Use of Falsified Information in Financial Statements by Damages Expert Does Not Entitle Defendant to Relief from Judgment 05-1537 August 07, 2006 Alexander, Cortney S. Decision Last Month at the Federal Circuit - September 2006Judges: Linn, Dyk (author), Prost [Appealed from: E.D. Mich., Judge Cohn] In Venture Industries Corp. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., No. 05-1537 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 7, 2006), the Federal Circuit affirmed-in-part and vacated-in-part the district court’s denial of Autoliv ASP, Inc.’s (“Autoliv”) motion for new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) and (3). In 1995, Venture Industries Corporation (“Venture”) and Autoliv settled a patent dispute.

This article was originally published in Law360 on May 24, 2023, and is republished here with permission.InCompañía de Inversiones Mercantiles SA v.Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua SABde CV, a panel of judges on theU.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuitrecently heldin a 2-1 decision that the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado had not abused its discretion when it denied a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) motion to vacate its prior confirmation of a foreign arbitral award, even though a foreign court in the country where the arbitration took place had annulled the award after the district court's initial recognition.The decision is notable because under the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, U.S. federal courts usually defer to the annulment orders of courts located in the country where the arbitral award was issued.[1]This is only the second time a U.S. federal court of appeals decided the public policy interests of letting the initial foreign arbitral award stand outweigh the interests of comity toward a subsequent annulment ruling in the same foreign jurisdiction. And it is the first time such a decision was based on Rule 60(b)(5).Background In 2005, a group of Mexican companies known as Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua SAB de CV, or GCC, entered into a shareholder agreement with Compañía de Inversiones Mercantiles SA, or CIMSA, a Bolivian

d a defense verdict was reversed with a remand for additional discovery.Morgan demonstrates:(1) the need for timely discovery requests;2) the importance of specific and timely objections to discovery; and,3) that “hide the ball” tactics won’t work.Michael Berman.Morgan demonstrates: (1) the need for timely discovery requests; (2) the importance of specific and timely objections to discovery; and, (3) that “hide the ball” tactics won’t work.Plaintiff, Mr. Morgan, alleged that he was battered by a police officer while he was handcuffed. He sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. The police officer denied the allegations. The Fourth Circuit wrote:The central issue in this appeal involves a discovery violation that was not revealed to the requesting party until near the end of trial. A jury found in favor of a police officer on allegations of excessive force and other claims. We consider whether the district court erred in denying the plaintiff’s post-trial motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3), based on the officer’s failure to disclose another, similar excessive-force lawsuit that had been filed against him.Upon our review, we conclude that this discovery violation was misconduct under Rule 60(b)(3), and that the plaintiff satisfied the other factors required for relief under that Rule. We therefore hold that the district court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s request for relief under Rule 60(b)(3). We reverse the district court’s ruling, vacate the court’s entry of final judgment against the plaintiff, and remand the case to the district court with instructions to award the plaintiff a new trial.Morgan v. Tincher, No. 21-2060, __ F.4th __ (4th Cir. Jan. 3, 2024).The Court further explained that:Well before trial, but ten days after the deadline established by the district court’s scheduling order, Morgan submitted discovery requests to Officer Tincher. As relevant to the present appeal, Morgan asked Officer Tincher in the interrogatories to disclose any al

Decided: July 13, 2015 The Fourth Circuit held that the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence is clear that the defendant’s motion constitutes a mixed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) and remanded to the district court to allow the defendant the opportunity to decide whether to abandon his improper claim or to proceed with a successive habeas petition. In 2004, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) began investigating McRae’s codefendant, Rodney Green, after becoming suspicious of drug trafficking.

The Court has had a busy day, having decided cases of significance to litigators and interest groups, but none is the blockbuster decision in societally divisive matters that the general public has been awaiting. In short, this is a business-as-usual day, with opinions sometimes showing broad consensus on the Court, but with some not-unexpected dissents.Kemp v. United Statesconcerned whether a district court’s mistake of law is correctable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) or 60(b)(6). In an opinion written by Justice Thomas and joined or concurred in by all of the other Justices save for Justice Gorsuch, the Court has held, in a somewhat hyper-technical decision, that, because Kemp’s motion alleged such a legal error, it was cognizable under Rule 60(b)(1) and untimely under Rule 60(c)’s one-year limitation period.

