In Phillips, the Seventh Circuit held that the Court is authorized to consider the consequence of a transfer before deciding to transfer which implies that the Court “take a peek at the merits,” since whether or not Plaintiff’s claims have any possible merit bears significantly on whether the Court should transfer or dismiss the Plaintiff’s case. The Seventh Circuit went on to hold that that a Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 is limited, which creates a power of limited review, that should reveal that “a case is a sure loser in the court that has jurisdiction over it, then the court in which it initially was filed did not have jurisdiction, should dismiss the case rather than waste time of another court.” Phillips, at 610-11.

Plaintiff has admitted that, even after extensive discovery on the issue, it was unable to find “something more” that would permit this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Feitian under the Delaware long-arm statute. Moreover, Plaintiff’s attempt to establish jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) is misguided as Plaintiff did not show that Feitian would not be subject to jurisdiction in any other state. Finally, transfer is not appropriate because 28 U.S.C. § 1631 applies only if the transferor court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant, which is not the case here. MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP /s/ Rodger D. Smith II Rodger D. Smith II (#3778) 1201 N. Market Street P.O. Box 1347 Wilmington, DE 19899-1347 (302) 658-9200 rsmith@mnat.com Attorneys for Defendants Feitian Technologies Co., Ltd. and RS-Computer OF COUNSEL: Matthew G. Reeves Locke Liddell & Sapp LLP 600 Travis Street 3400 JP Morgan Chase Tower Houston, TX 77002 (713) 226-1200 January 2, 2007 Case 1:05-cv-00149-GMS Document 84 Filed 01/02/2007 Page 12 of 13 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Rodger D. Smith II, hereby certify that on January 2, 2007, I caused to be electronically filed the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF DEFENDANT FEITIAN TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD. IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION, which will send notification of such filing(s) to the following: David S. Eagle Patrick A. Cost

ORDER Upon consideration of Plaintiff William A. Long’s Motion to Dismiss without prejudice, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED, and that this action is hereby dismissed without prejudice; SO ORDERED ______________________ Hon. Rudolph Contreras United States District Judge _______________________ Washington, D.C. Case 1:15-cv-00605-RC Document 29 Filed 06/02/16 Page 16 of 17 17 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WILLIAM A. LONG, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) ) ) Case No. 1:15-cv-00605 v. ) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HOUSING ) AUTHORITY, and ) ) ADRIANNE TODMAN, in her official capacity ) as the Executive Director of the District of ) Columbia Housing Authority, ) ) Defendants. ) ORDER Upon consideration of Plaintiff William A. Long’s 28 U.S.C. § 1631 Motion to Transfer and Motion to Dismiss without prejudice, and Defendants’ consent to a stay of the briefing schedule, it is hereby ORDERED that the briefing schedule is stayed pending a resolution to Plaintiff’s motions; SO ORDERED ______________________ Hon. Rudolph Contreras United States District Judge _______________________ Washington, D.C. Case 1:15-cv-00605-RC Document 29 Filed 06/02/16 Page 17 of 17

There are no statutes of limitation or other bars preventing Plaintiff from re-filing this lawsuit in another jurisdiction, if it chooses so. Therefore, transfer under Section 1631 or Section 1404(a) is not appropriate, and the Court should simply dismiss this action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Case 1:05-cv-00149-GMS Document 88 Filed 01/12/2007

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant but that transfer to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois is in the interests of justice. Accordingly, this case will be transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. All other arguments not expressly considered are deemed to be without merit.

Case 1:06-cv-01668-UNA Document 6 Filed 05/04/2007 Page 18 of 20 15 is transferred on the date upon which it was actually filed in or noticed for the court from which it was transferred. 28 U.S.C. § 1631. It is in the interest of justice for this Court to preserve the status quo by transferring the action, where the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the same general subject matter and must ultimately consider, for example, the same or similar issues of client access and discovery that have been extensively briefed in the District Court. Transfer to the Court of Appeals will also keep alive whatever rights Petitioners may have as a consequence of having filed their habeas Petition prior to the enactment of the purported habeas-stripping provisions in the MCA.

CONCLUSION The Fifth Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review Plaintiffs’ claims and therefore this Court does not. The Court should dismiss the action or transfer it to the Fifth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. In the alternative, in light of the ongoing agency proceedings regarding the ELG Rule that is at the heart of Plaintiffs’ challenge, the Court should stay all proceedings in this case until August 25, 2017, and direct the parties to file motions to govern further proceedings on that date.

See, e.g., Gerena v. Korb, 617 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that “in the interest of justice” is present in all three transfer provisions, so district judge need Case 1:13-cv-03659-CC Document 18 Filed 08/19/14 Page 16 of 27 17 not specify a specific provision); Allegheny Techs., Inc. v. Strecker, 2007 WL 852547, *16 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (transfer warranted under §§ 1404(a), 1406(a) and 1631 “in the interest of justice”). Regardless of the approach, the conclusion in this case is the same: this action belongs in the Middle District of Florida.

Such a transfer would conflict with § 1631 and amount to an improper continued exercise of jurisdiction by this Court. Even in cases where § 1631 transfer is available, the terms of § 1631 provide that a transferred case “shall proceed [in the transferee Case 1:05-cv-02349-UNA Document 25 Filed 05/14/2007 Page 7 of 13 -4- court] as if it had been filed in or noticed for the court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was actually filed in or noticed for the court from which it is transferred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1631. That means that if transfer were authorized under § 1631, further proceedings in the Court of Appeals would be governed by procedures appropriate to review in the Court of Appeals, not by the procedures that were imposed by this Court for the purposes of habeas corpus litigation.

Such a transfer would conflict with § 1631 and amount to an improper continued exercise of jurisdiction by this Court. Even in cases where § 1631 transfer is available, the terms of § 1631 provide that a transferred case “shall proceed [in the transferee Case 1:05-cv-01124-UNA Document 64 Filed 05/14/2007 Page 7 of 13 -4- court] as if it had been filed in or noticed for the court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was actually filed in or noticed for the court from which it is transferred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1631. That means that if transfer were authorized under § 1631, further proceedings in the Court of Appeals would be governed by procedures appropriate to review in the Court of Appeals, not by the procedures that were imposed by this Court for the purposes of habeas corpus litigation.