Therefore, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over Bulgaria, and should dismiss this action with prejudice. Id.; 28 U.S.C. §1330; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2). Respectfully submitted this seventeenth day of January, 2016.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO SERVE THE REPUBLIC WITH PROCESS AS TO THE ITALIAN BONDS AND THE GERMAN BONDS AND THUS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE REPUBLIC By statute, personal jurisdiction over a foreign state exists where (1) there is subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA and (2) service has been made in accordance with Section 1608 of the FSIA. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). Because plaintiffs failed to properly serve the Republic with process with their Complaint under Section 1608, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the Republic.

4 For example, the Plaintiffs in Smith and Zhang plead in one paragraph that personal jurisdiction over only MAS and MAB exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1330, but later plead that Section 1330(a) operates to confer personal jurisdiction over all Defendants. Smith OC at ¶¶ 16, 18 – 19, 21; Zhang SAC at ¶¶ 18, 21, 24.

C. NXP USA's Claims against France Brevets Should be Dismissed for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. As explained above, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over NXP USA’s claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). Moreover, it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this action on any other basis.

For these reasons, the Court may find, in the alternative, that Defendants are not entitled to sovereign immunity because this Action is based upon acts performed in the United States in connection with Defendants’ commercial activities. In sum, pursuant to both clause three and clause two of the FSIA’s commercial activity exception, Defendants are not entitled to sovereign immunity, and the Court “shall have original jurisdiction” under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). C. Dentons Need Not Allege that Defendants Waived Their Sovereign Immunity.

Thus, because NFCT is a citizen of Texas and because it was not created under the laws of any third country, NXP fails to prove that NFCT satisfies at least the third requirement under § 1603 (b) for it to be an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.” Accordingly, NXP fails to demonstrate that NFCT is subject to the personal jurisdiction of this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). 2.

The Complaint Should Be Dismissed for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Under the FSIA, a court can only acquire personal jurisdiction over a “foreign state” defendant if an exception to foreign sovereign immunity has been established and there is effective service of process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). Thus, Plaintiffs’ failure to plead facts 8 For the same reasons discussed with respect to the second clause, see supra note 7, the allegations of the Complaint also fail to satisfy the third clause’s requirement that the act upon which the action is based be performed “in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state” outside of the United States.

(noting that, under the FSIA, “personal jurisdiction over a foreign state [is only] automatic when an exception to immunity applies and service of process has been accomplished in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1608.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). Accordingly, the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Ghana unless Plaintiff both: (1) plausibly alleges that an exception to immunity applies; and (2) properly serves Ghana in accordance with the FSIA.

ent 28 Filed 11/22/13 Page 13 of 16 10 PUB’s investigation and regulatory review of Hydro’s risk management strategies and therefore cannot be characterized as “commercial” in nature because: (i) Plaintiff’s employment is governmental in nature where its consultancy was directed in furtherance of the PUB’s regulatory duties; and (ii) the activities performed by Plaintiff are clearly intertwined with the PUB’s government function of assessing Hydro’s risk management. Hijazi, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 673-74; see also Kato v. Ishihara, 360 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2004) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that her employment was by nature “commercial” where employment activities were rendered on behalf of a foreign state acting in its governmental capacity). B. Plaintiff’s Demands for Punitive Damages and a Jury Trial Must Be Stricken As a foreign sovereign (Compl. ¶ 25), the PUB “shall not be liable for punitive damages,” 28 U.S.C. § 1606, and cannot be subject to trial by jury, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). Hijazi, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 671. II. COUNTS XIII, XIV AND XV ARE BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL Claims against the PUB predicated on the PUB’s alleged improper publication of Plaintiff’s confidential information (i.e., Counts XIII, XIV, XV) are barred by collateral estoppel, which prohibits re-litigation of issues actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior proceeding.

POINT II THERE IS NO PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANTS Under the FSIA, the court has personal jurisdiction over a foreign state whenever subject matter jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) and service of process has been effected in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1608. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). Thus, absent an exception to immunity under the FSIA, the court not only lacks subject matter jurisdiction, but the court lacks personal jurisdiction as well.