(“CIMSA v. GCC”), a panel of judges on the Tenth Circuit held in a 2-1 decision that the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado had not abused its discretion when it denied a Rule 60(b)(5) motion to vacate its prior confirmation of a foreign arbitral award, even though a foreign court in the country where the arbitration took place had annulled the award after the district court’s initial recognition. The decision is notable because under the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention), U.S. federal courts usually defer to the annulment orders of courts located in the country where the arbitral award was issued.This is only the second time a U.S. federal court of appeals decided the public policy interests of letting the initial foreign arbitral award stand outweigh the interests of comity toward a subsequent annulment ruling in the same foreign jurisdiction. And it is the first time such a decision was based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).1BackgroundIn 2005, a group of Mexican companies known as Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua S.A.B. de C.V. (GCC) entered into a shareholder agreement with Compania de Inversiones Mercantiles S.A. (CIMSA), a Bolivian company, regarding interests in a cement company based in Bolivia.2The parties agreed to submit any disputes to Bolivia’s national chapter of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission. When a dispute arose in 2011, the parties initiated arbitration proceedings in Bolivia. The Bolivian arbitration tribunal ruled in CIMSA’s favor and awarded $34 million.3In September 2015, CIMSA petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Colorado to confirm the award under the New York Convention. While this petition was pending, GCC initiated proceedings in Bolivia to annul the damages portion of the award.4GCC’s challenge was initially successful; a Bolivian judge annulled the damages award in October 2015. In December 2016, however, the Plurinational Constitution

Although Mediator Had a Duty to Disclose Dealings with One of the Firms in the Litigation, Relief from Judgment Was Inappropriate Under Rule 60(b) 13-1529 June 24, 2014 Decision Last Month at the Federal Circuit - July 2014Judges: Prost, Rader, O'Malley (author) [Appealed from: E.D. Tex., Judge Schneider] In CEATS, Inc. v. Continental Airlines, Inc., No. 13-1529 (Fed. Cir. June 24, 2014), the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) was not warranted. CEATS, Inc. (“CEATS”) sued Continental Airlines, Inc., Alaska Airlines, Inc., Horizon Air Industries, Inc., Delta Airlines, Inc., Jetblue Airways Corp., United Airlines, Inc., Virgin America, Inc., US Airways, Inc., Ticketmaster, LLC., Ticketsnow.com, Inc., Live Nation Worldwide, Inc., and Airtran Airways, Inc. (collectively “Continental”) for patent infringement.

In Kemp, the defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)’s catchall provision “any other reason that justifies relief.” The defendant’s substantive argument to the trial court was that it made a legal error.First, the additional procedural difficulty: The trial court denied the defendant’s motion as untimely.

Companies specifically should take note that, depending on the language provided in an assignment provision of an employment contract, pre-invention innovations may not be subject to assignment obligation merely because those innovations later contribute to protectable intellectual property.296-2. Federal Circuit Affirms District Court's Grant of Motion to Vacate for Fraud in Expert's Prior TestimonyThe Federal Circuit recently affirmed a decision by the United States District Court for the Central District of California setting aside a judgment and injunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) for fraud and misrepresentation by an opposing party. See Cap Exp., LLC v. Zinus, Inc., No. 2020-2087, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 13322 (Fed. Cir. May 5, 2021) (Before Dyk, Bryson, and Hughes, Circuit Judges) (Opinion for the Court, Dyk, Circuit Judge).

Id. ¶¶ 23-25.The atmospherics of plaintiff’s claims were not improved by its concession at hearing that defendant Sisson didn’t prevent it from presenting documents at trial that plaintiff, itself, controlled during the discovery period. Judge Robinson noted that plaintiff’s delay in reviewing the boxes, or in securing access to its own shareholder’s emails, could hardly be laid at a defendant’s doorstep:“The Court finds it troubling that Plaintiff clearly failed to review relevant documents in its possession, both before and during the pendency of this litigation, which review would have alerted counsel to their existence, and now blames [a defendant] for withholding this information from the Court.”Id. ¶ 54.Without a North Carolina guidepost, the Court relied on interpretations of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) for the requirement that a moving party show the other side’s fraud by “clear and convincing” evidence. See Turner v. Duke Univ., 381 S.E.2d 706, 713 (N.C. 1989) (“Decisions under the federal rules are thus pertinent for guidance and enlightenment in developing the philosophy of the North Carolina rules.”).