Section 1333 - Admiralty, maritime and prize cases

11 Analyses of this statute by attorneys

  1. FLAME S.A. v. FREIGHT BULK PTE. LTD., NO. 14-2267

    University of South Carolina School of LawMeredith WeislerNovember 24, 2015

    (1) Defendant argued that under Fourth Circuit precedent, United States substantive law should not apply to this dispute, therefore the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding that both Flame and Glory Wealth had claims arising within federal admiralty jurisdiction, per 28 U.S.C. § 1333. (2) Defendants argued that under Supreme Court precedent, in Peacock v. Thomas, Flam and Glory Wealth’s allegations of alter ego and fraudulent concealment did not independently provide the district court subject matter jurisdiction, and that a plaintiff cannot rely on a prior lawsuit’s basis for the court’s jurisdiction in a subsequent suit to shift liability.

  2. 28 U.S.C. §1333 - The Shirt of Nessus that May Bring Down Hercules?

    Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PCChristopher HannanMarch 21, 2014

    28 U.S.C. §1333 - THE SHIRT OF NESSUS THAT MAY BRING DOWN HERCULES? As detailed in numerous prior posts (most recently regarding the Coronel decision), a series of decisions allowing removal of general maritime law (GML) claims by seamen, even when combined with otherwise statutorily non-removable Jones Act claims, has been developing among the district courts within the Fifth Circuit.

  3. The Labors of Hercules: Federal District Court in Washington Rejects Free Removability of General Maritime Law Claims Under 28 U.S.C. 1441 and Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc.

    Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PCChristopher HannanMarch 14, 2014

    n the discrete admiralty jurisdiction granted by Article III; (ii) GML claims brought at law could fall within the federal court's original admiralty jurisdiction if the plaintiff chooses to file the claims in federal court as admiralty claims; but (iii) federal courts do not have original subject matter jurisdiction over GML claims if a plaintiff exercises his right under the "Saving to Suitors" Clause to bring them at law in state court. In other words, as the Coronel court summarized, while GML claims can fall within the federal court's original admiralty jurisdiction, they are not exclusively within the admiralty grant of Article III because they can be brought at law under the "Saving to Suitors" Clause: [T]hroughout the history of federal admiralty jurisdiction—from the Judiciary Act of 1789 through Romero and up to the present—courts have given no indication that maritime claims are cognizable on the law side of federal courts absent subject matter jurisdiction independent of 28 U.S.C. § 1333. Turning to Plaintiff's claims, Section 1441(a) only permits removal of civil actions of which the district courts have "original jurisdiction."

  4. United States Supreme Court Issues First Decision in Climate Litigation

    Liskow & LewisMay 18, 2021

    The defendant energy companies contended that, during specific points in time, their energy production activities were at the behest and were under the control of the federal government. Therefore, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) allowed them, as federal officers, to remove the case to federal court. Notably, the energy companies asserted other grounds for removal such as federal jurisdiction under the federal question statute (28 U.S.C. § 1332), the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (92 Stat. 657, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)), the admiralty jurisdiction statute (28 U.S.C. § 1333), and the bankruptcy removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1452).Once the case was removed to federal court, the City of Baltimore filed a motion to remand. The district court examined each of the grounds for removal asserted by the energy companies and determined that none of the grounds could support federal court jurisdiction.

  5. A Court-Side Seat: “Inholdings” Upheld, a Pecos Bill Come Due and Agency Actions Abound

    Pillsbury - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate LawAnthony CavenderJanuary 14, 2021

    The claimants moved to dismiss, arguing that the vessel was a “dead ship” and not a vessel subject to this statute. The Fifth Circuit upheld the lower court’s dismissal of Southern Recycling’s invocation of this Act, noting that federal jurisdiction here depends on the court’s general admiralty jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), and that the vessel, which had a gaping hole open to the sea, “could not navigate over water” so there was no federal jurisdiction.State of Texas, et al., v. EPA This case involved the agency’s “nonattainment” designation for Bexar County under the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 2005 ozone NAAQS standard.

