Id. SFTI is wrong as a matter of law (SFTI Br. at 11) that its boilerplate allegations of intent to deceive the public are sufficient because "intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally." Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). As the Federal Circuit stated in Exergen, "[a]lthough 'knowledge' and 'intent' may be averred generally, our precedent, like that of several regional circuits, requires that the pleadings allege sufficient underlying facts from which a court may reasonably infer that a party acted with the requisite state of mind." Exergen, 575 F.3d at 3

Ebeid, 616 F.3d at 996. The Ninth Circuit found that even this implied false certification “scheme” failed to meet the requirements of Rule 9(b), noting (right after the limited portion proferred in Relator-Plaintiffs’ Opposition for a contrary argument) that traditional Rule 9(b) 6

The Ninth Circuit held that such “suspicious circumstances” “d[id] not constitute a sufficient factual basis” for the allegations of insider trading at issue in that case. Id.; see also, e.g., Stewart v. Wachowski, No. CV 03-2873 MMM (VBKx), 2005 WL 6184235, at *10 n.48 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2005) (“Allegations based on . . . weak factual inferences do not satisfy Rule 9(b) pleading requirements.”). (Appx.) Here, SFTI’s allegations that expired patent numbers appear on products in stores is meaningless with respect to any intent associated with the act of marking. At most, SFTI’s complaint amounts to allegations of suspicious circumstances that are insufficient to satisfy its obligation to plead fraudulent intent with particularity.

DLJ Securities, 2002 WL 362794, at *8-10. Further, though Rule 9(b) does not apply, plaintiff “still must allege some facts, in non- conclusory terms, showing that [the GRP Defendants] and the WWD Defendants knowingly participated in DLJ Securities Corp.'s breach.” DLJ Securities, 2002 WL 362794, at *10 (citing Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21, 26 n. 4 (2d Cir.1990); Furlong v. Long Island College Hosp., 710 F.2d 922, 927 (2d Cir.1983))

See U.S. ex rel Graves v. ITT Educational Servs., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 487, 510 (S.D. Tex. 2003); see also Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d 948, 951(5th Cir. 1994).14 Rule 8(a)’s liberal pleading standards, and not Rule 9’s requirement of specificity apply to a retaliatory discharge claim. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose- Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220 at 238 n.23.15 13 State Farm argues that conspiracy claims under the FCA also have a third requirement, that “the government suffered damages as a result of the acts alleged.

It appears Plaintiffs mis-cited Section 4b, but to the extent Plaintiffs intended to assert a claim thereunder, they fail for two reasons. First, a general fraud on the market is not recognized under Section 4b. See Korwek v. Hunt, 646 F. Supp. 953, 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Second, Plaintiffs fail to satisfy Rule 9(b). See Kolbeck, 923 F. Supp. at 568. Case 1:07-cv-06377-SAS-HBP Document 106 Filed 06/23/2008 Page 47 of 51 -38- right of action for violations of that rule provision. See Fustok v. Conticommodity Servs. Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1069, 1070 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (recognizing that Rule 166.3 does not create a private right of action). Further, Rule 166.3 only applies to CFTC registrants, and Plaintiffs have not (and could not) allege that Amaranth Advisors, AGI, AMLP or Mr. Maounis were CFTC registrants during the Class Period. 17 C.F.R. § 166.3 (“Each Commission registrant . . . must diligently supervise . . . .”); CFTC v. Commodities Fluctuations Sys., Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (discussing Rule 166.3’s applicability to registrants).

