debtor (i.e., a court-approved restructuring agreement between the debtor and its creditors).If the High Court enters a final liquidation order, the court convenes a meeting of creditors, during which creditors can file their claims against the debtor and nominate final liquidators for the debtor. The final liquidators are entrusted with liquidating the debtor's assets and distributing the proceeds to creditors in accordance with statutory priorities. The 1973 CA and the Insolvency Act also give liquidators the power to commence and defend litigation and to take certain other actions on the debtor's behalf.In July 2022, the JPLs filed a motion with the Bankruptcy Court for an order: (i) modifying the order recognizing the Rescue Proceeding to recognize the Liquidation under chapter 15 as a foreign main proceeding, and recognizing the JPLs as the debtor's foreign representatives; and (ii) substituting the JPLs for the BRPs in all matters pending before the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(c) (made applicable to chapter 15 cases and "contested matters" by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7025 and 9014(c)).The Manufacturer objected to the motion. It argued that: (i) the JPLs were attempting to commence a new chapter 15 proceeding "under the guise of a purported 'amendment' to the [recognition order] without even attempting to satisfy the requirements [for recognition] under the Bankruptcy Code or the Bankruptcy Rules"; (ii) because the Rescue Proceeding recognized by the Bankruptcy Court was terminated long before the JPLs filed their motion and the BRPs no longer had any authority to act on the debtor's behalf, the relief that the BRPs had pursued on behalf of the debtor (including obtaining discovery) was also terminated; and (iii) the JPLs failed to demonstrate that the debtor needed chapter 15 relief to protect its business or assets, or to preserve the causes of action in the litigation filed by the JPLs against the Manufacturer on the debtor's behalf in the U.S. District Court for t

After a trial, the jury found in favor of King on both counts.On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Johnson argued that the district court erred in substituting her as a defendant in her official capacity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d)—which provides that an “action does not abate when a public officer who is a party in an official capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office while the action is pending”—because under Virginia law, once she became sheriff, it was the beginning of an entirely new office. That is, Johnson argued that each sheriff under Virginia law is a “singular entity” who is “legally independent of predecessors and successors,” and thus she could not be substituted in her official capacity and held liable for her predecessor’s conduct during his term in office.

r. Habelt did not. The District Court chose the Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi (PERSM) to serve as lead plaintiff. PERSM then filed two amended complaints alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, specifically asserting that the company and certain of its executives made false or materially misleading statements about CMS’s regulatory price-setting process and iRhythm’s knowledge of these risks. The District Court granted iRhythm’s motion to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim prior to certifying any class. PERSM chose not to appeal the judgment, but Mr. Habelt, who at this point was just a putative class member even though he was the named plaintiff in the case, appealed the dismissal.In a split decision, the three-judge panel held that Mr. Habelt lacked standing to appeal because he was not a party to the action. Judges Thomas and Bea noted the caption of a case is not dispositive to identifying parties to the action. They pointed to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25, which recognizes that the case caption does not necessarily represent the current state of proceedings. Rather, the primary indicator of party status is the allegations in the operative complaint, and the judges found no mention of Mr. Habelt or his individual claims. They also held that a putative class member has no rights as a party before the class in question is certified. While there are “exceptional circumstances” that allow non-parties standing for appeals, the panel found Mr. Habelt was not “significantly” involved in the District Court proceedings such that his inclusion at this stage would be merited.Judge Bennett wrote a lengthy dissent. He held that Mr. Habelt was a party to the case, as he initiated the suit, remained part of the action through the operative complaint, never actively removed himself from the action, and was covered by the substantive allegations of the amended complaints. He further noted that the PSLRA creates the system to appoint a lead plaintiff, bu

The plaintiff, moreover, demands responses to written discovery from Old Monterey, even though that discovery is identical to that propounded upon New Monterey. This forces Old Monterey to move to substitute out of the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(c).Magistrate Judge William V. Gallo was not pleased with the plaintiff's insistence on keeping Old Monterey in the case:"What is going on in this case is unnecessary, aggressive litigation that will delay this case in the future—for no good reason.Old Monterey contends it should be terminated from this case because New Monterey is 'effectively 'the same entity,'as Old Monterey.

