Unless the constitutional analysis prescribed by Stern mandates a different result (a topic explored in other articles), if the judge determines the entire proceeding is core, the bankruptcy judge can issue final rulings, which are subject to appeal under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §158(a) rendering Rule 9033 irrelevant. If, however, a proceeding, or a part thereof, is found to be noncore, the bankruptcy judge can only issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on the noncore components to the district court, and the provisions of Bankruptcy Rule 9033 apply. Bankruptcy Rule 9033 is modeled, at least in part, after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, which governs the treatment of recommendations from a magistrate judge, and the process of getting the proposed findings before the district court is largely the same. Any proposed findings entered in a noncore proceeding must be served by the clerk of the court on all the parties "forthwith."

The motion was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation as to the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; W.D. Tex. Appx C, R. 1(d). The magistrate judge filed his Report and Recommendation on March 3, 2017 (Clerk's Doc. No. 47), recommending that this court deny the motion.

re simple enough: the Court would strike Excalibur's answer and enter judgment in favor [of plaintiff]." Excalibur I, 2014 WL 941444, at *10. A hearing will be held as ordered in this Ruling, after which defendant will be ordered to post pre-pleading security within seven days of this Court's order reflecting the amount of pre-pleading security to be posted. See Arrowood Surplus Lines, 2010 WL 1416747, at *2. Accordingly, plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Dkt. #26) is denied without prejudice to renew at a future time, if appropriate.II. CONCLUSIONFor the reasons stated above, plaintiff's Motion for Pre-Pleading Security (Dkt. #11) is granted such that a hearing date to determine the amount of pre-pleading security will be set, and plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Dkt. #26) is denied without prejudice to renew at a 14 future time, if appropriate.See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(written objections to ruling must be filed within fourteen calendar days after service of same); FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a), 6(e) & 72; Rule 72.2 of the Local Rules for United States Magistrate Judges, United States District Court for the District of Connecticut; Small v. Secretary, H&HS, 892 F.2d. 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989)(failure to file timely objection to Magistrate Judge’s recommended ruling may preclude further appeal to Second Circuit).1 Attached to plaintiff's brief (Dkt. #12) are copies of case law, and attached to the Declaration of Rosemarie D. Robles, dated May 19, 2015 (Dkt. #13) are the following exhibits: copy of the treaty reinsurance contract entitled, "Accountant, Lawyers, Miscellaneous and Real Estate Errors and Omissions Liability Cessions Treaty, effective April 1, 2001 ["E & O Treaty"](Exh. 1); copy of reinsurance bill, dated May 1, 2015 (Exh. 2); and copy of monthly bulletin from Connecticut Insurance Department, dated May 9, 2012. (Exh. 3).2 Attached to the Declaration of Angela Aloisio ["Aloisio Decl."], dated June 16, 2015 (Dkt. #31) are the following exhibits: copy of report from New York State

Court: United States District Court for the District of MassachusettsPlaintiffs Robert and Judith Gillis of Massachusetts filed this action against numerous defendants in Massachusetts state court, alleging the defendants caused Robert Gillis to be exposed to asbestos and to, thereafter, develop mesothelioma.Defendant John Crane Inc. filed a notice of removal with the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. After filing a motion to amend their complaint, the plaintiffs named PBV Inc. and Copeland Corporation LLC as additional defendants. Copeland is an Indiana corporation with its principal place of business in Indiana. PBV is an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business located in Ohio. PBV filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was referred to the magistrate judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(1).PBV claimed that pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed because they failed to demonstrate that PBV had sufficient contacts with Massachusetts such that the court could exercise personal jurisdiction over it.Robert Gillis allegedly sustained occupational exposure to asbestos by “servic[ing] products, building systems, machinery, and other apparatuses[.]” Relevant to PBV and Copeland, he allegedly serviced and installed Copeland compressors, which included asbestos-containing compressor gaskets manufactured by PBV, while working as a pipefitter and HVAC worker for Harris Environmental Systems in Massachusetts from 1968 to 2008. Beginning in 1966, PBV was a major supplier for Copeland’s products and worked with Copeland to design and manufacture gaskets for use in Copeland compressors. According to Copeland, PBV was the sole gasket supplier for its compressors. Though unable to identify the manufacturer of gaskets replaced, the pla

The second takeaway is that, if litigators are going to prevail in discovery disputes, they are going to have to prevail in front of the magistrate judge who is supervising the discovery process. Under 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), the magistrate judge’s orders are reviewed under a clearly erroneous or contrary to law standard. Even if the district judge might have ruled differently, the magistrate judge’s views will carry the day except in the most egregious cases of error.When the magistrate judge orders a remote deposition instead of a 62-hour jaunt to a distant tropical island, that’s going to be a tough order to overturn.

The magistrate judge explained that in the case at hand, interrogatories were a better discovery vehicle for the topics and that a 30(b)(6) deposition on those topics would be overly burdensome. The plaintiff raised several objections to the protective order.The district court reviewed the magistrate judge’s order for clear error under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). First, the court found that the magistrate judge had not based the ruling on the premise that 30(b)(6) depositions are per se inappropriate vehicles for discovery on contentions and affirmative defenses.

On January 13, 2020, LCS filed objections to Judge Aaron’s rulings on attorney’s fees.Judge Torres found that LCS and its attorneys failed to timely file the objections to Magistrate Judge Aaron’s award of attorney’s fees. Judge Torres ruled that because the original order from Judge Aaron was issued on May 29, 2019, LCS had 14 days from then to object to the rulings under FRCP 72. The Court ruled that LCS and its counsel’s misunderstanding of statutory deadlines was not a ground for receiving an extension of time to object to the Court’s findings.

On May 26, 2020, Magistrate Judge John Anderson granted Plaintiffs’ motion, finding that Capital One failed to meet its burden of establishing a valid privilege.District Court AffirmsCapital One objected to the Magistrate Judge’s ruling and sought relief from the District Court Judge under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). The Magistrate Judge’s decision was subject to evaluation under a “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard.

Although others courts have denied similar motions to compel, Capital One demonstrates that data breach victims cannot assume that cybersecurity reports will not be produced and should be careful to limit the use and distribution of the report. Capital One has filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, so the District Court will take a second look at this issue.

Capital One responded that the district court owes no deference to the magistrate judge’s decision, and that the plaintiffs are attempting to advance the wrong legal standard. Capital One argues it was justified in submitting additional clarifying evidence because the “clearly erroneous” standard is a mixed question of fact and law, and the court may consider all relevant evidence under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a).At the time of publication of this alert, the appeal remains pending before the district judge.TakeawaysBased on this new decision, companies should consider taking the following steps to best establish their position that a post-breach forensic report is protected by the attorney work product doctrine.