Neither version of the events surrounding Henderson’s murder offered by Jones or Perkins passes the normal test of logic. And that’s what makes the issue before the Supreme Court so critical: Jones’s testimony could be either the plausible truth or a patent lie.In 1996 Congress passed, and President Bill Clinton signed into law, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) which was codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). A major underpinning of AEDPA was to not only streamline but virtually eliminate the availability of the federal writ of habeas corpus to state prisoners who do not adhere to the strict procedural requirements governing access to the writ pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.Even before ADEPA, there were intense procedural obstacles a state prisoner had to mount in order to have a habeas petition heard under§ 2254.

seventh circuit decisionHabeas Procedure – Application for Successive Attack Application to extend the deadline for permission to file a second collateral attack, § 28 U.s.C. 2244(b), is premature:Now before the court are papers Maxy labels a motion, in which he informs us that he intends to file a second § 2244(b) application. Maxy explains that the application will be untimely because the prison limits his use of the copy machine, thereby delaying his ability to comply with the rules of this circuit.

Elsewhere, the Alabama Supreme Court has ordered a new trial in Ex parte McGriff, as the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the need of the state to disprove heat of passion beyond a reasonable doubt. In Johnson v. Dretke the Fifth Circuit has granted -- in a successive habeas case -- a COA on the issue of prosecutorial misconduct and due diligence to overcome the requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i). The Fifth Circuit has also granted a COA in Mines v. Dretke on Tennard and Penry IIissues.The web roundup this week notes posts from the CrimProf Blog & TalkLeft.This edition is archived on the web at: http://capitaldefenseweekly.com/archives/041220.htmAs always thanks for reading.

Under the AEDPA, a legal claim considered previously must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. S 2244(b)(1).[5] Even if we were to conclude that Babbitt's ineffective assistance of counsel claim (now grounded on allegations of his counsel's alcohol abuse during trial) was not previously presented, we would nonetheless deny Babbitt's application to file a successive petition on this ground because Babbitt fails to make a prima facie showing that he could not have previously discovered the facts underlying his claim through the exercise of due diligence.

People v. Anderson, 52 Cal. 3d 453 at 468 (1990) (citations ommitted). Accordingly, we reject Anderson's Caldwell claim.KREUTZER v. BOWERSOX (8th Cir11/15/00 - No. 99-3073) When petitioner's judgment became final under 28 USC 2244(d)(1), the one year statute of limitation for filing ahabeas action began running. Counsel's failure to recognize the importanceof the deadline does not equitably toll the running of the statute.

People v. Anderson, 52 Cal. 3d 453 at 468 (1990) (citations ommitted). Accordingly, we reject Anderson's Caldwell claim.KREUTZER v. BOWERSOX(8th Cir11/15/00 - No. 99-3073) When petitioner's judgment became final under 28 USC 2244(d)(1), the one year statute of limitation for filing ahabeas action began running. Counsel's failure to recognize the importanceof the deadline does not equitably toll the running of the statute.

DocketDecision below: 623 F. 3d 222 (5th Cir. 2010)Questions Presented (from SCOTUS docket page):1. WAS THERE JURISDICTION TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY UNDER 28 U.S.C. §2253(C) AND TO ADJUDICATE PETITIONER’S APPEAL?2. WAS THE APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OUT OF TIME UNDER 28 U.S.C. §2244(D)(1) DUE TO “THE DATE ON WHICH THE JUDGMENT BECAME FINAL BY THE CONCLUSION OF DIRECT REVIEW OR THE EXPIRATION OF THE TIME FOR SEEKING SUCH REVIEW”?SCOTUSblog pagePetition for certiorariBrief in oppositionPetitioner’s replyYet another habeas grant, involving (as habeas typically does) highly technical procedural issues. If you’re not a habeas practitioner, you won’t find much if anything of interest in this grant.Take the 2nd issue first. There’s a 1-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition, beginning on “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review,” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

To the contrary, if our post-AEDPA cases suggest anything about AEDPA’s relationship to Teague, it is that the AEDPA and Teague inquiries are distinct. See, e.g., Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 669—670 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (construing successive application provisions of AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412—413 (2000) (construing §2254(d)). Thus, in addition to performing any analysis required by AEDPA, a federal court considering a habeas petition must conduct a threshold Teague analysis when the issue is properly raised by the state.We reverse the Court of Appeals’ holding that “Teague is not implicated” by this case, 271 F.3d, at 543, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.Bell v. Virginia, 2002 Va. LEXIS 78 (VA 6/7/2002) Relief denied most notably on questions of Vienna Convention, right to an expert witness to address conditions relating to the future dangerous question and the meaning of the term "life without parole."

But he never appealed the district court's decision.Harvey has now brought the same claim for access to DNA evidence in this action. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3), successive habeas petitions may only be filed with leave of court. n2 In order to qualify as a successive petition, the dismissal of the first habeas petition must be on the merits.

First, he does not explain how his remaining claims—that his arrest warrants were not properly authenticated, that the state court records lacked issue dates of his arrest warrants, and that there was no record of his indictment being returned in open court—if proven, would establish his factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, especially given that he pleaded guilty to the armed robbery. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). Notably, Hammond also does not explain how the state court records associated with his 2012 conviction that he relies upon could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence before he filed his first § 2254 petition in 2016. See id. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i); In re Boshears, 110 F.3d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1997) (Authorization will not be granted for a claim predicated on facts that would have been uncovered through a “reasonable investigation” undertaken before the initial § 2254 petition was litigated.).