4. Presumption of Detention The statutory presumption of detention applies to Croce because he is charged in Count Seven with a narcotics trafficking crime carrying a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A). 5.

Contrary to the government’s assertions, the lack of criminal prosecution for unlawful acts related to animal rights activism indicate a downswing in Mr. Johnson’s involvement in such activity. V Thirdly the government argues the nature and seriousness of the danger under 18 U.S.C § 3142 (g) (4). The government fails to assert however what persons or community could possibly be in danger if Mr. Johnson would be released.

The government also notes that the instant offense carries a presumption of detention subject to rebuttal by the defendant. 18 U.S.C. §3142(e)(3)(B). At some future date, the defendant can move to reopen the detention hearing under 3142(f)(2)(B) should circumstances currently not known to the defendant develop that impact the determination of detention.

The Seventh Circuit added that “[a] court’s reliability analysis does not end with its conclusion that an expert is qualified to testify about a given matter. Even ‘[a] supremely qualified expert cannot waltz into the courtroom and render opinions unless those opinions 8 Although the Rules of Evidence do not apply during a detention hearing (see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)), Rule 702 provides a well-established framework for analyzing the relevancy and reliability of Dr. Xenakis’ opinions. 11 are based upon some recognized scientific method.

Second, whether or not posting the Singapore home or cash derived from it, standing alone, would be sufficient to assure Mr. Liew’s presence at trial—which it plainly would be—it is 4 The statute provides, in part: In considering the conditions of release . . . the judicial officer may upon his own motion, or shall upon the motion of the Government, conduct an inquiry into the source of the property to be designated for potential forfeiture or offered as collateral to secure a bond, and shall decline to accept the designation, or the use as collateral, of property that, because of its source, will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(4); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (providing for a “hearing to determine whether any condition or combination of conditions . . . will reasonably assure the appearance” of the defendant). Case3:11-cr-00573-JSW Document217 Filed12/19/12 Page14 of 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12 REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR AN ORDER REVOKING THE DETENTION ORDER AND GRANTING PRETRIAL RELEASE OF WALTER LIEW Case No.

The Defendant submits, respectfully, that the availability of these conditions (or some combination thereof) and applicable precedent—which demonstrates that courts have released nearly every other defendant charged with disclosing or retaining national defense information—makes Ms. Winner’s continued detention manifestly unjust, and further supports reopening of the detention hearing. WHEREFORE, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f), and for the reasons set forth above as well as in the accompanying Memorandum in Support of this Motion to Reopen Detention Hearing Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) and Impose Conditions of Release and Request for a Hearing, defendant Reality Leigh Winner respectfully requests that the Court (1) reopen the detention hearing, (2) find there is a combination of conditions that will reasonably assure Ms. Winner’s appearance as required and the safety of any other person and the community, and (3) release Ms. Winner pending trial with conditions, and that the Court grant such additional relief as may be warranted. In addition, the Defendant requests a hearing at the earliest practicable time to address this Motion.

Mot. at 16 citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(4) (emphasis in original). But the Government fails to emphasize the rest of the statutory language that follows, which makes clear that the Court need only decline to accept property as collateral for bail if “because of its source, [it] will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required.”

II. ANALYSIS OF FACTORS OUTLINED IN 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) As discussed in the following proffer of evidence, a review of the factors weigh in favor of detaining the defendant pending trial. A. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offenses Charged and the Weight of the Evidence Against the Person The defendant committed numerous serious offenses over a substantial period of SUBM ISSION RE: DETENTION CR 11-00142 JF 2 Case 5:11-cr-00142-EJD Document 3 Filed 03/22/11 Page 2 of 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 time.

It is similarly ludicrous to suggest that a Morgan Stanley employee with no involvement, direct or indirect, in RMBS trading is a “witness who may testify” to the RMBS trading at issue in this case. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(v) (emphasis added). There is simply no reason why the defendants should not be able to socialize about matters unrelated to the case with persons employed by these institutions free of interloping and scrutiny from the Government.

Mr. Brugnara is certainly a talkative and boisterous person, but the magistrate’s strong emphasis on their personal impressions of his courtroom demeanor is simply not a relevant consideration that has any bearing on whether he poses a flight risk or a danger to the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (outlining proper factors). As then-Judge Kennedy emphasized in Motamedi, the relevant statutory factors “may be considered only in terms of the likelihood that the person will fail to appear or will pose a danger to any person or to the community.”