In the aftermath of his conviction and sentencing in U.S. District Court, Virginia’s former-Governor Bob McDonnell filed a motion for release pending appeal. On January 6, 2015, the district court sentenced him to a two year active sentence, and his counsel filed the motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b). In relevant part, that statute states:(b) Release or detention pending appeal by the defendant.

The prosecutor moves the Court to remand the individual into custody pending sentencing. The government contends 18 U.S.C. § 3143(2) requires such detention as such possession is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A). You recall something about felon in possession [18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)] being a crime of violence, but you can’t remember anything about an addict in possession meeting that definition. You are correct. It hasn’t been found to be a crime of violence in the Circuit.

The 10th rejects Mr. Johnson's contention that the post-plea, pre-sentence presumption of detention does not apply because his guideline range would be zero to six months. In other words, he argued he was "a person for whom the applicable guideline promulgated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994 does not recommend a term of imprisonment " under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1). The 10th is unimpressed with Mr. Johnson's point that there are no guideline ranges of zero to zero months, so everyone would be subject to the detention presumption under the government's and the lower court's interpretation.

United States v. Ingle, 454 F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2006) A conviction for the offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon does not trigger the provision that requires detention pending sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2). 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4) (defining crime of violence).

United States v. Ramos, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180246 (D.N.M. Dec. 30, 2016):In the end, Congress wants the people to be released pending appeal to be people who are likely to win an appeal. Even if the Court were to use 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) now, in the presentencing context, the Court cannot say that it is likely that Ramos will be successful on appeal. The Court worked hard on the Motion to Suppress.

United States v. Johnson, 399 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2005) A conviction for the offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon does not trigger the provision that requires detention pending sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2). 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4) (defining crime of violence).

The government followed the court's suggestion. The 10th noted that release was not justified under 18 USC § 3143(a)(2)(A) because there was not a substantial likelihood of the granting of an acquittal or a new trial and the government was not going to recommend a non-prison sentence since there was a mandatory minimum of five years. The 10th held that the exceptional-reasons exception under 18 USC § 3145(c) didn't justify the release either because the court did not make an exceptional-reasons finding and compliance with release conditions terms does not by itself qualify as an exceptional reason.

(unpub'd) - The 10th reverses a meth defendant's pre-sentence release. There was no likelihood of acquittal or a new trial or a government recommendation of a non-prison sentence to justify release under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2). And there was no "exceptional" reason under § 3145(c) warranting release.