Both motions were addressed at a hearing conducted on March 29, 2010, and both were resolved at that time. Accordingly, the time between March 19, 2010 and March 29, 2010 is excluded from the speedy trial computations pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D).13 On April 23, 2010, the United States filed a motion seeking to exclude the defendant’s proposed expert testimony. See Crim. Doc.

#13), that motion was signed and filed by Evan Georgopoulos, Esq. of Mr. Carpenter’s former law firm of Greenberg Traurig LLP. While the filing of such a motion would normally stop the clock pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F), this motion did not stop the clock because Attorney Georgopoulos did not file his appearance until May 13, 2004 (Dkt. #15)—one week later.

10. For the foregoing reasons, the ends of justice will be served by excluding the time period between September 8, 2014 and March 23, 2015 in computing the time within which trial must commence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h), and those ends outweigh the best interests of the public and the Defendant in a speedy trial. Case 8:14-cr-00362-PJM Document 31 Filed 02/18/15 Page 3 of 4 4 WHEREFORE, the parties request that the Court exclude the time period between September 8, 2014, and March 23, 2015, under the Speedy Trial Act in conformance with the draft order that is submitted herewith for the convenience of the Court. Respectfully submitted, Rod J. Rosenstein United States Attorney District of Maryland By: /s/ Arun G. Rao Daniel C. Gardner Assistant United States Attorneys United States Attorney’s Office District of Maryland Case 8:14-cr-00362-PJM Document 31 Filed 02/18/15 Page 4 of 4

Respectfully submitted, PATRICK J. FITZGERALD United States Attorney Dated: August 7, 2009 /s Ryan S. Hedges RYAN S. HEDGES Assistant United States Attorney 219 South Dearborn Street, Room 500 Chicago, Illinois 60604 (312) 353-5340 Case 1:09-cr-00596 Document 11 Filed 08/06/2009 Page 5 of 6 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned Assistant United States Attorney hereby certifies that in accordance with Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 49 and 5, and Local Rule 5.5 and the General Order on Electronic Case Filing (ECF), the foregoing document: GOVERNMENT’S UNOPPOSED MOTION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO RETURN INDICTMENT was, on August 7, 2009, served pursuant to the district court’s ECF system: Daniel D. Rubinstein Abigail A. Clapp Greenberg Traurig LLP 77 West Wacker Drive Suite 3100 Chicago, IL 60601 Counsel for Defendant ELGIN NATHAN JAMES /s Ryan S. Hedges RYAN S. HEDGES Assistant United States Attorney Case 1:09-cr-00596 Document 11 Filed 08/06/2009 Page 6 of 6

’”) (quoting from the district court’s opinion, citation omitted). In addition, as the government also has explained, separate and apart from the representations that defense counsel previously have made to this Court, the “ends of justice” provision in the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8), has justified excluding the periods of time encompassed by each of Carpenter’s requested continuances. E.g., United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d at 432 (“The legislative history of the Speedy Trial Act Amendments Act of 1979 indicates that scheduling conflicts of either defense or government counsel were intended by Congress to be legitimate grounds for granting a continuance under § 3161(h)(8).”)

“[W]hen a district court grants an ends-of-justice continuance, it must ‘se[t] forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons’ for finding that the ends of justice are served and they outweigh other interests.” Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 506 (2006)(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A)). “When granting a continuance under the Speedy Trial Act's "ends of justice" exception, a district court may not simply credit vague statements by one party's lawyer about possible scheduling conflicts or the general desires for a continuance of other parties or their attorneys; instead, it must conduct an appropriate inquiry to determine whether various parties actually want and need a continuance, how long a delay is actually required, what adjustments can be made with respect to trial calendars or other plans of counsel, and whether granting the requested continuance would outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.”

199, at 16) (S.D. Ohio filed May 16, 2008) (Chief Judge S. Beckwith). WHEREFORE, the United States respectfully seeks the scheduling of an immediate telephone conference to establish a scheduling order in this case; an “ends of justice” findings pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8); and a Court declaration of “complex case” status pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) and (B)(i), (ii), (iv). Respectfully submitted, GREGORY G. LOCKHART United States Attorney s/Dwight K. Keller DWIGHT K. KELLER (0074533) Assistant United States Attorney Attorney for Plaintiff 602 Federal Building 200 West Second Street Dayton, Ohio 45402 (937) 225-2910 Fax: (937) 225-2564 Dwight.Keller @usdoj.

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Government respectfully requests that the Court set this case for jury selection on April 12, 2016, and set the start of evidence for May 9, 2016. The Government also requests that the Court exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act until May 9, 2016, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). Respectfully submitted, DEIRDRE M. DALY UNITED STATES ATTORNEY LIAM BRENNAN HEATHER L. CHERRY ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FEDERAL BAR NO.

The Act gives this Court substantial discretion to dismiss with or without prejudice, and requires the Court to consider, among other factors, the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances of the case that led to the dismissal, and the impact of a re-prosecution on the administration of the Act and on the administration of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(a)(2); United States v. Sykes, 614 F.3d 303, 309 (7th Cir. 2010). One relevant factor in weighing these considerations is whether delay has caused the defendant prejudice.

Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv) provides for a continuance where any party, including the government, needs reasonable time for effective preparation for trial. Lastly, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)(A) provides for exclusion of time when a defendant (David Stephens) is absent or unavailable. Case 3:09-cr-00336-JO Document 48 Filed 12/09/2009 Page 4 of 5 Page 5 GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT JAMES RAY YOAKUM’S MOTION FOR SEVERANCE OF DEFENDANTS Defendant’s motion for severance should be denied.