The bankruptcy court explained that after plan confirmation, a bankruptcy court’s “related to” jurisdiction is limited to matters that are closely connected to plan implementation, and the claims raised in the adversary proceeding did not have a sufficient nexus to implementation of the plan.The Trustee did not appeal the bankruptcy court’s ruling, but instead moved to transfer the adversary proceeding to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Section 1631 provides:Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section 610 of this title or an appeal, including a petition for review of administrative action, is noticed for or filed with such a court and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such court in which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed, and the action or appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed in or noticed for the court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was actually filed in or noticed for the court from which it is transferred.

9B suit brought by the Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston ("FHLBB"), alleging that Moody's Corp and Moody's Investor's Service, Inc. (together, "Moody's") knowingly provided false ratings on certain Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities purchased by FHLBB. The case had been dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction by Judge George A. O'Toole Jr. of the District of Massachusetts, who also held that the court could not transfer the case to another federal court where jurisdiction would be proper because 28 U.S.C. §1631 only permitted the transfer of cases dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than personal jurisdiction.The First Circuit vacated that decision, concluding that the plain language of 28 U.S.C. §1631, the statute's legislative history, and case law from other Circuits all weighed in favor of a ruling that the statute also permits transfer where the claims at issue were dismissed on either personal or subject matter jurisdiction grounds. Accordingly, the First Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether transfer was "in the interests of justice," in accord with the statutory requirement for transfer under 28 U.S.C. §1631.

9B suit brought by the Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston (“FHLBB”), alleging that Moody’s Corp and Moody’s Investor’s Service, Inc. (together, “Moody’s”) knowingly provided false ratings on certain Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities purchased by FHLBB. The case had been dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction by Judge George A. O’Toole Jr. of the District of Massachusetts, who also held that the court could not transfer the case to another federal court where jurisdiction would be proper because 28 U.S.C. §1631 only permitted the transfer of cases dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than personal jurisdiction. The First Circuit vacated that decision, concluding that the plain language of 28 U.S.C. §1631, the statute’s legislative history, and case law from other Circuits all weighed in favor of a ruling that the statute also permits transfer where the claims at issue were dismissed on either personal or subject matter jurisdiction grounds.

CAFC Opinion, CAFC ArgumentDavid Netzer Consulting Engineer LLC v. Shell Oil Co., No. 17-946Questions Presented:State action that is wholly arbitrary or irrational is a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Statute 28 U.S.C. § 1631 provides that it is mandatory and in the interest of justice that the Fifth Circuit must transfer a case once it determines that it does not have jurisdiction. Since the congress conferred the mandatory right of transfer, the Fifth Circuit cannot arbitrarily and capriciously decide not to transfer an appeal without providing reasoned analysis.

But the District Court “had a statutory obligation to transfer the claims against that defendant to another district court where personal jurisdiction would be present.” Either or both of 28 U.S.C. §1406(a) or 28 U.S.C. §1631 (the latter of which deals expressly with “want of jurisdiction”) call for transfer “if it is in the interest of justice.” Since the District Court’s action here “flowed solely from its mistaken application of the first-filed rule,” the dismissal of Chiquita was error.Finally, the court ruled that a decision in a Louisiana federal District Court to dismiss a parallel case on timeliness grounds was not res judicata as to the Delaware action.

Yet, rather than terminating the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit found a way out. Because the misfiling was an honest mistake of counsel, the appellate court exercised its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1631---which allows a court to transfer a case from the wrong court to the right court “in the interest of justice”---and transferred the appeal to the Federal Circuit as if the appeal had been timely filed in that court to start with.The Ninth Circuit explained that such a transfer would be in the interest of justice unless it was apparent that the appeal was frivolous or filed in bad faith. The Court distanced itself from the approach taken in some other circuits, in which the appellate court first “peeks at the merits” of the case to determine whether it is sufficiently meritorious to justify saving the appeal.Thus, in these two cases the Ninth Circuit addressed two “jurisdictional” errors caused by honest mistakes by counsel.

However, rather than dismiss the appeal which, depending on certain timing issues would likely have barred Amity from refiling the appeal in the Federal Circuit, the Ninth Circuit decided to order that the appeal be transferred to the Federal Circuit. In reliance on 28 U.S.C. section 1631, the Ninth Circuit concluded that it had the authority to transfer the appeal to a federal court of competent jurisdiction provided: “(1) the Court to which the appeal is to be transferred would have had jurisdiction at the time the appeal was filed; and (2) transfer is `in the interest of justice’.” The Ninth Circuit also recognized that it could order the transfer of the appeal on its own without Amity filing a motion for such transfer.

It was undisputed, however, that Robert was not and had never been in deportation proceedings. Thus, the court had no jurisdiction over Ashton’s petition for review because the petition for review was from Ashton’s denied motion to reopen his visa petition, not an order of removal against Robert.Additionally, the court determined that 28 U.S.C. § 1631 did not apply to this case. This section provides that when a petition for review is filed in a court that lacks jurisdiction, “the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action . . . to any other such court in which . . . the action could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed.”

The D.D.C. dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that after the 1999 amendments to the Patent Act, § 145 proceedings could not be maintained by patent owners. The D.D.C. then attempted to transfer the case to the Federal Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. The Federal Circuit first held that the D.D.C. erred in dismissing the case since a transfer is not proper when combined with a dismissal, but held that it would review the case as though properly transferred.

9, No. 10.) In Zoltek’s continuing saga of seeking compensation for the alleged infringement of its patent, the Federal Circuit now concluded (en banc) that the issue was whether the Court of Federal Claims properly allowed Zoltek to amend its complaint and transfer its claim for infringement under § 271(g) against Lockheed and remove the case to a United States district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. On the facts of this case, the Court held that the amendment and transfer were legal error occasioned in part by the Federal Circuit’s earlier decision.