  6. This Week at the Ninth: Willfulness and Waterways

    Morrison & Foerster LLP - Left Coast AppealsJames SigelDecember 7, 2020

    Key highlight: “[B]ecause the alleged tort here did not occur on navigable waters, thecomplaint here is not cognizable under the district court’s admiralty jurisdiction.”Background: Caleb Garrett filed a complaint for exoneration from or limitation of liability relating to a boating accident on Holter Lake in Montana, invoking the district court’s admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). Holter Lake is located on a stretch of the Missouri River completely obstructed by the Hauser dam at one end, and the Holter dam at the other.

  7. Hercules Ascendant? A New Fifth Circuit Personal Jurisdiction Decision, and a Gasp of Breath from a Seemingly Dead Letter

    Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PCChristopher HannanFebruary 17, 2018

    The Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Sangha v.Navig8 Shipmanagement Private Limited, No. 17-20093, — F.3d —-, 2018 WL 706518 (Feb 5, 2009) has continued the recent jurisprudential renaissance of personal jurisdiction decisions in a maritime ruling that has implications for jurisdictional disputes in all substantive areas. And perhaps equally importantly (certainly just as interesting, as previously tracked on this blog) the Sangha opinion may give fresh life to the much-debated, yet-to-be-resolved but by all recent appearances dead letter doctrine of removal of general maritime law (GML) claims under the revised provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1441 (as amended in 2014), notwithstanding the saving-to-suitors clause of 28 U.S.C. §1333, under the analysis originally set forth by the Southern District of Texas in the Hercules decision (and subsequently extended, rejected (frequently), and differentiated by various courts along the way).Sangha involved claims by Captain Sangha against his former employer Navig8, who had fired him as master of an anchor handling vessel after he was involved in a collision on the vessel MISS CLAUDIA in the Gulf of Mexico.

  8. Seventh Circuit: "Frivolous" Argument Saves Jurisdiction

    Foley & Lardner LLPThomas Shriner, Jr.July 10, 2015

    The Seventh Circuit issued an important opinion by Judge Easterbrook today, Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co., No. 14-1825, a clump of cases that arose after an Asiana Airlines jet manufactured by Boeing struck a seawall while landing on a runway at San Francisco International Airport two years ago, at the end of a flight from Seoul. The opinion holds that tort actions arising out of transoceanic flights will often (perhaps usually) fall within the federal district courts’ admiralty jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). While Wisconsin is next to a couple of the Great Lakes, so that that holding may affect some future tort case here, the aspect of the opinion that we want to comment on is a question of appellate jurisdiction with wider potential significance.

  9. Potential Game Changer: Admiralty Jurisdiction Serves As A Basis For Removal

    Schiff Hardin LLPBrian O'Connor WatsonJuly 10, 2015

    Indeed, on the second point, the Seventh Circuit split the circuits and disagreed with Plaintiffs’ argument under Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson v. Magnolia Marine Transp. Co., 359 F. 3d 1237, 1241 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[c]ourts have consistently interpreted the ‘savings clause’ to preclude removal of maritime actions brought in state court and invoking a state law remedy, provided there is no independent basis for removal” such as the presence of a federal question or diversity of citizenship”); Morris v. TE Marine Corp., 344 F. 3d 439, 444 (5th Cir. 2003) (same); In re Chimenti, 79 F. 3d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 1996) (same); Servis v. Hiller Sys. Inc., 54 F.3d 203, 207 (4th Cir. 1995) (same).Junhong shows how defendants can remove cases under federal officer jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1442, or general admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333. Increasingly, federal officer jurisdiction has been a basis for removal by defendants in asbestos cases.

  10. Grant of Summary Judgment to Defendant Reversed Under the Jones Act and Maritime Law

    Goldberg SegallaJoseph J. WelterMarch 3, 2015

    Grant of Summary Judgment to Defendant Reversed Under the Jones Act and Maritime LawSuperior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, March 3, 2015March 3, 2015Joseph J. Welter and Jason A. BotticelliCase Decisions,Maritime/Admiralty Law,New Jersey0In this case, the plaintiff claimed that the decedent was exposed to asbestos-containing insulation and winch brakes aboard various dredges and commercial vessels on which he worked over the years. “[P]laintiff asserted a Jones Act negligence claim under 46 U.S.C.A. § 30104 and a general maritime unseaworthiness claim under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333.” The defendants, Weeks Marine, Inc. and American Atlantic Company, moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff did not establish that he was exposed to asbestos aboard these vessels.