Id. at 8. With regard to concreteness, the Court recognized that, in some instances, the violation of a statutory right (e.g., denial of access to information to which a party is entitled under the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C.S. § 431, et seq., and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 1, et seq.) could satisfy the concreteness element of an injury-in-fact analysis, but noted further that not all instances of statutory violations constitute injury in fact.

In order to qualify as a SuperPAC, a PAC must make expenditures independent of any candidate by not acting “in concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate’s authorized committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents.” 2 U.S.C. § 431 (17); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(7)(B). Critics of SuperPACs often derided this independence as virtually impossible to police and certainly not a reality in practice when, as here, a campaign manager with ostensibly close ties to a candidate for federal office establishes an independent-expenditures-only PAC.