IntroductionThe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) can be intricate and confusing, especially when it comes to the interplay between various rules. Few aspects of civil litigation present potential pitfalls such as amending and supplementing pleadings.No matter how perfect a pleading may have been when it was filed, changing circumstances and newly emerging facts often require litigants to amend or supplement pleadings after filing. FRCP 15 establishes the guidelines for how and when litigants can amend and supplement pleadings in a pending case.In this post, we’ll define FRCP 15 in more detail, explain what it requires, and explore how the 2015 amendments to FRCP 4 affect FRCP 15. Then, we’ll talk about when to apply FRCP 15 versus FRCP 21 when adding or dropping parties. Finally, we’ll share our top four ways to efficiently prepare for trial and explain how technology can help.ContentsWhat is FRCP 15 and what does it allow?Amendments before trialAmendments during and after trialRelation back of amendmentsSupplemental pleadingsHow do the 2015, 2016, and 2017 amendments to FRCP 4 affect FRCP 15? Adding and dropping parties: Does FRCP 15 or FRCP 21 apply? 4 tips for efficient trial preparation Technology can help you tell a compelling storyWhat is FRCP 15 and what does it allow?FRCP 15 is a shorthand name for Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows parties to amend or supplement pleadings they have already filed with the court. FRCP 15 aims to streamline amendments, reducing the time and money parties spend arguing about amendments and increasing their chances of resolving the case on the merits. Rule 15 balances a flexible approach to amendments with limitations that ensure fairness for the opposing

State of Louisiana v. American National Property And Casualty Company, 2013 WL 5201146 (E.D. La. Sept. 11, 2013). In this case, the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that, while subject matter jurisdiction is generally determined at the onset of litigation, when an action is severed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, the severed action must have an independent jurisdictional basis to remain in federal court.Procedural History.In Louisiana v. AAA Insurance, Case No. 07-5528 (the “Road Home Litigation”), the State of Louisiana (the “State”), brought an action in state court to recover funds from over 200 insurers.

The sling manufacturer defendants – none of whom were citizens of Maryland – removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, but they did not argue only that the doctors had been fraudulently misjoined. They argued also that the claims against the doctors should be severed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 21, which says that a “court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party” and “may also sever any claim against a party.” Once severed, the obviously diverse claims against the product manufacturers would clearly belong in federal court.

Albahae v. Olaplex Holdings, Inc., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105361 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2023), is not a drug/device case, but is a very good case severing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 an attempt to join 101 plaintiffs on claims involving their use of the defendant’s hair care products. To be specific, there were 12 California plaintiffs plus 89 residents of 29 different states and five different countries. The plaintiffs claimed varying injuries from the hair care products, including hair loss, hair damage, itchiness, pain, fungus, dermatitis, loss of menstrual cycle, depression, headaches, and a variety of mental conditions. That’s a long list of injuries, and it’s a big reason why the court severed the plaintiffs. The defendant moved to sever and dismiss the non-California plaintiffs under Rule 21 for three reasons: (1) their claims did not arise from the same transaction or occurrence, (2) the claims lacked a common question of fact or law; and (3) justice and fairness called for severance. The court held that the first reason was enough and granted the motion.As the Albahae court reasoned, “[t]he products used, when they were used, and injuries alleged vary su

In May 2017, the Court ruled that the asserted claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,212,850 (the “’850 Patent”) and 7,907,996 (the “’996 Patent”) were not patent eligible under Section 101 as a matter of law (relying on Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014)). In March 2019, CardioNet requested that the court sever the counts related to those patents—Counts III and IV of its Third Amended Complaint—under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 to “allow CardioNet to immediately appeal to the Federal Circuit … the Court’s [May 2017] §101 rulings” on those patents.The Court denied CardioNet’s motion to sever Counts III and IV.

Wading into the split of authority on the legality of swarm joinder, Judge Jennifer Dorsey, partially adopting the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, made it clear that she believed that swarm joinder is not likely to promote judicial efficiency. She exercised her discretion under FRCP 21 to sever and dismiss all defendants in the case before her other than Kabala, without prejudice to LHF to refile separate lawsuits against them. While acknowledging the large differences of opinion as to whether swarm joinder is legally permissible under FRCP 20(a)(2), Judge Dorsey elected not to rule one way or another on that issue.

The Court found that such a pattern and practice, if proven, could certainly result in a substantial award of punitive damages. Accordingly, the Court declined to remand the action to state court. Next, defendant Nelson moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 21, to sever the claims against it from the claims against First Automotive and to remand those claims to state court as outside the subject matter jurisdiction conferred by CAFA. There were no class claims against Nelson because the plaintiffs asserted only their individual claims against Nelson.

ogical relationship” between Teradata’s trade secret and antitrust claims and SAP’s patent infringement counterclaims. The Court noted that one key consideration was that SAP’s products were the subject of the trade secret misappropriation and antitrust claims, but Teradata’s products were the subject of the patent infringement counterclaims, mitigating against any showing of a strong logical relationship. The Court also noted that SAP’s counterclaims did not relate to the validity of Teradata’s trade secrets or SAP’s monopoly but to the separate issue of Teradata’s alleged patent infringement. Thus, the Court concluded that the two sides’ claims did not “arise out of the same transaction or occurrence” and therefore SAP’s counterclaims were not compulsory.The Federal Circuit concluded that since SAP’s counterclaims were noncompulsory, they did not confer appellate jurisdiction. However, the Federal Circuit noted that if the Ninth Circuit were to sever SAP’s patent counterclaims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21, a judgment on SAP’s independent patent claims would be appealable to the Federal Circuit. However, as the case was presented, the Federal Circuit determined that it did not have jurisdiction over the noncompulsory counterclaims or the non-patent claims, and therefore transferred the appeal to the Ninth Circuit.Practical Note: For defendants deciding whether to assert noncompulsory patent counterclaims or institute a separate action for infringement, the path to appeal should be a necessary consideration.[View source.]

As for Haixing and Aszune, the Court found that under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, email service was appropriate because it was court ordered, was reasonably calculated to notify the defendants and was not prohibited by an international agreement.The Fifth Circuit rejected the defendants’ misjoinder argument, finding that there was no basis for misjoinder under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20 and 21. The Court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged that the defendants were all working together and that their conduct arose out of the same transaction, and therefore joinder was appropriate.

Although BNSF argued the court should sever the State because it was a nominal party, again the court disagreed; the State was not a nominal party because the plaintiff alleged the State committed torts that along with the defendants’ conduct caused Mrs. McDowell’s death.Finally, BNSF argued that the court should adopt the concept of “fraudulent misjoinder” to sever the plaintiff’s claims against the State. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, a court may use its discretion to add or drop a party, or sever claims. The court agreed with the magistrate judge’s finding that the State was not fraudulently joined, because BNSF did not assert that the negligence claim against the State was invalid on its face.Read the full decision here.Read the magistrate’s recommendation to remand filed on October 3, 2016.