Section 678 - Non-Federal jurisdiction of federally regulated matters; prohibition of additional or different requirements for establishments with inspection services and as to marking, labeling, packaging, and ingredients; recordkeeping and related requirements; concurrent jurisdiction over distribution for human food purposes of adulterated or misbranded and imported articles; other matters

5 Citing briefs

  1. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals et al v. Whole Foods Market California, Inc. et al

    REPLY

    Filed December 23, 2015

    Those preemption clauses unambiguously show that Congress meant to preempt conflicting state law. 21 U.S.C. §§ 678, 467(e). Whether preemption operates through express or conflict preemption does not change the fact that the Acts manifest a clear purpose to preempt conflicting state law.

  2. Stoltz v. Henkel Corporation et al

    REPLY in Support re Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to FRCP 12

    Filed May 29, 2015

    See id. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 678 (preempting “[r]equirements . . . which are in addition to, or different Case 1:14-cv-05547-ARR-MDG Document 26 Filed 05/29/15 Page 10 of 18 PageID #: 229 6 than those made under this chapter”), with, 21 U.S.C. §§ 379r, 379s (preempting state-law requirements that are “different from,” “in addition to,” or “otherwise not identical with” those imposed by the FDCA). See also 21 U.S.C. §§ 453(n)(4), 691(n)(4) (product is misbranded under the FMIA or PPIA if its “container is so made, formed, or filled as to be misleading”).

  3. State of Missouri, et al v. Harris

    REPLY

    Filed June 5, 2014

    The preemption clause in Nat’l Meat Assn. only applied to requirements “within the scope” of the Federal Meat Inspection Act that related to slaughterhouse “premises, facilities and operations.” 21 U.S.C. § 678. The EPIA has a similarly-worded preemption clause, 21 U.S.C. §1052(a), but it is not the preemption provision upon which Plaintiffs rely.

  4. Association des Eleveurs de Canards et d Oies du Quebec et al v. Kamala J Harris et al

    MEMORANDUM in Support of MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment as to Federal Preemption Claim 117

    Filed May 15, 2014

    (The express preemption provision in the FMIA is identical to that in the PPIA as to “ingredient requirements in addition to, or different than, those made under this chapter may not be imposed by any State.” 21 U.S.C. § 678.)3 The plaintiffs argued that the Michigan law was invalid because “the federal act entirely preempts the field of meat labeling and ingredient requirements.”

  5. Federal National Mortgage Association et al v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC et al

    REPLY to Response to 32 MOTION to Dismiss

    Filed April 3, 2015

    A cursory comparison between 4617(j)(3) and true express preemption statutes demonstrates that 4617(j)(3) lacks the requisite specificity and definitiveness to be an express preemption clause. Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 965, 969 (2012) (21 U.S.C. § 678’s statement that requirements “which are in addition to, or different from those made under [the Federal Meat Inspection Act] may not be imposed by any State.”); Perez v. Nidek Co., Ltd., 711 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013) (21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)’s pronouncement that “[n]o State . . . may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device . . . any requirement which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter[.]”)