The JSSA requires that the district's jury plan “prescribe some other source or sources of names” in addition to the usual source list “where necessary to foster the policy and protect the rights secured by” the fair cross-section guarantee. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1861. A substantial failure under the Act does not require Defendant to show prejudice.

Id. The Policy implemented by the District Court under its “plan” under Title 28, Section 1863 states as follows: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1861, all litigants "have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community." The court uses a two-step process to select jurors.

It is further the policy of the United States that all citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit juries in the district courts of the United States, and shall have an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (emphasis added). 3 Although Defendant Springer claims that the term “district” or “division” as used in Section 1861 is not defined by Congress, the term “division” is defined at Title 28, United States Code Section 1869(e).

Defendants’ application should be denied on this basis alone. Further, under the statute, defendants must first demonstrate that the information is “necessary” to show “a substantial failure to comply” with the Jury Selection Act, 28 U.S.C. §1861 et seq. (the “Act”). See 28 U.S.C. §1867(c), (f).

Under the Jury Selection and Service Act, parties are entitled to “a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes.” 28 U.S.C. § 1861. A party to a civil lawsuit may move to stay the proceedings prior to voir dire on the basis that the district court has substantially failed to comply with this mandate.

Beacon Journal Publ’g Co. v. Bond, 781 N.E.2d 180, 192 (Ohio 2002) (right of access extends to juror names and addresses); People v. Mitchell (In re Juror Names), 592 N.W.2d 798 (Mich. App. 1999) (“privacy concerns alone, unaccompanied by safety concerns, are not sufficient” to deny access to juror identities, and ordering juror names and addresses released); Des Moines Register & Tribune Co. v. Osmundson, 248 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1976) (jury list a public record subject to statutory right of access in Iowa). Case 1:11-cr-00161-CCE Document 296 Filed 05/23/12 Page 7 of 12 8 B. Access to Jurors’ Identity is Mandated by Federal Law The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 (28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq.) prescribes the manner in which federal jurors are to be selected and to serve. In addition to such things as describing the parameters of the jury pool (“a fair cross section of the community”) and providing there shall be no discrimination in service, the Act requires each U.S. district court to “devise and place into operation a written plan” that addresses a number of issues.

The undersigned counsel hereby submits that Judge LAND’s participation in this case as a complaining witness in what at the very least amounts to a quasi- criminal prosecution violates Plaintiff’s due process rights as explicated in several Supreme Court cases namely Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927), In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), and Ward v. Village of Monroeville 409 U.S. 57, 61 (1972). In particular, it is obvious that under no circumstances will or would Judge LAND ever allow Plaintiff to submit any facts or mixed questions of fact and law to a jury, despite the guarantees of the 7th Amendment, the public policies articulated by 28 U.S.C. §1861, and Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Case 4:09-cv-00106-CDL Document 24 Filed 10/02/2009 Page 14 of 24 Motion to Recuse the Honorable Clay D. Land, M.D. Georgia, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§144 and 455(a) 15 There is circumstantial evidence (Exhibit A) suggesting that, in fact Judge LAND was influenced by prior association or direct ex-parte communications with Attorney General Eric Holder, acting as agent on behalf of de facto President Obama.

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS ____________________________________ ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) ) v. ) CRIMINAL NO. 04-10029-GAO ) DANIEL E. CARPENTER ) ____________________________________) DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO INSPECT GRAND JURY SELECTION RECORDS PURSUANT TO THE JURY SELECTION AND SERVICE ACT Defendant Daniel E. Carpenter, through undersigned counsel, respectfully moves to inspect all grand jury selection records available under the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 (the “Act”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861 et seq. Because Mr. Carpenter’s request satisfies the Act’s requirements for access to grand jury selection records by a criminal defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 1867, this Court should grant the motion and provide Mr. Carpenter, his attorneys and his jury consultant with immediate access to all of the documents relating to the impaneling of the grand jury or grand juries (collectively, the “Grand Jury”) that returned the indictment against Mr. Carpenter on February 4, 2004 (Dkt.