Cunningham admitted that 20 to 30 percent of the material on his computer was child pornography. A subsequent “forensic analysis” revealed that 46 of the computer’s 212 shared files contained child pornography.Prior to trial, Cunningham’s attorney filed a Motion in Limine Concerning Pornographic Images and File Names under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 requesting that the trial court prohibit the Government from showing any of the child pornography videos obtained from Cunningham’s computer. Rule 403 requires the trial court to conduct a balancing test to determine if evidence has “probative value” or “is substantially outweighed by the danger of one or the more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”

No error in excluding as hearsay alleged discriminatory remarks. One remark "there's not a court in the land that could force me to hire Dr. Shervin back," excluded under FRE403 because nothing connected it to denial of job offer from another institution. Evidence of allegedly retaliatory comment by non-party (executive of a non-profit organization affiliated with, but separate from, school) not admissible as part-admissions under FRE801(d)(2)(D); also, could be upheld on FRE403 grounds because there was no evidence of school's involvement in decision. Court also properly excluded alleged vicarious admission (about being "on the same page" about hiring of plaintiff) where person who made comment held only a clinical associate position at Harvard and, thus, no proof that that any statements made regarding hiring were within the scope of his faculty appointment.

Grounds: Plaintiff who was fired for alleged dishonesty and insubordination, in connection with investigation of fire-extinguisher discharge, presented no reversible trial error. Challenge to FRE403 ruling was frivolous; plaintiff did not preserve error, and even if he did that was no error in admitting defense witnesses' non-hearsay statements of why employer decided to terminate plaintiff. Court also gave limiting instruction to prevent any misuse of the evidence.

Id.Pursuant to Rule 403, evidence will be deemed inadmissible (even if relevant) if its probative value is substantially outweighed by “the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issue[], misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time,” or the unnecessary presentation of cumulative evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 403; see alsoFla. Stat. § 90.403 (2015).

HOTF argued that allowing the plaintiffs to use such terms could improperly bias the jury against them. HOTF referenced Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and several decisions from the district courts, precluding the use of the term "patent troll" and other pejorative terms. Rule 403 permits a court to "exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury . . ."HOTF also pointed out that its business model was not relevant to any of the claims at trial since patent infringement and invalidity were not even issues that would be decided at trial.

”With respect to post-exposure warnings and design changes, the court first discussed that FRE 407 bars this evidence as subsequent remedial measures. Rather than addressing whether this evidence was possibly excepted under FRE 407, the court ruled that it was not admissible under FRE 403, stating: “the risk of unfair prejudice from this evidence is great. As noted above, it is a small step from using this evidence for the purpose of knowledge or causation, and using it for the purposes prohibited by Rule 407.

FRE 404(b) prohibition of "character evidence" not violated, where parallel evidence of harassment also tended to prove plan, motive or absence of mistake. Evidence not subject to exclusion for undue prejudice under FRE 403 because systematic pattern of harassment was highly probative of intent. Admission of some hearsay could not be shown to have had more than a slight effect on the jury's verdict; hence error was not reversible.

dismissed the claims against most of the plaintiffs, but the claims of fraud and failure to obtain informed consent against Dr. Schaefer went to trial. Ward’s signed consent form was admitted into evidence at trial, but he claimed he had no memory of discussing it with his doctors or signing it. The jury found in favor of Dr. Schaefer on all claims. Ward appealed.Ward argued that the court erred in refusing to allow the introduction of the patent for ACP-501 because the patent specified that it was a method for reducing arterial cholesterol in patients not suffering from LCAT deficiency. Ward argued that this language in the patent made clear that the drug was not appropriate for patients like him. The district court ruled that the patent was inadmissible because it had been offered without foundation, and that it had nothing to do with the issues of fraud and informed consent. On appeal, the First Circuit offered a different analysis but arrived at the same outcome, holding that the Fed. R. Evid. 403 balancing test “disposes of the matter.”The First Circuit noted that the patent’s description of ACT-501 “is of absolutely no relevance to Dr. Schaefer’s alleged failure to apprise Ward of the potential risks and rewards of taking the drug through expanded access.” The Court went on to point out that even if the single sentence in the patent pointing to its exclusion for patients with LCAT deficiency could surmount Fed. R. Evid. 401’s low bar for relevancy, this is “grossly outweighed” under the Rule 403 balancing test by the likely “confusion created and time wasted” in including the entire document, which is rife with “irrelevant technicalities” and “littered with scientific jargon.” The Court colorfully described the patent’s multiple pages filled with lines of DNA sequences as an “alphabet soup,” and other pages containing “black-and-white figures that might seem like a Rorschach test to a lay jury.” Hence, the Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ref

ToolGen's second basis for its Motion to Exclude is related to Exhibit Nos. 2708, 2710, 2716, 2734, 2751, 2770, 2771, 2772, 2773, 2775, 2777, 2780, 2781, 2782, 2784, 2829, 2830, 2842, and 2845, introduced in support of Broad's Substantive Motion No. 1, and also Exhibit Nos. 2704, 2705, and 2793 introduced in support of Broad's Substantive PreliminaryMotion No. 3, and was that they were hearsay and inadmissible under FRE 801 and 802. These Exhibits all contain out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted, specifically "to prove that Broad's experiments allegedly showed successful reduction to practice of Broad's Proposed Count 2."ToolGen's third ground for its Motion to Exclude is related to Exhibits published after December 12, 2012, as being irrelevant under FRE 401 and 403 for not providing information about the state of the art at the time the application was filed. In particular, Exh. 2217, relied upon by Broad expert Dr. Seeger and allegedly pertaining to the definition of guide RNA, was relied upon in opining on obviousness and thus should be excluded ToolGen maintained.

He cited numerous Fifth Circuit appellate court decisions admitting EEOC letters of determination or reasonable cause – but not letters of violation – on the grounds that “a letter of reasonable cause is more tentative in its conclusions whereas a letter of violation states the categorical legal conclusion that a violation has taken place.”The court granted Shell’s motion and excluded the EEOC determination letter from evidence at trial. It noted that a governmental agency’s determination is presumed admissible under the public records exception to the hearsay rule, but held that any probative value of the EEOC’s determination letter in this case was outweighed by its prejudicial effect under FRE 403. In particular, the EEOC’s references to an illegal medical examination and unlawful demotion were legal conclusions more akin to a ruling of law or letter of violation than an investigatory report with findings of fact and could confuse or prejudice a jury against Shell.By focusing on the EEOC’s characterization of facts and law – and not the official title of the letter or report in question – the court made clear that: (1) FRE 803(8)(A)(iii)’s hearsay exception does not automatically eclipse FRE 403; and (2) courts can serve as important and active gatekeepers and exclude evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, jury confusion, or other factors under the federal rules.In light of Nuccio, employment litigators should carefully examine written statements by government agencies to determine whether any misstatements of fact or conclusions of law provide a basis for excluding potentially harmful evidence.