Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 31: Handwritten Notes Case 3:01-cv-02402-AWT Document 161 Filed 04/02/2008 Page 6 of 11 7 This evidence is admissible as a basis for expert testimony, as it reflects calculations and measurements taken by Mr. Wicander in completing his report. See Fed. R. Evidence 703. Furthermore, the exhibit falls under the hearsay exception of present sense impression.

See ¶ l, supra; Doc. 359-13 at 2 (“The Plan Sponsors, acting by their respective Board of Trustees (or duly authorized committees thereof), may remove and replace any such member of the Committee at any time”). u. See ¶¶ b–g, supra. v. An expert in the area of judicial ethics regularly relies on statements of counsel regarding information they received (or did not receive) regarding a judge’s business and financial interests. Fed. R. Evid. 703. w. See ¶ v, supra, regarding statements of counsel. The extraordinarily close relationship Case 1:16-cv-06284-RWS Document 377 Filed 12/13/18 Page 18 of 30 13 between Judge Forrest and Mr. Chesler is supported by the record.

But Ms. Zhang’s report was not directed to the contents of the schematics—indeed, the schematics speak for themselves—but rather to describing Cellixsoft’s process for creating such schematics, a topic for which she is well qualified as a customer manager. Case 8:09-cv-01058-JVS -AN Document 680 Filed 08/01/11 Page 18 of 19 Page ID #:17021 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 16 - BROADCOM’S OPPOSITION TO EMULEX’S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: REVERSE ENGINEERING properly rely on the schematics for their opinions pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 703. Broadcom respectfully requests that the Court deny Emulex’s motion.

Though Dr. Mitchell does not address Federal Rule of Evidence 703, Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Jay Shulman, also reasonably relied on the Wexford policies and procedures in forming his opinions. Fed. R. Evid. 703. As discussed above, Dr. Shulman is extensively familiar with dental policies and procedures as an expert in correctional dentistry and they may be reasonably relied upon in forming his opinions in this case.

Here, Dr. Medvidovic does not provide an opinion on the subjective beliefs of Blue Coat’s employees, but rather uses the development documents as contemporaneous evidence demonstrating the technical benefits of the patents. See Fed. Rule of Evid. 703; see also Jamros, 70 F.3d at 1278 (“recognizing that expert opinion testimony is valuable where the circumstances were unwitnessed and thus required scientific deductions from circumstantial Case5:13-cv-03999-BLF Document274 Filed06/11/15 Page27 of 29 23 FINJAN’S OPPOSITION TO Case No. 13-cv-03999-BLF BLUE COAT’S DAUBERT MOTION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 evidence”). As such, Dr. Medvidovic should be able to rely on these documents in support of his opinions.

They may not; the Rule that bars McCune from relying on or introducing inadmissible hearsay applies doubly to Turner. See Fed. R. Evid. 703; Marvel, 726 F.3d at 136 (“a party cannot call an expert simply as a conduit for introducing hearsay under the guise that the testifying expert used the hearsay as the basis of his testimony.”).

Indeed, Rule 703, which Plaintiffs ignore, expressly permits experts to form their opinions on the basis of otherwise inadmissible facts and data. See Fed. R. Evid. 703 (“An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.”

Defendants’ attempt to have Mr. Regard testify to the facts involving their testing and validation processes and request to admit into evidence Mr. Regard’s chart amount to an impermissible end run around the Federal Rules of Evidence. When discussing F.R.E. 703, the Seventh Circuit stated “in explaining his opinion an expert witness normally is allowed to explain the facts underlying it, even if they would not be independently admissible. But the judge must make sure that the expert isn’t being used as a vehicle for circumventing the rules of evidence.”

An expert in the “particular field” that is relevant here—assessing the reasons why some of the biggest acts in the world like U2, Madonna, Guns ‘N’ Roses, Beyoncé, and Jay-Z chose not to conduct artist presales through a start-up company—would not base his report on the self-interested answers to interview questions by employees of the allegedly spurned company, reporting what someone allegedly told them about those artists’ interest in Songkick. Mr. Yurkerwich’s effort to do so violates Rule 703. See, e.g., ID Sec. Sys. Canada v. Checkpoint Sys, 249 F. Supp. 2d 622, 694–96 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (excluding expert opinion when only basis for lost profits was the financial projections of the Plaintiff’s president). Finally, Songkick argues that the Court need not intervene because Mr. Yurkerwich’s damages model is “modular,” allowing the jury to correct any problems by backing out the damages for artists who (despite his testimony) were not lost to Songkick by unlawful acts.

These articles broadly examine issues concerning standards organizations. Moreover, published academic articles in respected journals are exactly the sort of materials experts commonly rely on; there can be no doubt that the Bremer articles pass muster under Federal Rule of Evidence 703. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Sunny Merchandise Corp., 97 F. Supp. 3d 485, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (court refused to exclude expert opinion where expert relied Case 1:13-cv-01215-TSC Document 156 Filed 01/21/16 Page 12 of 26 9 on “articles about brand value” because “[s]uch sources. . . are clearly within the universe of those on which [she] could permissibly rely”).