. Sol., 513 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court concluded that it was not plausible that the HFPA had power within the market for foreign reporting on American films given the organization’s small size and inability to exclude from the market non-member foreign journalists like plaintiffs.Plaintiffs’ right to fair procedure claim failed because that right, which guards against “arbitrary decisions by private organizations,” Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 997 P.2d 1153, 1156 (Cal. 2000), only applies to decisions made by entities that are quasi-public in nature. The HFPA is not quasi-public in nature because it does not provide particularly important goods or services, make representations about its members’ qualifications, or enjoy legislative recognition as a quasi-public association. The HFPA’s ability to produce economic or professional harm, non-profit status, and connection to the film industry did not alter this analysis. Finally, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) barred plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief. That provision makes declaratory relief unavailable “with respect to Federal taxes.” Plaintiffs’ request for a declaration that the HFPA’s bylaws are inconsistent with its tax-exempt status was tantamount to a request for a declaration that the HFPA had violated federal tax law, and so § 2201(a)’s jurisdictional bar applied.[View source.]

The preliminary injunction in the separate ’841 patent infringement litigation was only “preliminary,” and there was no final determination as to the validity, infringement, or enforceability of the ’841 patent. Next, the Court analyzed whether the district court had abused its discretion in declining to entertain the suit pursuant to its broad discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act. The Court reviewed the language of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5), analyzed how it impacts a district court’s general grant of discretion in 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and upheld discretionary decisions declining jurisdiction in DJ actions. However, the Court also found that, “while the Declaratory Judgment Act does ‘confer on federal courts unique and substantial discretion’ to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction, that discretion is not unbounded.” Slip op. at 15 (citations omitted).

for example, “any work done by [Wilson] in this action be irrelevant in subsequent litigation because of the ultimate merits decision in this case.” Id.On Wilson’s motion to dismiss the entire complaint for lack of standing, it argued that there was no real or substantial controversy with Corning because Wilson had sued Corning’s customers, not Corning itself, for infringement. Id. In particular, Wilson pointed out that Corning lacked standing on the asserted methods patents because only Corning’s customers practiced those claims. Corning responded that there were common issues between itself and its customers related to infringement and validity of the asserted patents, and that Wilson had previously asserted the patents-in-suit against Corning in a 2013 lawsuit. Id. Corning also noted that Wilson had relied on Corning’s instructions for its HYPERStack products to support the infringement claims against its customers. Id.Judge Frank began by noting that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28U.S.C. §2201(a), has the same case or controversy requirement as Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at *6. He explained that a supplier can have declaratory judgment jurisdiction if “(a) the supplier is obligated to indemnify its customers from infringement liability or (b) there is a controversy between the patentee and the supplier as to the supplier’s liability for induced or contributory infringement based on the alleged acts of direct infringement by its customers.” Id. (quoting Arris Grp., Inc. v. British Telecomm’s PLC, 639 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).Judge Frank identified that Wilson had expressly stated in an earlier letter that it would be bringing a standalone lawsuit over the patents against Corning based on its customers’ use of HYPERStack. Id. Notably, this letter was purportedly sent as a settlement communication related to the 2013 lawsuit, but Judge Frank found that it could be properly considered under Fed. R. Evid. 408(a), because that rule prohibits the use of settle

It provides that in “a case of actual controversy … any court of the United States … may declare the rights and legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (emphasis added). Accordingly, it vests federal district courts with the discretion to decide whether to hear a claim seeking declaratory relief.Federal appellate courts have developed various approaches in determining whether a district court properly exercised its discretion to hear, or not to hear, a declaratory judgment action.

However, the insurer cannot easily abandon its insured during an ongoing lawsuit or it risks breaching its insurance contract with the insured and becoming exposed to all the damages that the plaintiff seeks. Accordingly, while providing a defense, the insurer files a new lawsuit in a federal district court – i.e. a Declaratory Judgment Action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure – asking the court to declare whether and to what extent coverage applies, and names all the first-filed litigants as necessary parties. Accordingly, there are now two separate lawsuits in two separate courts that the parties must simultaneously litigate.

Result: The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Court explained that “[u]nder the Declaratory Judgment Act, a federal court may issue a declaration resolving the parties’ competing legal rights ‘[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes.’” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). That rule reflects “congressional antipathy for premature interference with the assessment or collection of any federal tax” and means that “declaratory judgments and injunctions are rarely, if ever, granted.”

See, e.g., Forrester Environmental Servs., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Tech., Inc., 715 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (declining federal jurisdiction over state defamation action based on defendant’s statements that plaintiff was a patent infringer).See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

By Memorandum Opinion entered by The Honorable Colm F. Connolly in Power Integrations, Inc. v. CogniPower LLC, Civil Action No. 20-15-CFC (D.Del. July 1, 2020), the Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss counts 3, 4, and 5 of the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) after finding that Plaintiff failed to establish declaratory judgment jurisdiction for the claims.Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 that two of its products and the use of those products do not directly or indirectly infringe any of the three patents-in-suit owned by Defendant. Id. at *2.

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on its own volition remanded a Pittsburgh restaurant’s lawsuit seeking insurance coverage for business interruption losses stemming from the COVID-19 shutdown. The court questioned but did not determine whether it had diversity jurisdiction over the case, but instead exercised its discretionary authority to decline jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. s 2201(a). The court applied a balancing test, but the scale was tipped against federal court jurisdiction due to the novel insurance coverage issues under Pennsylvania law “best reserved for the state court to resolve in the first instance.”

But, before reaching the question of validity of the trademark registrations, the district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201(a)) confers a district court the power to “declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration” in “a case of actual controversy.” Where a plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment with respect to a trademark, a plaintiff in the Second Circuit must allege that it “has engaged in a course of conduct evidencing a definite intent and apparent ability to commence use of the marks on the product.”