*United States v. Fox, No. 2:14-CR-03-DBH, 2019 WL 3046086, at *3 (D. Me. July 11, 2019); United States v. Beck, No. 1:13-CR-186-6, 2019 WL 2716505, at *6 (M.D.N.C. June 28, 2019) (“While the old policy statement provides helpful guidance, it does not constrain the Court’s independent assessment of whether ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ warrant a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). An interpretation of the old policy statement as binding on the new compassionate release procedure is likely inconsistent with the Commission’s statutory role.”); United States v. Cantu, No. 1:05-CR-458-1, 2019 WL 2498923, at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 17, 2019) (“Because the Commission’s statutory authority is limited to explaining the appropriate use of sentence-modification provisions under the current statute, 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(C), an amendment to the statute may cause some provisions of a policy statement to no longer fall under that authority ....”) (emphasis in original)); United States v. Brown, No. 4:05-CR-00227-1, 2019 WL 4942051, at *4 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 8, 2019) (“Therefore, if the FSA is to increase the use of compassionate release, the most natural reading of the amended § 3582(c) and § 994(t) is that the district court assumes the same discretion as the BOP Director when it considers a compassionate release motion properly before it.”); United States v. Adams, No. 6:94-CR-302, 2019 WL 3751745, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 8, 2019) (holding that the Director of the Bureau of Prisons’ prior “interpretation of ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reasons is informative,” but not dispositive.); United States v. Bucci, No. CR 04-10194-WGY, 2019 WL 5075964, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 16, 2019) (“This Court agrees with Judge Hornby of the District of Maine that interpreting the Sentencing Commission’s guidance on compassionate r

The 10th rejects Mr. Johnson's contention that the post-plea, pre-sentence presumption of detention does not apply because his guideline range would be zero to six months. In other words, he argued he was "a person for whom the applicable guideline promulgated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994 does not recommend a term of imprisonment " under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1). The 10th is unimpressed with Mr. Johnson's point that there are no guideline ranges of zero to zero months, so everyone would be subject to the detention presumption under the government's and the lower court's interpretation.

There was probable cause that the defendant was guilty of DWI because his eyes were bloodshot and watery, an alcohol odor "emanated" from the defendant, the defendant admitted having a couple of beers and the officer was certain the defendant was intoxicated after giving the defendant sobriety tests. The § 4B1.2 commentary which says attempts of controlled substance offenses are "controlled substance offenses" was a proper exercise of the Sentencing Commission's broad authority under 28 U.S.C. § 994(a), even if the requirement of close-to-maximum sentences for career offenders under § 994(h) did not cover attempts. U.S. v. McGuire, 2011 WL 4925781 (10/18/11) (Okl.) (unpub'd) - The d. ct. did not abuse its discretion when it upwardly varied from 327 months to 500 months for a kidnapping, based on the facts that the defendant sexually assaulted a 10-year-old 3 times during the kidnapping.

red numerous multiyear recidivism studies with particular emphasis on the interplay between zero-point offenders (offenders with zero criminal history points under the guidelines) and recidivism; the Commission’s research demonstrates that zero-point offender recidivated far less than other offenders – 27% versus 42% for one-point offenders and 49% overall).In response to such statistics (as well as feedback from district courts, expert testimony, and widespread public comment), § 4.C1.1 was amended; now, offenders who did not receive any criminal history points under the sentencing guidelines receive a two offense-level point reduction. The Commission was keen to exclude offenders who committed serious and aggravated offenses from the amendment’s leniency: such serious and aggravated offenses include terrorism, sex offenses, serious human rights offenses, and others.Taken altogether, the Commission saw the amended § 4C1.1 as necessary to implement Congress’s directive in promulgating 28 U.S.C. § 994(j); as amended, §4.C1.1 better reflects the general appropriateness of imposing a sentence in which the defendant is a first-time offender.2. Withholding Points for Acceptance of ResponsibilityUnder the prior sentencing guidelines at § 3E1.1, an offender could potentially reduce an additional offense level point if they met certain criteria and upon a subsequent motion by the government (a “§ 3E1.1(b) Motion”). This potentially represented a 3-point reduction in offense levels for offenders – dramatically altering their sentences.A circuit split emerged over whether a § 3E1.1(b) Motion could be withheld if the offender moved to suppress evidence or raise sentencing challenges. The Circuits’ clashing views were predicated on what “preparing for trial meant”: if the offender saved the government the hassle of preparing for trial, they were awarded the additional reduction. But if the offender brought a suppression motion or other sentencing challenges, did that qualify as forcing the gover

A SOR form is a document that is issued by the Judicial Conference and approved by the U.S. Sentencing Commission. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(2)(1)(B). This requirement serves the sentencing process by making appellate review easier, since the precise reasoning is memorialized in a formal writing.

The proposed language reads:“If the defendant is a nonviolent first offender and the applicable guideline range is in Zone A or B of the Sentencing Table, the court should consider imposing a sentence other than a sentence of imprisonment, in accordance with subsection (b) or (c)(3). See 28 U.S.C. § 994(j). For purposes of this application note, a “nonviolent first offender” is a defendant who has no prior convictions or other comparable judicial dispositions of any kind and who did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon in connection with the offense of conviction.

These factors can be used to determine where within the guidelines range a sentence should be given, and whether and to what degree to depart from the guidelines (generally downward, rarely upward) if the offense or offender is otherwise outside the “heartland” of similarly situated offenders.When promulgating and amending the guidelines, Congress specifically directed that they be “entirely neutral” as to “race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status.” (U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt. (2014) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)).) However, the US Sentencing Commission was given authority to determine the relevancy of additional offender characteristics, and in so doing developed three distinct categories.

By Alan Ellis and Mark H. AllenbaughOn April 9, 2015, the US Sentencing Commission voted to fundamentally fix some portions of the US Sentencing Guidelines that have been in need of addressing for quite some time. On April 30, 2015, the Commission submitted to Congress amendments to the federal sentencing guidelines pursuant to its authority under 28 U.S.C. §994(p). These amendments will go into effect on November 1, 2015, barring congressional action.

In fact, through the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress told the Commission to design guidelines that preserved probation as a ‘generally appropriate’ sentence in certain cases, such as nonviolent crimes or first offenders. The initial provision of 28 USC §994(a)(1) directs that the first sentencing decision under the guidelines should be whether probation or prison is appropriate. That didn’t happen.

The Commission’s proposal was consistent with its obligation to formulate guidelines to “minimize the likelihood that the Federal prison population will exceed the capacity of the Federal prisons. 28 U.S.C. § 994(g).According to the Commission, there are an “estimated 46,000 offenders that may benefit from retroactive application of Amendment 782 subject to the limitation in §1B1.10 (e), and the average sentence reduction would be approximately 18 percent.