United States v. Tinklenburg, 131 S. Ct. 2007 (2011)Any time resulting from the filing of a pretrial motion falls within the exclusion of time for such pretrial motions, regardless of wehter the filing of the motion actually results in a delay. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D). The Sixth Circuit had previously held that only pretrial motions that actually result in a delay toll the clock.

The Fokker Services DPAThe Speedy Trial Act requires that a trial begin within 70 days of the government’s filing charges. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Courts regularly exclude time from the 70-day clock for many reasons ranging from the filing and disposition of pretrial motions, to mental competency exams, to the resolution of interlocutory appeals. The statute also permits the exclusion of time for any period during which the government defers prosecution by “written agreement with the defendant, with approval of the court, for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct.”

The waiver also stated that he had no objection “to the Court ordering that all delays resulting from the continuance be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act and that the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the interests of the public and Mr. Williams in a speedy trial.” On July 19, 2005, some five months later, the court entered a summary order resetting the trial for September 12, 2005, and stated that the entire period from February 14 to September 12 was excludable pursuant 18 USC § 3161(h)(8)(A). On September 9, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for violation of the Speedy Trial Act, which was denied because of the waiver.

According to the terms of the DPA, these reports are to remain confidential. Because the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), mandates that a criminal trial begin within 70 days after a defendant is charged or makes an initial appearance, the parties were required to obtain the district court’s permission to exclude the five-year term of the DPA in computing that time limitation—a routine request necessary to ensure the proper functioning of any DPA. Rather than rubber stamp the parties’ joint request, the district court invoked its “inherent supervisory power” to carefully scrutinize the details of the DPA and to either approve or reject the agreement on its merits.

June 7, 2023, a United States District Judge in the Southern District of Texas dismissed conspiracy charges related to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) and money laundering violations brought against Paulo Jorge Da Costa Casquiero Murta (“Murta”) by the Department of Justice, finding that prosecutors had intentionally caused delays in Murta’s trial, in violation of both the Speedy Trial Act and Murta’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. United States v. Murta, 4:17-CR-00514-8 (S.D. Tex. June 6, 2023). Murta, who had been in U.S. custody since July 2021, argued that despite his repeated demands for a speedy trial, the government had intentionally delayed his trial. The Court agreed and dismissed the charges against Murta with prejudice, finding that DOJ’s prosecutors had acted in bad faith.The Speedy Trial Act requires a criminal defendant’s trial to commence within 70 days after he is charged by indictment or information, or makes an initial appearance, whichever is later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Periods of delay may be excluded if they result from any pretrial motions, but even then the excluded period of delay cannot exceed 30 days. Id. at § 3161(h)(1)(D), (h)(1)(H). In the event a trial does not occur within the time limits provided by the statute, a defendant may move for dismissal of the charges against him. The Speedy Trial Act provides that the charges “shall” be dismissed, with the court determining in its discretion whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).A criminal defendant also has a right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. To determine whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right has been violated, courts consider four factors: (1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).Here, Murta made his initial appearance in July 2021 after being extradited from his h

BOP, COVID-19 Action Plan (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.bop.gov/resources/news/20200313_covid-19.jsp. BOP, Visitor/Volunteer/Contractor COVID-19 Screening Tool (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/docs/Visitor_Volunteer_Contractor_COVID-19%20Screening_v1_March_2020.pdf. U.S. Const. amend. VI. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(b), (c)(1).

Id. The parties submitted the DPA and a factual statement to the district court, as well as a motion to exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2012). Id.

Generally, under the Speedy Trial Act, a defendant must receive a federal criminal trial 70 days after being charged or first appearing. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 492 (2006) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq.) (addressing prospective waiver of the act).

The DPA requires HSBC to undertake (or to continue) numerous remedial measures to correct systemic failures, to forfeit $1.26 billion and to admit criminal wrongdoing. The parties presented the DPA as part of their joint request that the Court hold the case in abeyance for the five-year term of the DPA and exclude that time from the otherwise applicable 70-day statutory speedy trial period of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c). Pursuant to section 3161(h)(2), the period of delay occasioned by a deferred prosecution agreement “for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct” “shall be excluded . . . in computing the time within which the trial of any offense must commence.”

Plaintiffs have provided no evidence, however, of such dismissals or denials, and have not even alleged that these 'various litigations' were direct appeals of their convictions, habeas petitions, or civil rights actions."TIME ALLOWED FOR the preparation and filing of pretrial motions is excluded from a speedy-trial calculation if granted pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. 3161(h)(8), the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled June 18. U.S. v. Bobby Jarrell, 97-4187.