Filed August 26, 2016
P&As ISO MTN. OF PLAINTIFFS ROBERT READ AND HIROSHI SUZUKI FOR RELIEF FROM THIS COURT’S ORDER ON THE MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) AND LEAVE TO INTERVENE AS LEAD PLAINTIFF, SUBSTITUTE LEAD COUNSEL AND AMEND SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT -- No. 2:15-cv-00957-FMO-PJW 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 2:15-cv-00957-FMO-PJW Document 148-10 Filed 08/26/16 Page 5 of 5 Page ID #:2519
Filed September 8, 2016
Regardless, Read and Suzuki’s failure to take any action to protect their interests (or Case 2:15-cv-00957-FMO-PJW Document 149 Filed 09/08/16 Page 20 of 21 Page ID #:2539 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -16- Case No. :15-CV-00957-FMO-PJW AMIRA DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO READ AND SUZUKI’S MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER FRCP 60(B) AND FRCP 24 those of the proposed class) prior to the entry of judgment strongly suggests they are inadequate lead plaintiffs. The Court should, therefore, deny Read and Suzuki’s motion to be appointed co-lead plaintiffs and deny their selection of co-lead counsel as well.4 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Amira Defendants respectfully request that the Court deny Read and Suzuki’s motion in its entirety and deny all relief sought therein.
Filed June 9, 2011
Due to Plaintiffs counsel's excusable neglect, citations to that additional evidence were inadvertently not included in Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Separate Statement. The record contained the Declaration of Sandy Browne in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment, fied Apr. 24, 2011 (Dock. No. 232) - 8 - MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) AND OTHER RELIEF Case 2:08-cv-01877-LKK-KJN Document 271 Filed 06/09/11 Page 12 of 22 1 ("Browne Decl."). Ms. Browne-an expert with over 44 years of experience in vehicle occupant 2 safety and restraint systems (Browne Decl. iiii 2- 1 2)-testified that "the seat belt systems (in 3 Plaintiffs vehicle) were compromised and should have been replaced.
Filed October 9, 2015
CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Mr. Sater respectfully requests an Order vacating the Plaintiffs’ Rule 41(a)(1) Notices of Voluntary Dismissal without prejudice under Rule 60(b) and dismissing the Plaintiffs case with prejudice under Rule 41(b), or through the use of any other method that the Court deems appropriate. Dated: October 9, 2015 New York, NY MOSES & SINGER LLP Attorneys for Defendant Felix Sater By:___/s/___________________ Robert S. Wolf 405 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10174 (212) 554-7525 (phone) (917) 206-4325 (fax) rwolf@mosessinger.com cc: All Parties via ECF
Filed September 15, 2016
IFSO MTN. OF PLAINTIFFS ROBERT READ AND HIROSHI SUZUKI FOR RELIEF FROM THIS COURT’S ORDER ON THE MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) AND LEAVE TO INTERVENE AS LEAD PLAINTIFF, SUBSTITUTE LEAD COUNSEL AND AMEND SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT -- No. 2:15-cv-00957-FMO-PJW -11- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 DATED: September 15, 2016 Respectfully submitted, THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A. /s/ Laurence Rosen, Esq. Laurence M. Rosen, Esq. (SBN 219683) THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A. 355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2450 Los Angeles, CA 90071 Telephone: (213) 785-2610 Facsimile: (213) 226-4684 Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com Peter Safirstein, Esq.
Filed June 8, 2011
See, e.g., Milliken Co., 451 Mass. at 556 (test for successor liability applies to a predecessor corporation that sells its assets directly to a successor corporation) (test for "de facto merger theory of successor liability 'has usually been applied to situations in which the ownership, assets and management of one corporation are combined with those of another, preexisting entity.'"). This Court therefore should vacate the default judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) because Semtek procured that judgment in ISS's absence by misrepresenting to this Court the true identity of the Russian entity that acquired Merkuriy's shares. C. Similarly misleading was Semtek's representation to this Court that Merkuriy and Semtek, "with the approval and support of NPO PM," entered into a binding joint venture agreement to "commercialize[e] the excess communications capacity of various NPO PM satellites."
Filed December 30, 2019
Case 08-23583 Doc 208 Filed 12/30/19 Entered 12/30/19 16:17:32 Desc Main Document Page 13 of 15 14 Conclusion In conclusion, the Court denies the Waldos’ motion to reopen their 2008 bankruptcy case in order to seek relief from the Court’s summary judgment decision under Rule 60(d)(3) and the Court grants the Waldos’ request for waiving filing fees. Case 08-23583 Doc 208 Filed 12/30/19 Entered 12/30/19 16:17:32 Desc Main Document Page 14 of 15 15 DESIGNATION OF PARTIES TO RECEIVE SERVICE Service of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION REGARDING MOTION TO REOPEN AND SET ASIDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT PUIRSUANT TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(d)(3) will be effected through the Bankruptcy Noticing Center to each party listed below: By CM/ECF to: • Mark MiddlemasECFmailDistGroup@Lundbergfirm.com • Lon Jenkins trecfmail@ch13ut.org • United States Trustee USTPRegion19.SK.ECF@usdoj.
Filed June 7, 2012
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby: ORDERED, that the Defendant’s motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) construed as a motion pursuant to Rule 60(a) is granted, and it is further ORDERED, that the Defendant’s motion pursuant to Rule 62(b)(4) for a stay of execution pending the outcome of the motion for relief from judgment is denied as moot, and it is further ORDERED, that the Defendant’s motion for injunctive relief is denied as moot, and it is further ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court is directed to correct the judgment to include that the Plaintiff is entitled to post-judgment interest to be calculated pursuant to the federal rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
Filed December 8, 2014
Filed 12/08/14 Page 10 of 18 7 DM1\5201660.4 When Rule 60(b)(6) is available, the movant must “demonstrate that ‘extraordinary circumstances’ warrant relief.”
Filed February 28, 2007
Furthermore, assuming he has set forth a cognizable basis of jurisdiction under Rule 60(b), Plaintiff’s request for relief pursuant to that rule is untimely. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides that a motion seeking relief on the basis of “newly discovered evidence” or “fraud” must be “made . . . not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Plaintiff’s prior habeas action was dismissed by Judge Robertson on July 11, 2001.