The language of 18 U.S.C. § 1963 is far more broad than that in § 982, requiring the forfeiture of “any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962" (18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1)), any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over the RICO enterprise which the person has established, controlled, conducted or participated in (18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2); and any property constituting or derived from any proceeds obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3). Like § 982, the forfeiture provisions of § 1963 are “not explicitly limited to property ‘of the Case 2:09-cv-02435-FMC-VBK Document 47 Filed 09/04/2009 Page 5 of 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 “Thus, I conclude that these passages in the notes pertain only to the2 forfeiture of offense property, and therefor shed little light on the issue at hand.”

Indeed, even in narrower civil forfeiture statutes, many courts have required only a “but-for” causal relationship between the crime and the asset’s existence. See United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235, 1242-43 (7th Cir. 1987) (under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) of the RICO forfeiture scheme, “in order to win a forfeiture order, the government must show [the criminal acts] were a cause in fact of the acquisition or maintenance of [the property]”); see also, e.g., United States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (in which the Court expanded the “but-for” test to include forfeitures sought under § 1963(a)(3), authorizing the forfeiture of any property “constituting, or derived from, any proceeds . . . obtained, directly or indirectly, from” racketeering activity (emphasis added)); United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1213 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Olfchinick, 883 F.2d 1172, 1183 (3rd Cir. 1989); United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352, 1365 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying “but for” test to assess “nexus between property and [unlawful activity]”). But even if the Court were to require some greater nexus, such as proximate causation -- which would contradict Congress’s intent as expressed in the statutory text

Nor has any other. The Fourth Circuit, the one circuit that authorizes the restraint of substitute assets under 18 U.S.C. 1963(d)(1)(A), has held that “[while] . . .there is no Sixth4 Amendment right for a defendant to obtain counsel using tainted funds, [the defendant] still possesses a qualified Sixth Amendment right to use wholly legitimate Case 1:12-cv-23588-PCH Document 53 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/26/2012 Page 3 of 11 -4- funds to hire the attorney of his choice.” United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 804 (4 Cir. 2001), cert.

See United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1349-50 (11th Cir. 1989) (explaining that under 21 U.S.C. § 853 the government may restrain pretrial assets derived from criminal activity)9; see also, e.g., United States v. Parrett, 530 F.3d 422, 429 (6th Cir. 2008) (concluding that 21 U.S.C. § 853 did not authorize pretrial restraint of substitute assets); United States v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Gotti, 155 F.3d 144, 149-50 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that forfeiture provision in 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(A) did not authorize pretrial restraint of substitute assets). The Fourth Circuit is the only circuit to have held otherwise, concluding that 18 U.S.C. 1963(d)(1)(A) does allow for the pretrial restraint of substitute assets. In re Billman, 915 F.2d 916, 921 (4th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Bromwell, 222 Fed. Appx. 307, 311 (4th Cir. 2007) (following Billman).

That result appears patently at odds with the statutory scheme, which directs parties without an interest in specific property to seek relief from the Attorney General, not the court adjudging the forfeiture. The Attorney General has authority to dispense confiscated funds ‘to protect the rights of innocent persons,’ 18 U.S.C. § 1963(g)(1), and general creditors seem precisely the type of innocent persons Congress had in mind. BCCI Holdings (Lux.)

ll. Sept. 10, 2014), aff’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 746 Fed Appx. 541 (7th Cir. 2018) ......... 12 Sheikh v. Wheeler, 2019 WL 1057376 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2019) ................................................................................ 7 Stachon v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 229 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2000) ..................................................................................................... 11 Starfish Inv. Corp. v. Hansen, 370 F. Supp. 2d 759 (N.D. Ill. 2005) ........................................................................................ 12 United Food & Commercial Workers Union & Employers’ Midwest Health Benefits Fund v. Walgreen Co., 719 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2013) ................................................................................................... 7, 8 Statutes 18 U.S.C. § 1962 ......................................................................................................................... 1, 3 18 U.S.C. § 1963 ......................................................................................................................... 1, 3 18 U.S.C. § 1964 ......................................................................................................................... 1, 3 Ga. Code Ann. § 16-14-4(a) ........................................................................................................... 1 Ga. Code Ann. § 16-14-4(b) ........................................................................................... 1, 3, 6, 7, 8 Ga. Code. Ann. § 2-2-8.1 ................................................................................................................ 4 Other Authorities KURTZ CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND DEFENSES IN GEORGIA, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), § R1 (2018 ed.)

Instead, this phase codifies the far more limited notion that “restraining orders entered before forfeiture should be concerned with preserving assets equivalent in value to the potentially forfeitable property, and not necessarily the precise property.” United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 1988) (interpreting the pre-trial asset freezes authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(A)). And by codifying this notion, this phrase balances the Case 1:16-cv-23148-KMW Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/05/2016 Page 20 of 49 extraordinary injunctive reach of § 1345(a)(2)(B) to “any person” with a quantum of respect for the legal reality that “orders directed at third parties are strong medicine and should not be used where measures that are adequate and less burdensome on the third parties are available.”

Ingram, No. CIV S082490FCDDADPS, 2009 WL 2941463, citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.1980). Here, Plaintiff only makes one mention of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in all of his FAC, stating on the caption page, “18 U.S.C. 1961, 1964 et seq.; 18 U.S.C. 1962, 1963 et seq.; (Civil RICO Remedies); and, 5th and 14th Amendment Civil Rights Due Process Violations (enacted by Congress with Specific Reservations) in pari materia with the Supremacy Clause in the U.S. Constitution: also under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code.

...........................................................8, 9 18 U.S.C. § 1341 ..........................................................................................................................8, 9 18 U.S.C. § 1343 ..........................................................................................................................8, 9 18 U.S.C. § 1349 ..........................................................................................................................8, 9 18 U.S.C. § 1512 ............................................................................................................8, 29, 45, 56 Case 2:14-cr-00574-PBT Document 109 Filed 12/08/15 Page 11 of 83 xi 18 U.S.C. § 1519 ..................................................................................................................8, 29, 45 18 U.S.C. § 1956 ................................................................................................................31, 32, 36 18 U.S.C. § 1963 ............................................................................................................................60 18 U.S.C. § 3500 ......................................................................................................................53, 69 18 U.S.C. § 3731 ............................................................................................................................55 28 C.F.R. § 50.9 .............................................................................................................................64 Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 ..........................................................................................................................48 Fed. R. Crim. P. 12 ..................................................................................................................30, 49 Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 ..................................................................................................................52, 66 Fed. R.

tates v. Turner, 551 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2008) ..................................................................................................43 United States v. Turner, 594 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2010) ...................................................................................................30 United States v. U. S. Currency Deposited in Account No. 1115000763247 for Active Trade Co., 176 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 1999) .............................................................................................38, 45 Walters v. Nat’l Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) ................................................................................................................28 Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781 (3d Cir. 2000) ..............................................................................................39, 47 STATUTES 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2)(B) .........................................................................................................45, 46 18 U.S.C. § 1963 .............................................................................................................................8 21 U.S.C. § 853 .............................................................................................................................50 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ...........................................................................................................5, 26, 27, 62 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ...........................................................................................................................38 All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) ...............................................................................................26 RULES Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) .................................................................................................................27 N.D. Ill. L.R. 83.51.