These claims are barred by the prohibition against second or successive petitions in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), and no new claims may be heard by this Court without an order from the Court of Appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Furthermore, it is difficult to see what Richardson seeks in reopening review of his habeas petition. The Moving Defendants were not parties in the previous habeas petition and they should not be parties to this complaint, whether presented as a Rule 60(b) motion or as a second or successive habeas petition.

As the petition was filed on the date that it was due, it is timely. 2 With respect to pro se defendants, the prison mailbox rule that applies incarcerated habeas petitioners also apples to state collateral motions in determining whether they are “properly filed” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) for purposes of tolling the AEDPA statute of limitations. Fernandez v. Artuz, 402 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2005).

That subsection contemplates an uninterrupted impediment from whose removal the one-year limitations period can be measured, 17 Case: 1:13-cv-03394 Document #: 20 Filed: 10/30/13 Page 17 of 36 PageID #:96 not a series of intermittent obstacles interlarded with significant time periods during which the obstacles are absent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) (contemplated measurement of limitations period from “the date on which the impediment to filing an application . . . is removed”); see also Estramera, 724 F.3d at 776-77 (allowing that lack of library access might constitute § 2244(d)(1)(B) “impediment” where petitioner alleged law-library access denied for one-year period “between June 2008 and July 2009”). Nor could the quality of the segregation libraries justify statutory tolling.

Indeed,it is far more draconian even than the federal timeliness requirement. See 28 U.S.C. §2244(d) (expressly allowing delayed filings where, for example, a petitioner could not have,in the exercise of due diligence, earlier discovered the factual predicate of his claim). Intervenor’s only defense for Proposition 66’s restrictive one-year timeliness provision is to suggest that “extreme cases might justify use of equitable tolling.”

Given that the Petitioner did not appeal the denial of his motion, the Respondent suggests the better interpretation of the AEDPA statutes is that the clock started again after denial of the Rule 30 motion. Section (d)(2) of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 only provides that the AEDPA time period is tolled while the collateral claim “is pending.” The Rule 30 motion ceased to be pending when denied and the Petitioner made no filing to stay the effect of that decision.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Therefore, the habeas petition, which is dated April 1, 2011, is timely.5 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 5 The original petition was signed on April 1, 2011 and filed with this Court on April 7, 2011.

The limitation period shall run from the latest of– (1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; (2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action; (3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable the court of appeals. Pet. App. F 1-2; see 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3); Poindexter v. Nash, 333 F.3d 372, 382 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1210 (2004).

The District Court concluded, and Ragan does not dispute, that his habeas petition was not filed within the one-year AEDPA limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The issue before us is whether he should be entitled to equitable tolling.

) .............................. 9 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2008) ............................................................................... 54 Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013) ....................................................... 16 Wright v. United States Postal Serv., 305 F. Supp. 2d 562 (D. Md. 2004) ....................... 20 Constitutional Provisions U.S. Const. amend. VIII .............................................................................................. passim Md. Const. art. II, § 20 ...................................................................................................... 10 Md. Declaration of Rights art. 25 ............................................................................... passim Case 1:16-cv-01021-ELH Document 23-1 Filed 07/08/16 Page 8 of 65 viii Statutes 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) ...................................................................................................... 28 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) ................................................................................................. 27 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ..................................................................................................... 2, 20, 27 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) ....................................................................................................... 27 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ........................................................................... 1, 2, 3, 17, 18, 20, 21, 27 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) ..................................................................................................... 3, 54 Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 3-502(2) ..................................................................... 43, 44 Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 3-502(3) ........................................................................... 43 Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 3-701(2) ......................................................................... 8, 9 Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. §

AEDPA’s statute of limitations is tolled during the time in which a “properly filed” state habeas petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A state habeas petition is “pending” as long as the ordinary state collateral review process continues.58 Accordingly, a “pending” petition generally includes the time “between a lower court decision and a filing of a new petition in a higher court.”