It applied precedent to hold that appellate jurisdiction could not be created by dismissing remaining claims without prejudice, given the possibility that the plaintiffs could merely attempt to reinstate the claims at a later date. In its view, the Court stated that since the Rule 41(a) dismissal order as to at least three of the four dismissed defendants had been without prejudice, there was not a final decision as required by 28 U.S.C. §1291.B. Appeal No. 2In their return to the district court, the plaintiffs again tried to establish an appealable final decision for purposes of Section 1291 by requesting and obtaining from the district court a partial final judgment of dismissal with prejudice, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).After the district court acquiesced in this request, plaintiffs lodged their second appeal. In the second appellate journey to New Orleans, a different Fifth Circuit panel again dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because of the absence of a final decision.

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a district court’s denial of attorney’s fees, finding that voluntary dismissal with prejudice constituted a final judgment for the purposes of FRCP Rule 54(d) under Ninth Circuit law. Keith Mfg., Co. v. Butterfield, Case No. 19-1136 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 7, 2020) (Hughes, J.).

Elliott v. Archdiocese of New York, 682 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2012). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) states that a district court may direct entry of a final judgment as to fewer than all claims or parties, which would allow an immediate appeal, “only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” This lengthy opinion by Judge Greenberg (no relation), in a case involving allegations of sexual abuse of a minor child, dismisses an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court, which had granted motions to dismiss the complaint filed by four of the five defendants, entered a purported final judgment without having found that “there is no just reason for delay.”Generally, somewhat similar, in broad outline, to the rule in New Jersey state court, “an order which terminates fewer than all claims pending in an action or claims against fewer than all the parties to an action does not constitute a ‘final’ order” for purposes of appellate jurisdiction.

Brigham & Women’s Hosp. Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 761 F. App’x 995, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2019).In May 2019, Perrigo filed a Bill of Costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) seeking $90,637.02 from Brigham. Plaintiffs objected to all but $2,357 of these costs.

Thus, Fitbit argues that upon joinder it became a party to all of the challenges advanced by Apple and is entitled to challenge any aspect of the Final Written Decision that it is dissatisfied with.Keith Manufacturing Co. v. Butterfield, No. 19-1136, Courtroom 402Larry Butterfield appeals from a district court’s denial of his motion for attorney’s fees. The question presented to the Court is whether a stipulated dismissal with prejudice constitutes a “judgment” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a), allowing the defendant to move for an award of attorney’s fees.While an employee of Keith Manufacturing, Mr. Butterfield filed for a patent. A dispute arose and Mr. Butterfield left Keith Manufacturing.

A prevailing defendant in a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) case can recover costs even without a court finding that the plaintiff filed suit in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled. In Marx v. General Revenue Corp., the Supreme Court affirmed the 10th Circuit’s decision upholding a district court’s award of costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) to a prevailing debt collector in an FDCPA suit without a finding of bad faith and a purpose of harassment. Rule 54(d) provides that “[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.”

A prevailing defendant in a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) case can recover costs even without a court finding that the plaintiff filed suit in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled. In Marx v. General Revenue Corp., the Supreme Court affirmed the 10th Circuit’s decision upholding a district court’s award of costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) to a prevailing debt collector in an FDCPA suit without a finding of bad faith and a purpose of harassment. Rule 54(d) provides that “[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.”

The Court further explained that, based on precedent, the district court would have clearly abused its discretion by sua sponte dismissing Google’s counterclaims. Alternatively, iLOR argued that even if Google’s counterclaims remain pending, the district court’s judgment certifies the decision for immediate appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), and therefore vests the Court with jurisdiction to consider the district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief, grant of SJ of noninfringement, and sua sponte dismissal of iLOR’s remaining claims. Rule 54(b) states that “the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.”

Keith Manufacturing Co. v. Butterfield, Appeal No. 2019-1136 (Fed. Cir. April 7, 2020)In a case arising from a stipulated dismissal, the court addressed the extent to which it qualified as a “judgment” for purposes of Rule 54(d) The stipulated notice of dismissal, filed under FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), was silent as to costs and attorneys’ fees. Twelve days after the stipulated notice was filed, the defendant filed a motion for an award of its attorneys’ fees pursuant to FRCP 54(d). Rule 54 requires that an attorneys’ fee motion must be filed no later than 14 days after “judgment.”

Butterfield filed a timely motion for attorney’s fees for the whole litigation, including the patent-related grounds.[3]In denying Butterfield’s motion, the district court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Microsoft to hold that a Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) motion for costs and/or attorney’s fees requires a judgment from the court, and that a voluntary dismissal with prejudice is not such a judgment. Butterfield appealed.What’s a “Judgment”?