The Court should instruct Defendant that if it feels “a door has been opened” as to any of the matters set forth herein, they must, before presenting anything in the jury's presence regarding same, approach the bench and make inquiry to the Court. This particular limine subpart is to be followed regardless of the time of the trial, including arguments. See FED. R. EVID. 103(c) (providing that evidentiary rulings should be made outside the jury’s presence to prevent exposing the jury to inadmissible evidence). GRANTED: ____________________ DENIED: __________________ 7.

See, e.g., MM Steel, 2013 WL 6588836, at *3 (excluding antitrust compliance policy); Stora Enso, 2007 WL 1630366, at *2 (excluding two sections of antitrust compliance policy); J&M 5 As noted above, Dow does not object to admission of the section entitled See supra at 2. Case 2:08-cv-05169-WJM-MF Document 179 Filed 10/15/15 Page 15 of 17 PageID: 11044 12 Distrib., 2015 WL 144797, at *2–3 (requiring not only limiting instruction but also redactions); see also Fed. R. Evid. 103(d). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons and those explained in its opening brief, Dow respectfully requests that this Court grant its motion in limine concerning antitrust policies.

128-6) ¶ 1 . Case 2:08-cv-05169-WJM-MF Document 191 Filed 10/15/15 Page 14 of 17 PageID: 11226 11 Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2236-37 (2012) (noting an increased risk that a jury, as opposed to a judge, will take evidence as substantive proof rather than just as expert reliance material); Fed. R. Evid. 103(d) (“To the extent practicable, the court must conduct a jury trial so that inadmissible evidence is not suggested to the jury by any means.”).

Everlight is objecting and moving to strike this evidence now, its first and only opportunity to do so, because Nichia waited until post-trial filings to introduce it. If Everlight had not filed its Motion, the objections would be waived under FRE 103, and the Court and Federal Circuit would have undoubtedly noted that fact. Instead, the Court should limit the evidence to what was admitted at trial and consider nothing else in reaching its decision.

’s Mot. at 28 n.13, and he claims that his objection was therefore preserved under Federal Rule of Evidence 103(b). That argument fails, however, because, by Moore’s own hypothesis, Staubach’s impromptu testimony about the club’s admission policy raised an entirely different issue than the basic fact of Moore’s membership in the club.

Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 (1984). F.R.E. 103(c) dictates that “in jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.” Further,“[p]reliminary questions concerning the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court.”

Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 (1984). F.R.E. 103(c) dictates that “in jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.” Further,“[p]reliminary questions concerning the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court.”

Evidentiary Rule 103 – which governs the practice in this Court – provides that a party must make an offer of proof “[i]n case the ruling is one excluding evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(2). Finally, from a policy perspective, it certainly should not be the practice of this Court to allow a party to proactively expand the trial evidentiary record, premised solely on a broad- sweeping appellate rule – App. Rule 10(a) – that is retrospective in its purpose of defining the record.

As indicated previously, irrelevant evidence is inadmissible and therefore should be excluded from trial. Fed. R. Evid. 103(c) and 402. H. If the Defendants Interject Any of These Issues into the Trial in the Jury's Presence, the Court Should Immediately Give a Limiting Instruction If any of the above "evidence" or argument is interjected into the proceedings, the Court should immediately give the jury a limiting instruction.

21, 2011)(considering motion to strike as a notice of objection); Carroll v. Tavern Corp., Nos. 1:08- CV-2514-TWT-JFK, 1:08-CV-2554-TWT-JFK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30126, at *44-45 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2011) (denying motion to strike but considering motion as objections); Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, Inc., No 1:13-cv-00312-WSD-JCF, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117020, *8-9 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 29, 2013). Second, this District has held that the plain language of Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a) implicitly recognizes that a motion to strike evidence is procedurally proper. Corey Airport Servs., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 632 F.Supp.2d 1246, 1267-68 (N.D. Ga. 2008).