 (9th Cir. 2010).

The Determination made no reference whatsoever to the form agreements. Instead the EEOC only made a determination on two enumerated issues: (1) whether the College retaliated against Debbi Potts in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 623(d); and (2) whether the College used an invalid waiver in its Agreement with Debbi Potts in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 626(f). (Id.

(Complaint, ¶7(c)). The ADEA, at 29 U.SC.§626(b), incorporates remedies set forth in the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §201 et seq. (“FLSA”). The FLSA was amended in 1977 to strengthen that statute’s anti-retaliation provisions, providing that an employer that violates the anti-retaliation provision “shall be liable for such legal…relief as may be appropriate.”

Plaintiffs have not alleged a single fact in support of their OWBPA claims, and they should be dismissed. B. Plaintiffs Failed to Exhaust Their Administrative Remedies Plaintiffs are also barred from filing an action under the OWBPA because they did not first exhaust their administrative remedies by filing charges of discrimination with the EEOC alleging an OWBPA violation or a like or related claim.4 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2004) (“the ‘scope’ of the judicial complaint is limited to the ‘scope’ of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination” (citation omitted)). No Plaintiff filed any charge that mentions the OWBPA or any waivers of age discrimination claims.

III. THE EEOC’S SECOND CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW Even assuming, arguendo, Mach Mining had changed the law in a manner that directly affected the Second Claim, the EEOC‟s Motion still fails as a matter of law. The EEOC asserts the Second Claim as an independent claim for a violation of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (“OWBPA”). However, there is no independent claim for a violation of the OWBPA.