A state court's factual finding of competency is presumed correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner bears the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.

Sex Registration Not Severe Restraint, In Custody, for Federal Habeas Purposes 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the Federal habeas corpus statute, requires a petitioner to be “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court … in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States” before he can obtain the writ. The term “habeas corpus” is Latin for “you have the body.”

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 contains two provisions governing federal-court review of state-court factual findings. Under 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(2), a federal court may not grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus based on a claim already adjudicated on the merits in state court unless that adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Under §2254(e)(1), “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct,” and the petitioner “shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”

The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). "If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, [*16] the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).

After consideration of this distinction and careful review of Beck and its progeny, however, we determined conclusively that "a defendant in a capital case [is entitled] to a lesser included instruction when the evidence warrants it, notwithstanding the fact that the jury may retain discretion to issue a penalty less than death," and we held that the rule in Beck indeed applies to Oklahoma. Hooks, 184 F.3d at 1227. We therefore consider the merits of Hogan's Beck claim. . .Pursuant to AEDPA, the applicable standard of review depends on whether we characterize an examination of the sufficiency of the evidence for a lesser included offense instruction as a "determination of a factual issue," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), or a legal conclusion. If the determination of insufficient evidence is a legal conclusion, we are to ask whether it was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.

He raised a state postconviction claim that his attorney dropped the ball by failing to seek expert testimony on serology and blood spatter which would have shown, he argued, that the physical evidence bolstered his theory of the case. After losing in state court, he filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition, which was denied by the district court. The 9th granted relief on appeal, but the Court now reverses.

If you are like most people, by now you have probably broken most of your New Year's resolutions.So today I want to suggest a new 2009 resolution specifically for Illinois criminal-defense lawyers: Resolve to file more U.S. Supreme Court petitions for certiorari from state court judgments.To understand why this is so important, let me review some legal history with you.In 1948, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. 2254 dealing with federal habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners. Four years later, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that this statute meant that as long as a state prisoner gave state courts the first chance to decide any federal constitutional issue in his case, he was free to file a habeas petition in federal court pursuant to section 2254.

for habeas relief is filed in federal court. Respondent’s application is subject to AEDPA’s amendments because it was not filed until after AEDPA’s effective date. Pp. 2—8.(a) Because of AEDPA’s heavy emphasis on the standards governing the review of a habeas application’s merits, the Court interprets the Lindh rule in view of that emphasis. Thus, whether AEDPA applies to a state prisoner turns on what was before a federal court on AEDPA’s effective date. If, on that date, the state prisoner had before a federal court a habeas application seeking an adjudication on the merits of the prisoner’s claims, then AEDPA does not apply. Otherwise, an application filed after AEDPA’s effective date should be reviewed under AEDPA, even if other filings by that same applicant–e.g., a request for the appointment of counsel or a motion for a stay of execution–were presented to a federal court prior to AEDPA’s effective date. A review of the amended chapter 153 supports this conclusion. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) provides that, “[i]n a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” (Emphasis added.) Under the Ninth Circuit’s view, that presumption would rarely apply in a capital case, as §2254(e)(1) would be applicable only to those capital prisoners who did not need counsel and did not seek a stay. AEDPA’s text, however, contains no indication that §2254(e)(1) was intended to have such a limited scope. Nor is it reasonable to believe that Congress meant for a capital prisoner to avoid application of §2254(e)(1)’s stringent requirements simply by filing a request for counsel or a motion for a stay before filing an actual habeas application. Finally, the procedural rules governing §2254 cases reinforce the Court’s view. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in the habeas context to the extent that they are not inco

63 F. Supp. 2d 525 (1999). The District Court rejected respondent’s Mills claim on the merits, applying the AEDPA standard of review articulated in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d): “Supreme Court precedent … did not require an outcome contrary to that reached by the state courts.” 63 F. Supp. 2d, at 544.

O’Dell reaffirmed that the States have some discretion in determining the extent to which a sentencing jury should be advised of probable future custody and parole status in a future dangerousness case, subject to the rule of Simmons. We have not extended Simmons to cases where parole ineligibility has not been established as a matter of state law at the time of the jury’s future dangerousness deliberations in a capital case.Whether Ramdass may obtain relief under Simmons is governed by the habeas corpus statute,28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. III), which forbids relief unless the state-court adjudication of a federal claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” As explained in Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. ___, ___ (2000) (slip op., at 15), a state court acts contrary to clearly established federal law if it applies a legal rule that contradicts our prior holdings or if it reaches a different result from one of our cases despite confronting indistinguishable facts.