The request should be denied since the government has not provided the documentary basis required to support Goldman's claim. Alternatively, we respectfully request that the Court exercise its power to "require additional documentation or hear testimony" in relation to Goldman's restitution claim, 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(4), and set a further briefing schedule as necessary. KL3 2900364.

Finally, the Attorney General’s authority under the MVRA is not dependent on such language in a judgment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(m)(1)(A)(ii). As recognized by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, [The defendants] owe the full amount.

Case 1:08-cr-00360-RCL Document 785 Filed 07/08/15 Page 9 of 11 10 deems a response to these factual challenges necessary, the government requests that the Court allow the government an additional 75 days for response to those factual challenges. Title 18 U.S.C. 3664(d)(5) provides that “the court shall set a date for the final determination of the victim's losses, not to exceed 90 days after sentencing.” In Dolan v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a sentencing court retains the power to order restitution after the 90-day period, where, as here, “the sentencing court made clear prior to the deadline's expiration that it would order restitution, leaving open (for more than 90 days) only the amount.”

C. Mr. Litvak Has Limited Financial Resources From Which to Pay an Order of Restitution In determining whether to order restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3663, the court “shall consider” the financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a). To be sure, Mr. Litvak earned substantial compensation while employed at Jefferies.

Under the MVRA, the Court Case 1:08-cr-00360-RCL Document 775 Filed 05/26/15 Page 2 of 4 3 should consider the defendants’ financial circumstances only in specifying the manner and schedule of payments. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2). The purpose of the MVRA is, “to the extent possible, to make victims whole, to fully compensate victims for their losses, and to restore victims to their original state of well-being.”

S. Rep. 97-291, at 32 (1982) (Judiciary Committee Report on Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982). The current version of this provision in the MVRA provides that “[a]ny amount paid to a victim under an order of restitution shall be reduced by any amount later recovered as compensatory damages for the same loss by the victim in (A) any Federal civil proceeding. . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(2). “‘The purpose of § 3664(j)(2) is to prevent double recovery by a                                                              2 Defendants will file complete versions of any such documents under seal.

In sum, the deal between Alcatel Lucent and the government allows the Company to conceal the information relating to its criminal conduct; resolve all criminal exposure through the payment of a fine below the legal required minimum; provides immunity for the companies from prosecution beyond paying these insufficient fines; avoid required presentence procedures; avoid a criminal conviction for Alcatel Lucent S.A. and thereby appropriate administrative restrictions applicable to convicted criminals; and further avoid legally required restitution. The Department’s Failure to Carry Out Its Responsibilities Case 1:10-cr-20907-MGC Document 16 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/03/2011 Page 13 of 17 14   Under Section 18 U.S.C. § 3771, 18 U.S.C. § 3663, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, 18 U.S.C. § 3664, and Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Department, in connection with a plea and conviction for a Title 18 crime, is required to carry out a broad array of responsibilities designed to provide information to the Court as part of sentencing procedures and is obligated to affirmatively act to protect the victims of crimes. The foregoing statutes, among others, require the Department to, at a minimum: 1.

A monthly nominal payment of $50 for the terni on lier probation would stress the severity of lier crime and allow tlie Housing Stability Plus Program to regain a portion of its lost funds, whule at 2 the saine tirne balancing lthe impact a restitution order would have on Ms. Loving and lier son. 2 If ibis Court deannines an order of restitution ini excess of nominal restitution is appropriate, Ms. Loving rcqucsts ffiat the Court allow for as extended a payrnenî paiod as allowable imder 18 U.S.C. § 3664 (e)(3)(a). A086661 1710.

.........................................................................1 Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. J.G. Menihan Corp., 28 F. Supp. 920 (W.D.N.Y. 1939) .........................................................................................6, 7 Tecnimed SRL v. Kidz-Med, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)........................................................................................7 United States v. Hoffenberg, 94 Cr. 213, 1997 WL 96563 (S.D.N.Y. March 5, 1997) ...................................................2, 3, 5 Statutes 15 U.S.C. § 1115 ..............................................................................................................................2 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 ............................................................................................................................9 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A .........................................................................................................................9 18 U.S.C. §§ 3664 ............................................................................................................................9 Other Authorities 3 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 18.15 (4th ed.

75 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2009) passim United States v. Cuti, 08 Cr. 972 (DAB), 2011 WL 3585988 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2011) 6, 20 United States v. Donaghy, 570 F. Supp. 2d 411 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (Amon, J.), affd, United States v. Battista, 575 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2009) 3, 5, 9, 16 United States v. Kane, 944 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir. 1991) 17, 18 United States v. Kones, 77 F.3d 66 (3d Cir. 1996) 19 United States v. Levis, 08 Cr. 181 (TPG), 2011 WL 497958 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011) 6 United States v. Papagno, 639 F.3d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 2011) passim United States v. Skowron, 839 F. Supp. 2d 740 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 12 United States v. Weitzman, 09 Cr. 989 (LTS), 2010 WL 3912735 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2010) 3, 9, 14 STATUTES 15 U.S.C. § 7246 20 Case 1:11-cr-00907-JSR Document 132 Filed 12/14/12 Page 3 of 43 18 U.S.C. § 371 2 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) 16 18 U.S.C. § 3663A 2 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4) passim 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1) 2 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3)(B) 19 18 U.S.C. § 3664 2 Case 1:11-cr-00907-JSR Document 132 Filed 12/14/12 Page 4 of 43 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Mr. Gupta respectfully submits this memorandum in opposition to the application of the government and The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. ("Goldman") for restitution of legal fees and other expenses of nearly $7 million. Under the applicable statute and governing Second Circuit case law, a victim is entitled to restitution for legal fees and expenses only to the extent the victim establishes that these costs were necessarily incurred during participation in the government's investigation or prosecution of the offense of conviction, and then only if "unduly complicated determinations of fact" are not required.