Filed December 23, 2015
Those preemption clauses unambiguously show that Congress meant to preempt conflicting state law. 21 U.S.C. §§ 678, 467(e). Whether preemption operates through express or conflict preemption does not change the fact that the Acts manifest a clear purpose to preempt conflicting state law.
Filed May 29, 2015
See id. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 678 (preempting “[r]equirements . . . which are in addition to, or different Case 1:14-cv-05547-ARR-MDG Document 26 Filed 05/29/15 Page 10 of 18 PageID #: 229 6 than those made under this chapter”), with, 21 U.S.C. §§ 379r, 379s (preempting state-law requirements that are “different from,” “in addition to,” or “otherwise not identical with” those imposed by the FDCA). See also 21 U.S.C. §§ 453(n)(4), 691(n)(4) (product is misbranded under the FMIA or PPIA if its “container is so made, formed, or filled as to be misleading”).
Filed June 5, 2014
The preemption clause in Nat’l Meat Assn. only applied to requirements “within the scope” of the Federal Meat Inspection Act that related to slaughterhouse “premises, facilities and operations.” 21 U.S.C. § 678. The EPIA has a similarly-worded preemption clause, 21 U.S.C. §1052(a), but it is not the preemption provision upon which Plaintiffs rely.
Filed May 15, 2014
(The express preemption provision in the FMIA is identical to that in the PPIA as to “ingredient requirements in addition to, or different than, those made under this chapter may not be imposed by any State.” 21 U.S.C. § 678.)3 The plaintiffs argued that the Michigan law was invalid because “the federal act entirely preempts the field of meat labeling and ingredient requirements.”
Filed April 3, 2015
A cursory comparison between 4617(j)(3) and true express preemption statutes demonstrates that 4617(j)(3) lacks the requisite specificity and definitiveness to be an express preemption clause. Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 965, 969 (2012) (21 U.S.C. § 678’s statement that requirements “which are in addition to, or different from those made under [the Federal Meat Inspection Act] may not be imposed by any State.”); Perez v. Nidek Co., Ltd., 711 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013) (21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)’s pronouncement that “[n]o State . . . may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device . . . any requirement which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter[.]”)