Professor Siegel went on to say, “This seems to be the safest course until there is a definitive federal ruling about whether the 30-day period may be measured from an appellate determination.” Prof. David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1988 Revision, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, at 767. 17 provides a plaintiff to refile claims in state court after the plaintiff’s federal case is dismissed.

This January 19 letter was an enforcement action that caused Respondents’ claims to accrue anew andstarted a new three-year clock. CONCLUSION This Court should apply “the clear, plain languageofthe statute,” as found by Judge Hicks, 2 AA 514, andaffirm his and the Court ofAppeal’s ruling that Respondents’ claims were timely underthe plain terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). Dated: September 23, 2013 CITY OF LOS ANGELES By: /ZMN/ for Edward Jordan Michael N. Feuer (No. 111529) City Attorney Valerie Flores (No. 138572) ManagingAssistant City Attorney Edward M.Jordan (No. 180390) Assistant City Attorney City of Los Angeles 1800 City Hall, 200 N. Main Street Los Angeles, CA 90012-4110 Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent City of Los Angeles 3] BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND,P.C. By: “Gab¥J.

40 The new claim “relates back” to the date on which the original complaint was filed. Here, given that Norex’s supplemental non-federal claims were timely filed in state court under both CPLR 205(a) and § 1367(d), and Norex’s additional non-federal claims (under New York law) clearly arise from the same facts and occurrences, Norex is entitled under the relation-back doctrine to assert the New York state law claims at issue in its amended complaint. Indeed, because Defendants acknowledge that the New York state law claims are “repetitive” of Norex’s other supplemental non-federal claims (R. 186), which were timely filed, there can be no doubt that Norex satisfied CPLR 203(f)’s statutory purpose of notice.

As discussed above, however, it does not. Finally, Congress intended Section 1367(d) to provide “a straightforward tolling rule” that would be “conducive to the administration ofjustice.” Jinks, 538 U.S. at 463.

Finally, Respondents imply throughout their brief that the policy in favor of deciding claims on the merits outweighs the policy favoring prompt prosecution. See RB 2 (“Kern’s focus on the general purpose of statutes of limitations to protect defend- ants is completely balanced, if not outweighed, by the interest in allowing a determination of supplemental state law claims on the merits”); id. at 9 (“Respondents submit that the wording of §1367(d) and federal and California precedent support applying tolling in the usual manner of suspending the running of the clock, which serves the equally,if not more, valid legislative goal of allowing state claims to be decided on the merits after supple- mental jurisdiction in the federal court ends”). Contrary to these implications, however, “[t]he two public policies” at issue here— “the one for repose and the other for disposition on the merits— are equally strong, the one being no less important or substantial than the other.”

Kern County relies on the Second District Court of Appeal’s opinion in Kolani v. Gluska (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 402 (Kolani), on two out-of-state cases (Berke v. Buckley Broadcasting Corp. (N.J.Super.A.D. 2003) 821 A.2d 118; Huang v. Ziko (N.C.Ct.App. 1999) 511 S.E.2d 305), and on an unpublished case from the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (Juan v. Government ofCommonwealth ofNorthern Mariana Islands (N.M.1.) 2001 WL 34883536), all interpreting 28 United States Code section 1367(d) in this way. Kern County refers to these courts’ interpretation as the extension approach.

Indeed, the Counterclaim appears to be designed specifically to serve that purpose. Accordingly, this Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Defendant’s Counterclaim under § 1367(c)(2). ii. Strong public policy reasons favor declining to exe

See, e.g., 2 Appellants’ Appendix (“AA”) 392-95. Becausethetrial court overruled Kern’s demurrer based on Section 1367(d), and the Court of Appeal similarly rejected Kern’s Section 1367(d) argument whenraised on appealofthe preliminary injunction, there has been no occasion to decide Respondents’ argument that their claims are timely under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 355. In addition, neither court opined on Respondents’ argumentthat their claims accrued on January 19, 2011.

In any event, Plaintiff’s claims do not raise novel or complex issues of state law. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). Nor do the claims against the District predominate over the claims against the other Defendants.

This is simply 28 incorrect.18 It is undisputed that, by its plain language, §1367(d) tolls “any claims asserted under subsection (a)” and §1367(a), in turn, provides that “the district courts have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to the claims in the action within such original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (emphasis added). It is well-settled law that “all other claims” under § 1367(a) includes foreign law claims.