See Washington Rules of Appellate Procedure 2.1-2.5, 4.1-4.4, 6.1, 12.1-13.7; 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Case 3:16-cv-05464-RJB Document 10 Filed 08/04/16 Page 15 of 21 16 Attorney General of Washington Revenue and Finance Division 7141 Cleanwater Drive SW PO Box 40123 Olympia, WA 98504-0123 (360) 753-5528 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Plaintiffs cannot show that they will suffer irreparable harm from their existing convictions when they have adequate means to challenge those convictions through the normal judicial appeal process.

v. Abrams, 761 F. Supp. 237 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Turco v. Monroe County Bar Association, 554 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 United Board of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19,20 Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 13, 14, 15, 16 Zuckerman v. Appellate Division, 421 F.2d 625, 626 (2d Cir. 1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 STATUTES Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 10 Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 N.Y. Jud.Law § 140-b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 28 U.S.C. § 1257 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8 42 U.S.C. § § 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,6 42 U.S.C. § 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2, 6, 18, 19 Case 1:06-cv-02158-ARR-LB Document 6 Filed 06/12/06 Page 25 of 26 iv Chapter 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4 N.Y. Constitution, Article VI, §7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Case 1:06-cv-02158-ARR-LB Document 6 Filed 06/12/06 Page 26 of 26

The Court stressed that Rooker-Feldman does not preclude a subsequent federal action, even where a party attempts to litigate the same subject matter as a state court action. The statute on which Rooker-Feldman is based, 28 U.S.C. § 1257, does not stop a district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state court. If a federal plaintiff “present[s] some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party…, then there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.”

The doctrine "arises from 28 U.S.C. § 1257 which s ta tes in re levant part that '[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a s ta te in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court."' In re Knappeg ,̀ 407 F.3d 573, 580 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1257). "Since Congress has never conferred a s imilar power of review of the United States District Courts , the Supreme Court has inferred that Congress did not intend to empower Dis trict Courts to re vie w s ta te court de cis ions ...." Id.

Finally, if a petition for certification is denied, or the Supreme Court of New Jersey were to render an unfavorable decision, Malhan would then be capable of filing a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court to seek review to the extent that the New Jersey State courts’ decisions rely on applications of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257. And the fact that Malhan now seeks a federal venue to raise or re-raise constitutional arguments is of no consequence because absent a specific, explicit Congressional requirement, claims arising under federal law need not be adjudicated in a federal court.

191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971). After the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected their claims, the couple appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court pursuant to former 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2). Until 1988, this statute afforded the Supreme Court mandatory appellate jurisdiction for review of state supreme court decisions adjudicating the constitutionality of a state law; the statute was subsequently replaced with review by writ of certiorari.

That does not hold true if the underpinnings of the summary disposition shift so significantly that the precedential value of the decision must be questioned. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975), superseded by elimination of 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (appeal as of right to Supreme Court) (summary dispositions may no longer be binding “when doctrinal developments indicate otherwise”) (citation omitted). The recent Texas ruling in De Leon contains a useful summary of the “doctrinal and societal developments” since Baker was summarily resolved more than forty years ago.

Bd of Elecs., 422 F. 3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005). "The doctrine reflects the principle set forth in 28 U.S.c. § 1257 that the Supreme Court is the only federal court that has jurisdiction to review state court judgments ... unless otherwise provided by Congress." Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 2002).

LAW AND ARGUMENT I. Neither Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Barred By the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Interpreting a statute “designed to prohibit end-runs around state court judgments,” the United States Supreme Court in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) held that lower federal courts lacked jurisdiction to conduct appellate review of state court judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). 3 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as it has come to be known, “is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”

But, as BLAG concedes, Baker involved same-sex partners claiming the “constitutional right to marry each other” (Dkt. 119-1 at 10) — a right Ms. Golinski already has exercised and not the issue before this Court. A summary dismissal under the Supreme Court’s previously mandatory appellate jurisdiction2 is controlling only on the specific issues presented to the Court, and Baker 2 The mandatory appellate jurisdiction applicable to the Supreme Court under former 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) was repealed in 1988. Case3:10-cv-00257-JSW Document133 Filed06/24/11 Page16 of 41 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS CASE NO. 3:10-CV-0257-JSW sf-2996998 6 is irrelevant to the question presented here: whether the federal government has adequate justification for disrespecting the marriages of one minority group among a state’s validly married residents.