Rule 611 - Mode and Order of Examining Witnesses and Presenting Evidence

7 Analyses of this statute by attorneys

  1. Court Explains the Law Governing the Admission of Summary Evidence and the Different Standards for Admission of Such Evidence Under Rule 1006 and Rule 611(A)

    Federal Public Defender for the Central District of illinoisFebruary 2, 2016

    It must not misrepresent their contents or make arguments about the inferences the jury should draw from them. The other option is a pedagogical chart admitted pursuant to the court’s “control over the mode … [of] presenting evidence” under Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a). Rule 611(a) pedagogical summaries are meant to facilitate the presentation of evidence already in the record.

  2. Objections To Testimony and Evidence in Family Court

    Stange Law Firm, PCJune 13, 2022

    Raising the objection may force the opponent to establish the missing element.Another popular objection is cumulative evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 611. The family court judge has the discretion to control this evidence during trials and can rule on whether it is necessary or whether it is just merely repetitive.

  3. De Bene Esse depositions: A trial testimony insurance policy

    KennedysPamela SchultzMay 30, 2023

    r is outside the United States, unless it appears that the witness’s absence was procured by the party offering the deposition.***(E) on motion and notice, that exceptional circumstances make it desirable—in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of live testimony in open court—to permit the deposition to be used.Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4)(B), (E).Further, the procedures granted by the Federal Rules of Evidence address the Court’s ability to recognize that while witnesses are expected to be available, they are not expected to be at ready at the whim of a particular party, and judges routinely exercise their powers under Rule 611 to accommodate reasonable witness scheduling, such as the use of a de bene esse deposition at trial. See generallyEstate of Thompson v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 291 F.R.D. 297, 312-13 (N.D. Iowa 2013) (“This does not mean that Mr. Macklin must necessarily be available, as guaranteed by Kawasaki, whenever the Thompsons want to call him. Rule 611 of the Federal Rules of Evidence does grant me the authority to ‘exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to: (1) make those procedures effective for determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.’ FED.R.EVID. 611(a).”).Moreover, Courts have, in more recent years, upheld the use of discovery depositions as de bene esse depositions when a witness is simply unavailable as prescribed by the Federal Rules. As an example, in Bouygues Telecom, S.A. v. Tekelec, Inc., 238 F.R.D. 413 (E.D.N.C. 2006), the court held it was appropriate to treat deposition of foreign attorney noticed by defendant as a de bene esse deposition that was not barred by twenty-deposition limit in case management order, where defendant made clear its intention to take attorney's deposition to preserve her testimony if discovery deposition could not be effected, and attorney's trial testimony could be obtained only by means o

  4. CVC Opposes Broad's Motion to Exclude Evidence and Broad Files Reply

    McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLPKevin NoonanJune 18, 2021

    Moreover, CVC asserts that it is "'entirely appropriate' to admit testimony elicited on redirect even where that testimony extends beyond the scope of cross-examination," citing Taskett v. Dentlinger, 344 F.3d 1337, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003). And CVC resorts to 37 C.F.R. § 1.671(b) and Fed. R. Evid. 611(b) for the rule that redirect testimony in proceedings before the PTAB were permissible where such testimony "clarify[ies] facts that were not made sufficiently clear by . . . cross examination." Because Broad's motion does not address these standards nor assert a basis in view of them for CVC's purported transgression thereof, CVC's Opposition maintains that Broad fails to provide the Board with any basis for granting their motion.

  5. Stay in Your Lane: Defining the Scope of an IPR Deposition

    Ward and Smith, P.A.Payton CollierApril 17, 2021

    As such, "to the extent that [the expert's] testimony constitutes 'a matter affecting his credibility,' cross-examination of that testimony will be permitted, even if that testimony relates to asserted grounds of unpatentability on which [the Board] did not institute trial." Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 611(b)).In Reactive Surfaces, the Board distinguished amongst testimony relating to asserted grounds of unpatentability.

  6. Leading questions

    Law Office of Phillip CavePhillip D. CaveJune 30, 2011

    Federalevidence review has an excellent piece on leading questions during the prosecution direct. As part of the comment they say:The Seventh Circuit recently explored the limitation on leading questions through FRE 611(c), admonishing the government about a trend that was disturbing, even if at most it would be only harmless error.I see this regularly in courts-martials as well. There are times when it is proper to ask leading questions: general introductory matters, moving from a broad topic to another, developing the testimony or focussing a witness.

  7. Capital Defense Weekly, December 17, 2001

    Capital Defense NewsletterDecember 17, 2001

    e State's closing argument comments during the penalty phase were fundamental error; (12) the trial court erred in giving no weight to valid mitigation; (13) the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty when the jury made no unanimous findings of fact as to death eligibility; (14) the trial court erred in finding that the murder was both cold, calculated, and premeditated and that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain (improper doubling)."USA v. Lee, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 26538 (8th Cir 12/14/2001) Death sentence reinstated on appeal. "The United States [successfully] argue[d] on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in ordering a new penalty trial because (1) individuals have no enforceable rights in the DOJ death penalty protocol, (2) the district court did not commit error, much less plain error, in admitting testimony concerning Lee's past bad acts and potential psychopathy on cross examination and rebuttal, (3) the district court should not have applied Federal Rule of Evidence 611(b) in its post hearing analysis of the evidence at Lee's capital sentencing hearing, (4) Lee had no right to advance notice of the evidence the government would introduce at the penalty phase, and (5) the government's evidence was not limited by its prehearing statement or acceptance of jury instructions."DELAYED PUBLICATION, AMENDED & DEPUBLISHED OPINIONSNo cases noted.OTHER NOTABLE CASESUSA v. Desir, No. 00-2423 (1st Cir 12/10/01) Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, defendant, who failed to state that he knew a juror after juror gave his name and occupation and others notified defendant of the past acquaintance, may not seek a new trial based on "newly discovered evidence".USA v. Ferrera, No. 00-14723 (11th Cir 12/11/01) Hostage Taking Act, 18 USC 1203, which penalizes only aliens, meets constitutional muster under Article I and Due Process.Hutto v. Weber, No. 00-3529 (8th CIr 12/14/01) Sixty year prison term for attempted escape does not violate the proportionality rule of the 8th Amendment ev