ary 6, 2017, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. filed six similar petitions for IPR against the patents-in-suit. Also on January 6, 2017, Akorn Inc. filed six more similar petitions for IPR against the patents-in-suit. On March 31, 2017, Teva and Akorn were joined with the corresponding Mylan proceedings. After Allergan assigned the patents to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, the Tribe moved to terminate the IPRs, invoking its sovereign immunity. The IPR petitioners filed their opposition to the motion on October 13, 2017. The Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe filed its reply on October 20, 2017, and the motion is currently pending at the PTAB. However, on October 20, 2017, the Eastern District of Texas (Judge William Bryson) held that numerous claims of four of the six patents-in-suit were invalid for obviousness and this included all of the claims that Allergan was asserting pursuant to a court order limiting the number of claims that could be asserted. During consideration of a Motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(c) to join the Tribe as a necessary party to the ANDA case, the Eastern District of Texas expressed “serious concerns about the legitimacy of the tactic that Allergan and the Tribe have employed” effectively allowing Allergan “to rent – the Tribe’s sovereign immunity in order to defeat the pending IPR proceeding in the PTO.” The Court also questioned whether Allergan transferred all substantial rights in the patents to be considered a patent owner because it retained the rights to receive royalties on the sale of Restasis. The Court also cited Ninth Circuit precedent, holding that a Native American tribe waived sovereign immunity by intervening in a lawsuit. The Eastern District of Texas ultimately decided that it did not need to resolve the validity of the assignment to the Tribe and ordered the joinder of the Tribe as a co-plaintiff as a precautionary measure to prevent any challenge to the judgment based on omission of a necessary party. Bottom Lines: Observers give the McCaskill bi

And, of course, it renders a nullity the basis for Allergan's assignment of these patents to the Nation that raised considerable dudgeon amongst Allergan's generic competitors, members of Congress, and some commentators on pharmaceutical patents and sovereign immunity. Judge Bryson's decision on Allergan's motion was simple: Accordingly, in order to ensure that any judgment entered in this case will be protected against challenge on the ground that the proper parties were not all joined as plaintiffs, the Court hereby orders the joinder of the Tribe as a co-plaintiff in this action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(c). In so doing, the Court does not hold that the assignment of the patent rights to the Tribe is valid, but instead proceeds on the ground that the assignment may at some point be held valid, and that joining the Tribe as a party in this action is necessary to ensure that the judgment in this case is not rendered invalid because of the absence of a necessary party.

After the complaint was filed, the district court received notice of Mr. Tavantzis' death. When no party moved to substitute the proper party to continue Mr. Tavantzis' claims within the time required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a), the district court dismissed Mr. Tavantzis from the lawsuit, leaving ChrisTrikes as the only remaining plaintiff. As a result, the district court examined whether ChrisTrikes' had standing to maintain the patent infringement claims, which included claims based on theories of direct infringement, contributory infringement, and induced infringement.

Plaintiff Widow Allowed to Proceed on Claims Even Though Not Timely Substituted as Special Administrator of Husband’s EstateU.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, November 10, 2015November 12, 2015Lynn A. LehnertCase Decisions,Wisconsin0The decedent died of mesothelioma and the plaintiff, his widow, proceeded on the claims that had been filed prior to his death; the plaintiff did not substitute herself as special administrator of his estate. Defendant Owens-Illinois filed a notice of death pursuant to federal rules, then filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(2), requiring timely substitution of a proper party. Defendants 3M and Weyerhaeuser filed motions to join.

Qimonda could not join Jaffe’ as the real party in interest under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(3) because Rule 17(a) governs substitution of a proper plaintiff at the commencement of the lawsuit.While Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(c) allowed substitution of Jaffe’, he would only step into Qimonda’s shoes, and at the time of the motion, Qimonda lacked standing to sue.Ultimately, the situation may just present a timing issue. Judge Spencer noted that the Federal Circuit has held that a temporary loss of standing can be cured if the jurisdictional challenge occurs after the party holding all substantial rights has been joined.

Outcome on Appeal: Affirmed [plaintiff]. Grounds: New sheriff was properly substituted as successor under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). Testimony of other women who claimed to have been harassed by the same sheriff properly admitted where it is relevant to (1) whether the sheriff's conduct was because of the plaintiff's sex, and (2) whether the conduct is severe or pervasive.