Bonilla v. Volvo Car Corp., 150 F.3d 62, 70 (1st Cir. 1998). (6) In addition to their failure to plead with specificity under Rule 9(b), Plaintiffs’ Unjust Enrichment claims fail because: (1) Connecticut, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas Plaintiffs fail to plead any act making the Mayweather Defendants’ retention of any benefit unjust (Vertex, Inc. v. City of Waterbury, 278 Conn. 557, 573 (2006); Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 2011); WMCV Phase 3, LLC v. Shushok & McCoy, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1196-97 (D. Nev. 2010); Jurista v. Amerinox Processing, Inc., 492 B.R. 707, 754 (D.N.J. 2013); Gabriel v. Giant Eagle, Inc., Case No. 14-cv-00980, 2015 WL 4954578, at *15 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2015); Brooks v. GAF Materials Corp., 41 F. Supp. 3d 474, 485 (D.S.C. 2014); Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 525 (Tenn. 2005); Mary E. Case 2:15-cv-06230-RGK-PLA Document 55-6 Filed 09/07/16 Page 11 of 12 Page ID #:621 11 MAYWEATHER DEFENDANTS’ [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING 12(B)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Bonilla v. Volvo Car Corp., 150 F.3d 62, 70 (1st Cir. 1998). (6) In addition to their failure to plead with specificity under Rule 9(b), Plaintiffs’ Unjust Enrichment claims fail because: (1) Connecticut, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas Plaintiffs fail to plead any act making the Mayweather Defendants’ retention of any benefit unjust (Vertex, Inc. v. City of Waterbury, 278 Conn. 557, 573 (2006); Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 2011); WMCV Phase 3, LLC v. Shushok & McCoy, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1196-97 (D. Nev. 2010); Jurista v. Amerinox Processing, Inc., 492 B.R. 707, 754 (D.N.J. 2013); Gabriel v. Giant Eagle, Inc., Case No. 14-cv-00980, 2015 WL 4954578, at *15 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2015); Brooks v. GAF Materials Corp., 41 F. Supp. 3d 474, 485 (D.S.C. 2014); Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 525 (Tenn. 2005); Mary E. Case 2:15-cv-06573-RGK-PLA Document 52-6 Filed 09/07/16 Page 11 of 12 Page ID #:544 11 MAYWEATHER DEFENDANTS’ [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING 12(B)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Bonilla v. Volvo Car Corp., 150 F.3d 62, 70 (1st Cir. 1998). (6) In addition to their failure to plead with specificity under Rule 9(b), Plaintiffs’ Unjust Enrichment claims fail because: (1) Connecticut, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas Plaintiffs fail to plead any act making the Mayweather Defendants’ retention of any benefit unjust (Vertex, Inc. v. City of Waterbury, 278 Conn. 557, 573 (2006); Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 2011); WMCV Phase 3, LLC v. Shushok & McCoy, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1196-97 (D. Nev. 2010); Jurista v. Amerinox Processing, Inc., 492 B.R. 707, 754 (D.N.J. 2013); Gabriel v. Giant Eagle, Inc., Case No. 14-cv-00980, 2015 WL 4954578, at *15 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2015); Brooks v. GAF Materials Corp., 41 F. Supp. 3d 474, 485 (D.S.C. 2014); Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 525 (Tenn. 2005); Mary E. Case 2:15-cv-06664-RGK-PLA Document 34-6 Filed 09/07/16 Page 11 of 12 Page ID #:531 11 MAYWEATHER DEFENDANTS’ [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING 12(B)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Bonilla v. Volvo Car Corp., 150 F.3d 62, 70 (1st Cir. 1998). (6) In addition to their failure to plead with specificity under Rule 9(b), Plaintiffs’ Unjust Enrichment claims fail because: (1) Connecticut, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas Plaintiffs fail to plead any act making the Mayweather Defendants’ retention of any benefit unjust (Vertex, Inc. v. City of Waterbury, 278 Conn. 557, 573 (2006); Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 2011); WMCV Phase 3, LLC v. Shushok & McCoy, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1196-97 (D. Nev. 2010); Jurista v. Amerinox Processing, Inc., 492 B.R. 707, 754 (D.N.J. 2013); Gabriel v. Giant Eagle, Inc., Case No. 14-cv-00980, 2015 WL 4954578, at *15 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2015); Brooks v. GAF Materials Corp., 41 F. Supp. 3d 474, 485 (D.S.C. 2014); Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 525 (Tenn. 2005); Mary E. Case 2:15-cv-06574-RGK-PLA Document 48-6 Filed 09/07/16 Page 11 of 12 Page ID #:546 11 MAYWEATHER DEFENDANTS’ [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING 12(B)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9