Two days after the order issued, IOENGINE requested a conference to discuss the damages issues and the parties engaged in letter briefing. IOENGINE asked the district court to reconsider its decision, arguing that the expert’s testimony was admissible under FRE 703, even if the underlying licenses, verdicts and settlement agreements were not admissible. Alternatively, IOENGINE requested the ability to serve short addendums to its technical and damages reports, or a bifurcation or adjournment of the trial date.

In particular, Exh. 2217, relied upon by Broad expert Dr. Seeger and allegedly pertaining to the definition of guide RNA, was relied upon in opining on obviousness and thus should be excluded ToolGen maintained. ToolGen raised similar objections against Exhibits 2201, 2226, 2231, 2232, 2654, and 2683 (for the relationship as independent inventions between SaCas9 and chimeric Cas-9) and Exhibits 2226, 2231, 2232, 2454, 2683, and 2653.ToolGen further objected to "certain testimony of Broad's expert Dr. Seeger (i.e., Ex. 2454, ¶¶166–168, 233–243, 255–57) under FRE 702 and 703" as being irrelevant under FRE 403 and improper under FRE 702 and 703. The latter objection was based on ToolGen's assertions that the evidence is based on "inadmissible exhibits of the type upon which an expert would not ordinarily [or reasonably] rely."

Finally, Wi-LAN argued that the source code printouts should have been admitted into evidence through their expert witness. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 703, an expert witness can sometimes rely on evidence that has not been admitted if it is material that "experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on." Wi-LAN argued that its expert, despite not having authenticated the source code printout, should nonetheless be able to rely on the source code printout in their testimony and provide a copy to the jury.

Avondale opposed the motion.This issue is governed by Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 703 provides:“An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed.

Broad then cites examples of inconsistencies between the statements CVC has made in this interference and what was said in the Exhibit regarding whether reducing eukaryotic CRISPR to practice was difficult or routine.Broad's legal basis for its opposition to CVC's motion to exclude is that a party admission is not hearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) and Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). Even if not falling under this hearsay exception, Broad argues, Dr. Breaker as an expert is permitted to rely on these statements under Fed. R. Evid. 703. As for reliability, Broad argues that the statements at issue are ones the PTAB relied upon in Decisions on Motions in this interference and the '048 Interference.

The Court, agreeing with the district court, rejected this argument based on a lack of trustworthiness in the materials.Finally, Wi-LAN argued that the source code printout was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 703. The Court addressed this in two parts.

Upon the proper objection by legal counsel, it is possible to challenge or limit the testimony of an expert. At least, the court should prohibit an expert from merely “parroting” the opinions of other non-testifying experts or the court may instruct an expert to refrain from discussing certain assumptions that are not proven or offered into evidence, on the basis that such would cause more confusion and jury misuse than provide the appropriate probative value.Should you have any questions about the admissibility of a particular expert opinion, please contact the CSH Law Aviation Practice Group.Federal Rule Evidence 703; N.C. Rule Evidence 703 (If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.);State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 557 S.E.2d 500 (2001).Credle v. Smith & Smith, Inc.,42 F.Supp. 3d. 596 (D.N.J. 2013).Knous v. United States, 981 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2013).State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 557 S.E.2d 500 (2001); State v. Thompson, 188 N.C. App. 102, 654 S.E.2d 814 (2008), review denied, 662 S.E.2d 391 (N.C. 2008); State v. Durham, 176 N.C. App. 239, 625 S.E.2d 831 (2006); State v. Mobley, 684 S.E.2d 508 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).N.C. R. Evid. 702(a)(1).

The opinion, then, at least serves to alert lawyers and judges to the new requirements of § 907.03.A caution, though: The opinion in this case (¶¶10-12) segues from the Confrontation Clause to § 907.03 via the plurality opinion inWilliams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). In the course of concluding that references by a state’s expert to an outside lab report didn’t violate the Confrontation Clause, the Williams plurality cited Federal Rule of Evidence 703 (the federal counterpart to § 907.03) for the proposition that the references to the outside lab report were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted in the report, but only to explain the basis for the expert’s opinion. Id. at 2239-41.

The failure of counsel, or experts, to uncover such abuse was not by itself IAC. Concurring, Silverman emphasizes the interplay between FRE 703 (experts) and evidence relied upon by the expert to render her opinion. In this case, the issue was whether the petitioner’s assertion of childhood abuse becomes evidence and part of the record.

The failure of counsel, or experts, to uncover such abuse was not by itself IAC. Concurring, Silverman emphasizes the interplay between FRE 703 (experts) and evidence relied upon by the expert to render her opinion. In this case, the issue was whether the petitioner’s assertion of childhood abuse becomes evidence and part of the record.