This does not comply with the statutory requirement that “[a] receipt or other evidence of actual cost shall be furnished.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(1). Only the documentation that appears to relate to Gabriel Antonio Alvarez Arguello’s ground transportation appears to comply with the requirement that it be at the most economical rate reasonably available, see 18 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(1), but Dole provides no explanation why it includes bills for cab fare from the airport to the Marriott and back that appear to be connected with attendance at hearing beginning on September 1, 2009, but also charges from August 27, 2009, and 10 See http://www.marriott.com/hotels/maps/travel/miajw-jw-marriott-hotel-miami/ 11 See Dole’s Exhibit C at 4.

Witnesses may also be paid a “travel allowance equal to the mileage allowance … for official travel of employees of the Federal Government,” 28 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2), and a “subsistence allowance … in an amount not to exceed the maximum per diem allowance prescribed by the Administrator of General Services … for official travel in the area of attendance by employees of the Federal Government.” 28 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2). Wilson and Roach were subpoenaed as stated above in item 2.

Payment is generally mandatory. See 28 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (“Except as otherwise provided by law, a witness in attendance at any court of the United States, or before a United States Magistrate Judge, or before any person authorized to take his deposition pursuant to any rule or order of a court of the United States, shall be paid the fees and allowances provided by this section.”).

Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 98 C 0505, 2003 WL 1908032, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2003). Second, Chapterhouse concedes that the subsistence allowance is capped by statute, see § 1821(d)(3), and was $171 per diem at the time of trial, see Per Diem Rates Look-Up, http://www.gsa.gov/portal/category/100120 (last visited Oct. 20, 2013). The only objection that GW raised with respect to the subsistence allowance for Dr. Grindley and Mr. Nagy1 was that the amount claimed exceeded the per diem. Thus, Chapterhouse should be awarded its requested eight days for Dr. Grindley2 and three days for Mr. Nagy, totaling $1,881 for these two witnesses. 3. Printing costs Section 1920 allows a court to tax as costs the prevailing party’s “[f]ees and disbursements for printing,” 28 U.S.C. § 1920(3), and “the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case,” id. § 1920(4).

J.) Witnesses, however, are normally required to utilize common carriers “at the most economical rate reasonably available.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(1). Case 5:03-cv-02289-JW Document 360 Filed 06/16/2006 Page 6 of 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case No.

NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 916 F.Supp. 751, 764 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1821, all but $40 of Plaintiff’s request for $42,600.20 in expert fees related to Thomas Ueno must be denied. VI.

See Id. at *13. Section 1821(c)(4) provides: “All normal travel expenses within and outside the judicial district shall be taxable as costs pursuant to section 1920 of this title.’” Id. at *12.

367, 368 (BIA 1973) (noting that the legislative history of the INA reveals that Congress intended administrative parole to be used to bring in noncitizens for the “purposes of prosecution” (quoting S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 12-13)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (declaring “aliens who have been paroled into the 5 In contrast, when a court vacates an involuntarily deported defendant’s plea that was the basis for deportation, the defendant may be able to resume lawful status, allowing reentry into the United States to face re-prosecution. The court’s vacatur allows for a resumption of status.

This is clearly wrong. In Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987)the Supreme Court held that “absent explicit statutory or contractual authorization for the taxation of the expenses of a litigant’s witness as costs, federal courts are bound by the limitations set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1821 and § 1920.” (finding court had no authority to award expert witness fees beyond those permitted by § 1821 absent statutory or contractual authority).37 The Clayton Act does not give this authority, merely allowing for recovery of “cost 36 See also W. Va. Univ.

15 U.S.C. § 26 requires the Court to award the “cost of suit,” including a reasonable attorney’s fee, to any injured plaintiff who “substantially prevails” in an action for injunctive relief under the Clayton Act. For many years, courts in the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Clayton Act strictly to permit recovery of only those costs taxable under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1920 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 224 (9th Cir. 1964).