Instead, this Court simply need undertake a traditional Brady and Due Process analysis. If this Court were to find in Carpenter’s favor under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), the Court can perform independent de novo review. Under de novo review, this Court is not constrained under Harrington v. Richter’s doubly-deferential review.

Accordingly, the Court will not issue a COA in this case. IV. CONCLUSION For the following reasons, Petitioner’s § 2254 petition (Doc. No. 1) will be dismissed as moot. A COA will not issue.

Finally, a federal court has no powertocorrect state-law errors. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). These federal restraints exist because state court proceedings are presumedto be the “main event,” not a “tryout on the road” before the federal habeas corpus proceedings.

A habeas petitioner is required to exhaust state remedies by presenting the substance of his constitutional claims to the state courts prior to seeking federal habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). The exhaustion requirements is satisfied only when the highest state court has been “given a full and fair opportunity to rule on the claim.”

51 14 Case 9:10-cv-01312-JKS Document 23 Filed 11/30/12 Page 14 of 15 V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Kulakov is not entitled to relief on any ground raised in his Petition. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Court declines to issue a Certificate of Appealability.

Petitioners bear the burden of establishing that their federal claims were exhausted byfair presentation to the state high court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Darr v. Buford, 339 U.S. 200, 218-19 (1950); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999); Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981); Williams v. Craven, 460 F.2d 1253, 1254 (9th Cir. 1972) (citing Schiers v. California, 333 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1964)); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (b)(1)(A). Exhaustion requires the petitioner to “fairly present”his claims to the highest court ofthe state ... In orderto fairly present a claim, the petitioner mustclearly state thefederal basis and thefederal nature of the claim along with relevant facts... Cooperv.

But Saddler does not assert that (1) the application of judicial estoppel is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or (2) the court of appeals’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In reality, what Saddler asserts is not a claim at all.

III. The Error Is Not Harmless The Appellate Division held that even if the statements to Blandino were wrongfully admitted, such admission was harmless. In this 28 U.S.C. §2254 proceeding, petitioner is entitled to the writ if it is shown that the constitutional error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Wood v. Ercole, 644 F.3d 83, 93-94 (2nd Cir. 2011), citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).

Again, the segregation satellite law library to which petitioner had access until he was granted access to the main law library “around July 2008,” Doc. 7 at 6, included the code volumes containing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and 28 U.S.C. § 2244. Exh.

Because a federal habeas court is prohibited from granting relief unless a decision was based on “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the Case 3:06-cv-02248-O Document 63 Filed 05/07/12 Page 4 of 18 PageID 1597 5 state court proceeding,” it follows that demonstrating the incorrectness of a state-court fact finding based upon evidence not presented to the state court would be of no avail to a habeas petitioner. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). It would be contrary to that purpose to allow a petitioner to overcome an adverse state-court decision with new evidence introduced in a federal habeas court and reviewed by that court in the first instance effectively de novo. . . .