to Judge Forrest, section 365(b)(1), unlike several other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, does not explicitly require that a default be material, suggesting that Congress did not intend a materiality analysis in connection with the unexpired lease cure and adequate assurance requirements. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(N) (cause for conversion or dismissal of a chapter 11 case includes "material default by the debtor with respect to a confirmed plan"); § 1208(c)(6) (substantially the same for chapter 12); § 1307(c)(6) (substantially the same for chapter 13). Moreover, Judge Forrest explained, "section 365(b)(2) specifically exempts certain types of defaults involving ipso facto and forfeiture clauses; nonmaterial defaults are not one of the exempted categories." Id.Despite its determination that the bankruptcy court had erred, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the bankruptcy court's failure properly to analyze section 365(b)(1)'s "curative requirements" was harmless error under Fed. R. Civ. P. 61, which provides that "the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights" (made applicable to bankruptcy cases by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9005).According to Judge Forrest, the only outstanding issue was the landlord's alleged right to "adequate protection of future performance" under section 365(b)(1)(C), because any existing breaches had been cured or had been found by the bankruptcy court to be "only minor deviations from the contract terms." Therefore, she wrote, "any adequate assurance responsive to the alleged defaults would be little more than simple promises not to deviate from the contract terms again." Furthermore, Judge Forrest noted, the landlord "has not explained how any additional assurance of future performance would have substantively impacted its right to full performance of the lease terms." Id. at 1240.The Ninth Circuit ultimately ruled that any error committed by the bankruptcy court was "harmless." Noting the below-market n

Panel affirms judgment, but vacates (on qualified immunity grounds) the damage awards against the individual defendants, because discrimination on the basis of being engaged to marry person of different race was not "clearly established." District court committed error in not granting the hearing officer's report collateral estoppel/issue preclusion effect at trial (on the issue of whether plaintiff committed charged misconduct that led to dismissal, sleeping at work and not responding to calls), but error was harmless under FRCP61. Jury was presented with an array of evidence establishing plaintiff's misconduct (including his own cross-examination at trial).

Later that day, a new letter from Willis arrived at Hendricks' home, which included an additional complaint-her 'failure to cooperate with a criminal investigation.'"The employer, post-trial, argued that the plaintiff sued the wrong entity and failed to join the right one (the Office of the Clermont County Sheriff), but the panel holds that the argument comes too late: after the jury reached its verdict (Fed. R. Civ. P. 61). The defendant also argued that the entity named as the employer does not have the legal capacity to be sued, but the panel holds that defendant was obliged to raise this by way of its answer: "Rule 9(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure says that a party must raise an opponent's 'capacity to sue or be sued . . . by a specific denial, which must state any supporting facts that are peculiarly within the party's knowledge' (emphasis added).