After trial, the jury awarded Ascion more than $2.5 million for unpaid commissions. Following the jury verdict, Ascion moved for fees and costs under two federal statues and a written agreement between the parties: (a) 35 U.S.C. § 285, (b) 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and (c) a pre-litigation “Commission Agreement” that had been entered into by the parties before litigation began. Notably, Ascion’s motion sought fees not only from the defendant, Ruoey Lung Enterprise Corp., but also from the defendant’s pre-trial counsel, Wang, Hartmann, Gibbs & Cauley (“WHGC”).

Absent Misrepresentation, a Party May Rely on a Favorable JMOL Determination and Jury Verdict as Objective Evidence That Its Infringement Claims Are Not Frivolous 09-1058 April 26, 2010 Decision Last Month at the Federal Circuit - May 2010Judges: Newman, Lourie (concurring), Bryson (author) [Appealed from: D. Colo., Judge Matsch] In Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v. BrainLAB Medizinische Computersysteme GmbH, Nos. 09-1058, -1059 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 26, 2010), the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of attorney fees against Medtronic Navigation, Inc. (“Medtronic”) under 35 U.S.C. § 285 based on its continued efforts to pursue the case after an adverse claim construction decision, and alleged litigation misconduct. The Court also reversed the decision to hold Medtronic’s counsel jointly liable for the attorney fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and its inherent powers. In 1998, plaintiff Medtronic brought a patent infringement action against BrainLAB Medizinische Computersysteme GmbH (“BrainLAB”).

A forensic investigation of Dillon’s laptop computer revealed that Dillon had provided his copy of the loan agreement to his attorneys on October 1, 2013 — one week before the original complaint in the suit was filed. Nevertheless, Dillon’s counsel continuously challenged the authenticity of the loan agreement, at the same time his law firm had a copy identical to the one that Generations claimed was genuine.Based on these actions, Generations moved for sanctions under the district court’s inherent authority and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Id. at *6.

Throughout the course of the FCA litigation, the district court voiced its concerns that the FCA suit was frivolous and had been brought purely for retaliatory reasons. The district court even went so far as to warn the relator and his counsel that unless it became apparent that the claims had evidentiary support, they would both be subject to sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4). At the close of discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment and sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4), both of which were granted by the court.

The court found that the defendant met the required “exceptional case” standard of § 285 based on the unreasonable way in which the patent-owner litigated the case. Though the court awarded attorney fees under § 285, the court denied the defendant’s request for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, because there was no evidence of bad faith by the plaintiff’s counsel in pursuing the litigation.Section 35 of the Patent Act permits courts to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in exceptional cases.

lawyers, including David Boies, filed the case, Robertson v. Cuban, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. They allege their clients relied on Cuban’s endorsement of the Voyager cryptocurrency platform in October 2021 when creating their Voyager accounts and investing their funds. Voyager filed for bankruptcy protection in July 2022, losing hundreds of millions in investors’ funds. The plaintiffs allege the platform illegally sold unregistered securities through the Voyager platform.The initial complaint included two Florida plaintiffs, Rachel Gold and Pierce Robertson, who both alleged that they heard Cuban’s endorsement of the Voyager platform and relied on it to invest in cryptocurrency through Voyager. Two months later, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. In April 2023, they attempted to file a second amended complaint to add additional class representatives from Florida.The defense opposed the motion to amend and filed a motion for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Under that statute, a court may require an attorney “who so multiples the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously … to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”Cuban’s counsel argues that the court should personally sanction one of the plaintiffs’ counsel — but not the plaintiffs themselves — for “patently false assertions in the complaint and other filings.”The motion claims that Gold falsely represented herself as a Voyager account holder when instead she opened an account in her husband’s name. This fact impacts Gold’s standing and her ability to bring a claim because, under Florida law, only purchasers may bring unregistered securities claims.Additionally, the motion argues that Robertson falsely alleged that he relied on Cuban’s endorsement of Voyager when opening his account in the summer of 2021. Voyager first approached Cuban in August 2021, and Cuban made his first public statement endorsing

Gust, Inc. v. AlphaCap Ventures, LLC, Appeal No. 2017-2414 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 28, 2018) In an appeal from a district court decision awarding fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, the Federal Circuit reversed. The decision makes it more difficult for parties sued by non-practicing entities to recover the costs of litigation from the plaintiff’s attorneys.

On September 20, a United States District judge for the Northern District of California granted defendant United Recovery System’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs arising from its successful defense of a lawsuit based on alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the California Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, also known as the Rosenthal Act. URS sought more than $60,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs under the FDCPA, the Rosenthal Act, and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James found that attorneys’ fees and costs were warranted against plaintiff Simonett Forto’s counsel under the Rosenthal Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, but not the FDCPA.

On December 8, 2016, District Judge Denise Cote (S.D.N.Y.) granted defendants Gust, Inc.’s (hereinafter, “Gust”) motion for attorneys’ fees and costs under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 against plaintiff AlphaCap Ventures, LLC (hereinafter, “AlphaCap”) and its counsel.Background In January 2015, AlphaCap, despite having knowledge of the decision in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) and its implications for its patents, initiated ten patent infringement actions in the Eastern District of Texas against every major entity that provides internet crowdfunding services. Gust answered AlphaCap’s complaint in March 2015 with six counterclaims, seeing a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity on each of the three patents-in-suit.

Although Lapolla Industries, Inc. won the dismissal with prejudice, it still spent two years defending a case that it claims never should have been brought.Indeed, the plaintiffs’ own expert concluded that the SPF compounds would not negatively impact health, and the levels were well below permissible and recommended exposure limits.Lapolla used the plaintiffs’ expert to turn the tables against plaintiffs and their attorneys arguing for (1) sanctions against the attorneys who failed to produce draft expert reports and emails, and (2) attorneys’ fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which authorizes federal courts to shift fees and costs against any attorney who multiplies the proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously.Sanction powers, like 28 U.S.C. § 1927, can bring a measure of fairness to mass tort litigation, where plaintiffs’ attorneys use the “cost of defense” to force settlements regardless of the merits.