In United States v. Brennan, the Second Circuit (Kearse, Winter, Pooler) rejected an as-applied challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), which requires a defendant who has been found incompetent to stand trial to be committed to the custody of the Attorney General to determine whether he is likely to attain competency in the future. Section 4241(d), as discussed below, is a statute meant to guarantee a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable restraint.

Failing to assess his competency violated the Due Process Clause.United States v. Arenburg, 605 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2010)Defendant’s behavior during trial should have prompted the court to re-evaluate whether the defendant was competent to stand trial (to say nothing of representing himself). 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a).United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 2009)The court reviews the various factors that the court should consider in deciding whether the government has a sufficient interest in forcefully medicating the defendant in order to render her competent to stand trial.

There is no specific federal statute which controls a case in this procedural posture. The U.S. Supreme Court inRees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966), recognized that the standard enunciated in 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (formerly § 4244), which determines a defendant's competence to stand trial, also applies in cases where a death row inmate seeks to forego further appeals. Relying onRees, the Fifth Circuit inStreetman v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1521 (5th Cir. 1988), recognized that in such cases, the standard for reviewing competence is analogous to the standard set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247, which authorizes a federal district court to order a psychiatric or psychological examination of a defendant whose mental competence is in issue.An order under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 requiring psychiatric or psychological examination calls for "'an exercise of judicial discretion to determine if there is "reasonable cause to believe" that the defendant may be incompetent.'"

Ryan v. Gonzales, USSC No. 10-930; Tibbals v. Carter, USSC No. 11-218, 1/8/13United States Supreme Court decision, reversingIn re Gonzalez, 623 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2010), and reversing and remandingCarter v. Bradshaw, 644 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2011)These two cases present the question whether the incompetence of a state prisoner requires suspension of the prisoner’s federal habeas corpus proceedings. We hold that neither 18 U. S. C. § 3599 nor 18 U. S. C. § 4241 provides such a right and that the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Sixth Circuits both erred in holding that district courts must stay federal habeas proceedings when petitioners are adjudged incompetent. (Slip op. p. 1).The statutory provisions relied on by the circuit courts of appeal involved a statutory right to counsel for federal habeas petitioners on death row (§3599) and the process for competency evaluations for federal criminal defendants before sentencing (§4241).

United States v. Chaudhry, 630 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 2011) The government may not appeal a decision by the trial court to commit a defendant to a psychiatric facility pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241. United States v. Weyhrauch, 544 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2008) The government failed to provide an adequate certification under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, because it was not signed by the U.S. Attorney himself, nor was there proof that a proper Department of Justice official approved the pretrial appeal.United States v. Giffen, 473 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2006) The government is authorized to appeal an adverse decision by the district court relating to the Classified Information Procedure Act (CIPA) insofar as the district court’s ruling relates to the admissibility or non-admissibility of classified evidence.

If this is unsuccessful, the criminal justice system has adequate imprisonment alternatives to prevent any future opportunity to offend.SOURCES:1/ 18 U.S.C. § 2452(A)(a)(5)(A); 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)2/United States v. Volungus, 599 F.Supp.2d 68 (U.S.D.C. Mass. 2009)3/United States v. Volungus, 2010 U.S.App. LEXIS 428 (1st Cir. Jan. 8, 2010)4/ 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241, 4247-42485/ 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a)(5)(6)6/ Id, Lexis at 3-57/ U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 38/ U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; Ex parte Karstendick, 93 U.S. 396 (1876); Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956)9/ Id., Lexis at 1010/Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)11/ http://www.johntfloyd.com/comments/march08/05a.htm12/United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 2009)13/United States v. Comstrock, 551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2009)14/ United States v. Comstock, 129 S.Ct. 2828, 174 L.Ed.2d 551 (2009)15/United States v. Comstock, 507 F.Supp.2d 522 (W.D. North Carolina 2007)By: Houston Criminal Lawyer John Floyd and Paralegal Billy Sinclair

United States v. Cornejo-Sandoval, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 1195527 (10th Cir. 2009)Court rejects D’s procedural and substantive competency claims regarding court’s failure to order a second competency evaluation during trial. 18 USC Sec. 4241(a) sets out the procedure when a question of competency arises. Review of a decision whether to order a second exam is not plenary–rather, it is for an abuse of discretion.