Defendants will be filing a Notice of Appeal of the August 4, 2009 Order. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1253. In order to give this Court a fair opportunity to consider Defendants’ stay request, Defendants will wait to request a stay from the Supreme Court until Friday, September 4, 2009, at 12:00 p.m. if this Court denies this request or fails to act by that time.

Compare City of Lynn v. Labor Relations Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 172, 178, 681 N.E.2d 1234, 1238 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (stating that, in most cases, subjects deemed excluded from mandatory bargaining under c. 150E are reserved, by statute or tradition, to the “sole discretion of the public employer so as to preserve the intended role of the governmental agency”) with Mass. Gen. L. c. 15D, § 2(u) (specifically authorizing EEC to “work[] cooperatively” with family child care providers to improve quality of services “through providers who have the requisite skills and training”). 3 That decision, which arose from an appeal of a three-judge district court ruling under 28 U.S.C. § 1253, is binding authority on this Court. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975) (“(v)otes to affirm summarily . . . are votes on the merits of a case” in cases arising from Court’s appellate jurisdiction) (citation omitted). Case 1:14-cv-11866-LTS Document 24 Filed 09/26/14 Page 9 of 18 10 50, 62 (1975) (under federal labor law, the “complete satisfaction of all who are represented [by the exclusive representative] is hardly to be expected”) (citation omitted).4 Though Plaintiffs assert that they are “forced to accept” (Am. Compl., ¶ 26) an exclusive representative for purposes of negotiating with the state, the Act imposes no such burdens on dissenting family day care providers.