Rule 51 - Instructions to the Jury; Objections; Preserving a Claim of Error

7 Analyses of this statute by attorneys

  1. Seventh Circuit

    Outten & Golden LLPPaul MollicaApril 5, 2011

    Employer did not err in excluding evidence of how phone recording system worked (FRE403), hearsay statements by client and customers about her performance. District court erred in instructing jury without proving partes with opportunity to read and object to charge under FRCP51(b), but error was harmless, because charge was substantially accurate in its definitions of retaliation and "materially adverse action." FRCP60(b) motion on judicial bias properly denied.Mullin v. Temco Machinery, Inc., 732 F.3d 772, 120 FEP 494 (7th Cir. 2013).

  2. Serio-US Industries, Inc. v. Plastic Recovery Technologies, Corp.

    Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLPAaron J. CapronAugust 10, 2006

    On appeal, Serio-US argued that the district court’s jury instructions contained claim construction errors. The Federal Circuit noted that even though Serio-US submitted proposed jury instructions on the second day of trial, the record did not show that Serio-US objected to the district court’s jury instructions, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c). Thus, the Court held that Serio-US could only appeal “plain error” under Rule 51(d), which in the Fourth Circuit requires a showing of a “miscarriage of justice.”

  3. Second Circuit

    Outten & Golden LLPPaul MollicaApril 5, 2011

    Nevertheless, district court erred in instructing jury that the "ability to interact with others is a major life activity" and that jury could find that plaintiff was perceived by employer as "having relations with others that were characterized on a regular basis by severe problems." (Defendant failed to make specific objection to the charge, Fed. R. Civ. P. 51, but court took notice of previous briefing of same issue on summary judgment.) Court finds that "interacting with others" may constitute a major life activity under the ADA, noting split in the circuits, but rejects Ninth Circuit's framework in favor of narrower conception that plaintiff's disability must "severely limit[] the fundamental ability to communicate with others, i.e., to initiate contact with other people and respond to them, or to go among other people (citing examples of autism, agoraphobia and depression).

  4. Henry v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, No. 08-1477 (2d Cir. Aug. 4, 2010)

    Outten & Golden LLPPaul MollicaAugust 3, 2010

    2008); McInnis v. Town of Weston, 375 F. Supp. 2d 70, 83 (D. Conn. 2005) (citing Schreiber v. Worldco, LLC, 324 F. Supp. 2d 512, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). While we caution that none of these factors should be regarded as dispositive, we think this framework will often provide a useful approach to the admission or exclusion of remarks not directly related to the adverse action against the plaintiff, and employ it here."In this case, the panel evaluated statements said to be racially biased, only to find them too remote in time or remote from the decision-makers to warrant admission.On other assignments of error, the panel holds that (1) the employee failed to make an offer of proof on another motion in limine (regarding other incidents of discrimination suffered by co-workers), thus forfeiting any objection (FRE103(a)); (2) he also forfeited his objection (by not making it on a timely basis) that the district court judge failed to share the final draft of the jury charge with the parties (Fed. R. Civ. P. 51); and (3) the use of McDonnell Douglas burden-shifiting terminology in the jury charge was not plain error.The one issue that gives pause is the part of the instruction that required the jury to find that the employer's avowed reasons for its actions were "pretext." At trial, this is not the standard - an employee must show only, in light of the entire record, that discrimination more likely than not motivated the adverse action. "

  5. Seventh Circuit

    Outten & Golden LLPMarch 18, 2008

    y a comparable employee upon whom to base a prima facie case. Only comparable employee (who remained out beyond 180 days but was rehired) was rehired at a time where the company was prospering, and because he had special skills that the plaintiff did not possess. Failure to rehire plaintiff came when company was in economic distress.Lewis v. City of Chicago Police Dept., 590 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 2009). Panel: SIMON, Evans, Sykes. Claims on Appeal: Title VII discriminatory assignment (sex) and retaliation. Disposition Below: Judgment after a jury trial [defendant]. Outcome on Appeal: Affirmed [defendant]. Grounds: Jury charge was not made inaccurate by unintentional inclusion of word "also," which according to plaintiff implied that she had to prove her discrimination claim as a pre-condition to retaliation liability. Jury was not misinformed: it heard closing arguments that corrected the misimpression and the charge as a whole was correct. Moreover, plaintiff waived error at trial under FRCP 51(b)(2). Misprinted verdict form including wrong claim as to individual officer defendant was promptly corrected by court wand was not error. District court did not err in submitting question of "materially adverse action" to jury on discrimination claim, where defendant presented evidence contesting whether the failure to assign plaintiff to temporary duty in Washington D.C. had any effect on her career. Instruction was also correct for retaliation claim and was consistent with Burlington Northern. Instruction correctly required the jury to find intentional discrimination. Plaintiff waived issue about whether mixed-motive instruction should have been given where her tendered instruction was inadequate statement of law, then abandoned request at jury instruction conference. Exclusion of "pretext" instruction was not error. Objection to failure of district court to give general instructions (burden of proof, weight of evidence etc.) waived and not plain error. District court did not err in exc

  6. Second Circuit

    Outten & Golden LLPMarch 17, 2008

    Nevertheless, district court erred in instructing jury that the "ability to interact with others is a major life activity" and that jury could find that plaintiff was perceived by employer as "having relations with others that were characterized on a regular basis by severe problems." (Defendant failed to make specific objection to the charge, Fed. R. Civ. P. 51, but court took notice of previous briefing of same issue on summary judgment.) Court finds that "interacting with others" may constitute a major life activity under the ADA, noting split in the circuits, but rejects Ninth Circuit's framework in favor of narrower conception that plaintiff's disability must "severely limit[] the fundamental ability to communicate with others, i.e., to initiate contact with other people and respond to them, or to go among other people (citing examples of autism, agoraphobia and depression).

  7. Ecolab v. Paraclipse

    Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLPApril 3, 2002

    Paraclipse manufactures and sells a competing insect trap, the Insect Inn IV trap (“Insect IV”), and was sued by Ecolab previously in the same court because of an earlier product, the Insect Inn II trap (“Insect II”). Concerning the jury verdict of noninfringement, the Federal Circuit found that the jury instructions were partially flawed and that the error was prejudicial. Ecolab at trial, however, failed to contest the jury instructions and/or propose alternative instructions for the Court’s consideration. Thus, the Court considered whether Ecolab’s failure to object to the instructions constituted waiver under Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 or whether its objection at the Markman hearing was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal under the Rule’s futility exception. At the Markman hearing, Ecolab fully briefed its position concerning the proper construction of certain terms in the claims.