Bruce v. Samuels, USSC No. 14-844, 2016 WL 112684 (January 12, 2016), affirmingPinson v. Samuels, 761 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) of the federal Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis must pay 20% of his or her existing income toward the filing fee of a case he or she files until the fee is paid. The federal circuit courts were split when it came to applying this requirement to prisoners who owed fees for more than one case.

On June 8, 2020, the Supreme Court decided Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, No. 18-8369, holding that the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) prevents a prisoner who has had at least three lawsuits dismissed because they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted from bringing another suit without paying the requisite filing fee, regardless of whether the prior dismissals were with or without prejudice.The PLRA precludes a prisoner from suing without paying a filing fee (otherwise known as proceeding in forma pauperis or “IFP”) if any court has previously dismissed three or more of his or her suits as frivolous or malicious or because they failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).A Colorado prison inmate had three prior lawsuits against corrections officers, prosecutors, and judges dismissed.

Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, USSC No. 18-8369, 2020 WL 3038282, 6/8/20, affirming 754 Fed. Appx. 756 (10th Cir. 2018); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)The federal Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) bars a prisoner from being able to file a lawsuit without first paying filing fees if the prisoner has “three strikes”—that is, has had three or more prior suits dismissed because they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The issue here is whether the dismissal had to be with prejudice, or whether a dismissal without prejudice counts, too.

Question presented:When a prisoner files more than one case or appeal in the federal courts in forma pauperis, does 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) cap the monthly exaction of filing fees at 20% of the prisoner’s monthly income regardless of the number of cases or appeals for which he owes filing fees?Lower court decision: Pinson v. Samuels, 761 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014)DocketScotusblog pageUnder § 1915(b)(2), enacted as part of the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act, prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis must each month pay 20% of their existing income towards a federal case or appeal’s filing fee until satisfying the entire filing fee. Five circuits (including the D.C. Circuit in this case, and our own Seventh Circuit) hold that where a prisoner has more than one federal case or appeal for which a filing fee is or remains owed, § 1915(b)(2) requires the prisoner to make a separate monthly 20% installment payment for each such filing fee.

But under the federal Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, a “three strikes” provision precludes IFPstatus to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated …, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). But what if the prisoner is appealing one of the “strikes” and the appeal is still pending; does it still count as a “strike”?

The result: Expensive litigation of often meritless lawsuits with virtually no chance of collecting costs as a prevailing party.The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (PLRA), is an invaluable tool for dealing with the most troublesome of prisoner plaintiffs — the serial filers. Although relatively unknown to most non-criminal-law practitioners, a review of the requirements of the PLRA is beneficial for counsel representing pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers defending claims filed by prisoners.In 1996, Congress passed the PLRA in response to concerns that prisoner lawsuits had “grown astronomically—from 6,600 in 1975 to more than 39,000 in 1994.”

The District Court dismissed the suit under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995’s “three-strikes rule,” which prevents a prisoner from bringing an IFP suit (i.e., without first paying the filing fee), if he has three or more prior suits “dismissed on the ground that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §1915(g). The Tenth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Lomax’s argument that two of his prior lawsuits did not count as strikes because they were dismissed for failure to state a claim, but without prejudice. Today, the Court affirmed, holding that the broad language of Section 1915(g) applies to dismissals issued both with and without prejudice to a plaintiff’s ability to reassert his claim in a later action.

Long, long ago, when we clerked for a federal district judge, we handled more than a few prisoner cases. We have to confess that many of the ones we saw were humorous to us, because they alleged a range of perceived slights and personal affronts as violations of their constitutional rights. (As readers know, we take constitutional rights seriously. That applies to prisoners too, but we are talking about allegations regarding the purported right to masturbate and the purported right to be free of guards claiming they were having sex with the prisoner’s wife.) Some of the prisoner plaintiffs were frequent flyers. Because prisoners are often allowed to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. §1915, without filing fees and with time on their hands, some prisoners brought case after case. Some of them may have thought their cases were all well founded and some may have found them good ways to pass the time. We are not sure what they thought, but we know that §1915 allows the courts overseeing such a case to dismiss it sua sponte if the court determines at any time that “the action or appeal—(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii)seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” The frequent flyers we saw back then were flagged to get a substantive review of their complaints with their pauperis applications. Many of those cases ended at that point.We know of nothing like this screening procedure for frequent flyers who pay filing fees, but maybe there should be. The cottage industry of “patent trolls” who tend to bring case after case in a single district court has been well described. There are a

The Court's decision is available here. Coleman v. Tollefson, No. 13-1333: Although a federal litigant who is too poor to pay court fees may proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. §1915, a “three strikes” provision prevents a court from granting such status to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated . . ., brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” §1915(g).

Earlier this month, a district court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed on its own initiative a Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) claim brought by a consumer alleging inaccurate reporting of her charged-off vehicle loan. The court’s opinion in Shelton v. Americredit Financial Services, Inc. provides a nuts-and-bolts analysis of what does not constitute inaccurate credit reporting for purposes of the FCRA.The pro se plaintiff in Shelton alleged that her lender violated the FCRA by erroneously reporting her auto loan as charged-off, i.e., written off as a loss and closed. In conjunction with the filing of her complaint, the plaintiff successfully moved the court to allow her to proceed without prepayment of fees or costs under the federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915. In granting the motion, however, the court undertook its additional responsibility required under the statute — screening the complaint to ensure that it stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. Despite the liberal construction typically afforded to pleadings filed by pro se litigants, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim.As summarized by the court, § 1681s-2(b) imposes a duty on furnishers to ensure that their reporting of consumer credit information to credit reporting agencies is accurate. Additionally, upon notice of a consumer’s dispute concerning the accuracy of information reported, a furnisher must investigate the dispute and, if appropriate, correct the inaccuracy. Thus, a threshold showing of inaccuracy is an essential element in pleading a § 1681s-2(b) claim. According to the court, this is where the plaintiff’s complaint came up short.In its analysis, the court noted initially the complaint’s admission that the plai