gment, order, or decree: (i) involves a question of law as to which there is no controlling circuit court or U.S. Supreme Court precedent or "involves a matter of public importance"; (ii) involves a question of law requiring the resolution of conflicting rulings; or (iii) if immediately appealed, "may materially advance the progress of the case or proceeding in which the appeal is taken."Magistrate JudgesMagistrate judges are judicial officers of the U.S. district courts appointed by the district judges for a renewable term of eight years (four years for part-time magistrates) to handle a variety of judicial proceedings. The U.S. magistrates system was established by the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 604, 631-639 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3060, 3401-3402). Thus, like bankruptcy judges, magistrate judges are Article I, rather than Article III, judges.The jurisdiction and powers of magistrate judges are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636. Those powers include, among other things, "all powers and duties conferred or imposed upon United States commissioners" by law or by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the authority to issue warrants, conduct preliminary proceedings in criminal cases, and hear cases involving petty offenses committed on federal lands.Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), with the consent of the parties, a magistrate judge "may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he serves."Houston Action CounselA church that owned a large commercial building in Houston (the "landlord") leased space to a health care services company (the "debtor") for a low-cost medical clinic. Due to a rent dispute, the landlord terminated the lease and obtained a judgment entitling it to possession of the premises. However, before it was evicted, the debtor filed for chapte

Specifically, with the “consent of the parties,” a magistrate judge may conduct “any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgement.” 28 U.S.C. §636(c)(1). Recently, in McAdams v. Robinson, 26 F.4th 149 (4th Cir. 2022), the Fourth Circuit determined that the word “parties” in this statute does not include absent class members.

During the pendency of the litigation in 2011, the agency adopted a new standardized message that complied with the Act. The parties then consented to conduct all further proceedings before a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C §636(c), and the district court entered an order designating the magistrate to exercise jurisdiction over the entire case. In 2013, the parties reached an agreement to seek certification of a nationwide, settlement-only class under Rule 23(b)(2).

With respect to dispositive motions, a district judge may designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to the district judge proposed findings of fact and recommendations.28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Dispositive motions include those specifically identified in 28 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(A), such as motions for injunctive relief and motions for summary judgment, as well as other motions not specifically identified in the statute to the extent they are dispositive of a claim or defense.

In Day v. Persels & Associates, LLC, 729 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2013), (Day v Persels) Miranda Day sued several debt management companies on behalf of herself and 125,000 consumers. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), Day, the putative class representative, and the defendants consented to adjudication of the claims by a magistrate judge, and later reached a proposed settlement agreement. Notice of the proposed settlement was sent to more than 98 percent of the putative class members, informing them of the procedure to object to the proposed settlement and of the date of the final fairness hearing before the magistrate judge.

This approach would lead to fewer sanctions, since the attorney under fire has two chances to talk the courte out of this punishment. Judge Cabranes reaches this conclusion because, under 28 U.S.C. 636 (which grants magistrates their authority), these judges cannot resolve dispositive motions, such as motions "for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment," etc. These motions are the subject of Reports and Recommendation (or, "R&R's") which the district court resolves.

lified for benefits. Northrop determined that for an employee to qualify they needed to be (1) regularly scheduled to work at least 20 hours a week, and (2) a recipient of an individually-issued “memo” by HR.After two ex-employees did not receive cash severance benefits, they filed suit. They argued that their eligibility was established because they regularly worked more than 20 hours a week and characterized the “memo,” which neither received, as a document that merely verified eligibility under the 20-hour standard. Northrop argued that the plan treated the “memo” as more than a ministerial document—it was the means by which eligibility for severance benefits was determined. The District Court granted summary judgment in Northrop’s favor, ruling that the plan’s language conferred discretion to choose who, if anyone, is eligible to receive the disputed severance benefits post-termination.In the District Court, the parties consented to a magistrate judge presiding over the case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). However, once the class was certified (on behalf of all ex-employees who did not receive the “memo”) and the stakes multiplied, Northrop requested that the district court judge resume control. The District Court agreed.On appeal (Seventh Circuit):The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the language in the plan made clear that severance benefits were contingent on the receipt of the “memo,” which plaintiffs and other class members plainly did not receive.Plaintiffs argued that until October 2011, Northrop provided the “memo” to every terminated employee who had worked a threshold number of hours—they contended that the plan’s change in course supported an estoppel theory. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, finding that it tended to “show[] only that the firm may have made a mistake; it does not create a legal entitlement to have the mistake extended to other kinds of benefits.”The Seventh Circuit rejected plaintiffs’ argument that Northrop’s conduct could be characterized as “inter

The magistrate judge overruled McAdams’ objections.On appeal, McAdams raised the same challenges and claimed that the magistrate judge did not have jurisdiction over settlement approval. Specifically, McAdams claimed that absent class members are “parties” under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). This section allows a magistrate judge to exercise settlement jurisdiction only “upon the consent of the ‘parties.’

Although it might be obvious to attorneys who routinely practice in the federal courts, for those who do not, it is important that specific and timely objections to a federal magistrate’s report and recommendation are filed to preserve review of those arguments by both the district and appellate court. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 and 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) provide that such written objections are to be filed and served within 14 days after service of a copy of the recommended disposition. The district court then conducts a de novo review of any portion of the report and recommendation that has been properly objected to.

Although it might be obvious to attorneys who routinely practice in the federal courts, for those who do not, it is important that specific and timely objections to a federal magistrate’s report and recommendation are filed to preserve review of those arguments by both the district and appellate court. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) provide that such written objections are to be filed and served within 14 days after service of a copy of the recommended disposition. The district court then conducts a de novo review of any portion of the report and recommendation that has been properly objected to.