In 1948, Congress largely replaced traditional habeas actions for federal inmates with 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which allows federal inmates to challenge their convictions “upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, . . . or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” Id. § 2255(a). However, in a provision now located at § 2255(e), this so-called “motion to vacate” preserved federal inmates’ access to traditional habeas actions where a § 2255 motion “is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention.”Case BackgroundIn 2000, Petitioner Marcus DeAngelo Jones was convicted on one count of making false statements to acquire a firearm and two counts of possessing a firearm as a felon. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6), (g)(1). Jones later filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Although the district court initially dismissed his § 2255 motion, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that Jones’s trial counsel was ineffective for

In McCloud v. United States, the Second Circuit (Walker, Raggi, Nardini) rejected the petitioner’s contention that a development in Circuit law following a defendant’s conviction constitutes a newly-discovered fact extending the deadline for a defendant to file a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In so holding, the Second Circuit reached the same conclusion as the three other circuits to have addressed the question.

In May of 2009, Adams pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement to three of the eight counts: (1) robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count 2); (2) using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 3); and (3) being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (Count 8). The plea agreement contained a statement stating that Adams waived his right to challenge the conviction or sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 unless it was for ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. Based on his previous criminal history and total offense level, Adams received a total of 240 months.

After a three-day trial in September, McRae was convicted of all charges and was sentenced to 210 months imprisonment. McRae filed a petition in 2008 under 28 U.S.C § 2255 to vacate the sentence claiming ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and prosecutorial misconduct. Later without holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment and the Fourth Circuit determined that McRae could not appeal absent a Certificate of Appealability (COA).

injurious acts, directed at frustrating a California judgment, were manifested in the United States. Thus, looking to context, the majority sees no problem posed by any presumption against extraterritoriality or international comity. The dissenters argue that an injury to intangible property does not qualify as a “domestic injury” under RICO. The opposite holding by the majority strengthens the ability of U.S. domestic parties to combat attempts to hide assets to which those parties have valid legal claims when their adversaries are conspiring with foreign banks.While the alignment of Justices in the three cases previously discussed might strike at some preconceptions, there should be no surprise at the stark conservative/liberal division inJones v. Hendrix.Writing for the six jurisprudentially conservative members of the Court (with the three liberals—Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson—dissenting) Justice Thomas opined that the limitation on second or successivehabeas corpusmotions under 28 U.S.C. §2255 does not make the statute “inadequate or ineffective” such that the prisoner may proceed with his statutory claim under §2241. Therefore, a federal prisoner may not file a second or successive §2255 motion based solely on a more favorable interpretation of statutory law adopted after his conviction became final and his initial §2255 motion was resolved.The facts of the case are interesting. Jones was convicted in 2000 of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon and of making false official statements. He appealed to the Eighth Circuit and lost. He then filed a §2255 action which, in 2006, resulted in vacating one of his concurrent sentences but no other relief. Thirteen years later, when the Court abrogated an Eighth Circuit precedent as to the knowledge element of the gun crime, Jones tried to leverage this decision into a new collateral attack on his conviction. However, he could not satisfy the prerequisites for a new §2255 action—newly discovered evidence or a new rule of const

United States v. Mustafa, 406 F. App’x 526 (2d Cir. 2011).Approximately four years later, Kassir filed a pro-se petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, challenging only his conviction for distributing information relating to explosives, destructive devices, and weapons of mass destruction. His argument was that the definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2)(A)--for which he was convicted--is unconstitutionally vague, based on Supreme Court decisions invalidating similar language in other statutes.

In Simmons, the Court held that a prior North Carolina conviction will constitute a felony for purposes of an enhanced punishment only if the prior conviction was punishable for more than one year of imprisonment as to that defendant. Surratt and the Government agreed that only one of his prior convictions would qualify was a “felony drug offense” under Simmons.Hoping to capitalize on the Simmons decision, in the Fourth Circuit, Surratt filed another motion for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C § 2255. The Court denied the motion because it fell outside of the statutory exceptions enumerated under §2255.

In United States v. Garcia, Chief Judge Tymkovich, writing for the panel majority, acknowledged those reasons and rang the certiorari bell: "Regardless of how we, as a circuit, continue to handle these matters, the Supreme Court will have the final word." Stay tuned . . . .Indian CountryWant to learn more about subject matter jurisdiction and Indian Country? Read United States v. Antonio (finding evidence of territorial jurisdiction sufficient, and no procedural error).Crimes of violence; 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); 28 U.S.C. §2255 timeliness; actual innocenceFrom United States v. Bowen:"In short, we hold that United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), in which the Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is void for vagueness, created a new substantive rule that is retroactively applicable on collateral review, and we conclude that Bowen’s convictions for witness retaliation do not qualify as crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). Therefore, Bowen is actually innocent of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).

U.S. v. Snyder, 871 F.3d 1122 (9/21/17) (Wyo.Published) - With respect to Johnson and 28 USC § 2255, the 10th starts off with good timeliness and procedural default rulings. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3), a defendant's § 2255 motion is timely if filed within a year of "the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review."

The district court sentenced Ragin to 360 months in prison and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence.On October 1, 2010, Ragin moved to have has conviction and sentence vacated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, raising allegations accusing his counsel of providing ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court issued an order requesting an evidentiary hearing to be held to resolve Ragin’s ineffective assistance claim.