See, e.g., Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (noting that Section 1951 “speaks in broad language, manifesting apurpose to use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish interference withinterstate commerce by extortion, robbery, or physical violence.”). Here again, Plaintiffs’have not alleged any conduct by Defendant Pickard that crosses state lines, and theirallegation that Defendant Pickard has violated Section 1951 thus fails as a matter of law. 3. Plaintiffs do not allege any obstruction of justice involving any federal judicial proceeding in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a).The

Claims that Defendants somehow “perjured” their oaths of office as Governor and legislators suffer a similar fate. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. §1951 by “conspiring” to racketeer by violating section 1503 also fails. 2.

Thomas Jameson 19 Case 1:16-cv-00675-MCA-KBM Document 1 Filed 06/24/16 Page 19 of 33 Attachment A District Court’s Judgment Case 1:16-cv-00675-MCA-KBM Document 1 Filed 06/24/16 Page 20 of 33 AO 245B (Rev 12/03) Criminal Judgment Sheet 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT District of New Mexico Judgment in a Criminal CaseUNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. (For Offenses Committed On or After November 1, 1987) Case Number: 1:05CR01618-001MCA USM Number: 31677-051 Defense Attorney: Thomas Jameson (appointed) Daniel Rojas THE DEFENDANT: pleaded guilty to count(s) SIII and SIV of Redacted Indictmentc    pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) d    after a plea of not guilty was found guilty on count(s) d    The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses: Count Number(s) Offense EndedNature of OffenseTitle and Section SIII 07/01/2005 07/01/2005 Interference with Commerce by Threats of Violence Using and Carrying a Firearm During and in Relation to a Crime of Violence 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951(a)(1) 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) SIV The defendant is sentenced as specified in pages 2 through 5 of this judgment.

As a matter of law, the threat of litigation, even the meritless threat of litigation, does not constitute a predicate act of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act. See Winters, 2018 WL 326518, at *10 (“[S]everal circuits have found that even meritless litigation does not constitute extortion under Section 1951”); U.S. v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1208 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that Defendants’ “threat to file litigation against Marion County, even if made in bad faith and supported by false affidavits” is not extortion as a matter of law). Where a party threatens litigation in bad faith, the Eleventh Circuit explained in Pendergraft, it is up to “the courts, and their time-tested procedures” to reliably resolve the matter, “separating validity from invalidity, honesty from dishonesty.”

1, at 91 (¶¶ 172–73).] As used in the Hobbs Act, “[t]he term ‘extortion’ means the obtaining of property from another with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear . . . .” See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). Nowhere do Plaintiffs allege even a single incident of alleged 2:14-cv-12693-MFL-DRG Doc # 37 Filed 10/27/14 Pg 36 of 49 Pg ID 338 23 extortion involving any particular one of the ViSalus Defendants.

There is no requirement of an overt act in the statute prohibiting Hobbs Act conspiracy. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The relevant case law from this District, however, is inconsistent.

A defendant is liable under the Hobbs Act if he "in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Extortion is defined by the statute as "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, orfear,orundercolorofofficialright."

See Knoll v. Schectman, 275 F. App’x 50, 51 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting conclusory allegations of mail and wire fraud as a predicate act under RICO). c. The Hobbs Act As discussed above, the Hobbs Act prohibits “obstruct[ing], delay[ing], or affect[ing]” commerce or the movement of anything in commerce “by robbery or extortion.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). This criminal offense “includes obtaining property from another through a wrongful threat of force or fear.” United States v. Jackson, 180 F.3d 55, 69 (2d Cir. 1999). Plaintiffs do not allege either element. In a conclusory fashion, Plaintiffs allege that the “Defendants violated the Hobbs Act through their bribery and extortionate activity, as detailed herein, including their successful corruption of and bribing of the Mexican judicial officials and attempts to instill fear merely stating his view that the judgment would be overturned because it so plainly contravened Mexican law on damages. He was certainly unlikely to admit to opposing counsel that he had been bribed, which is the unreasonable inference Plaintiffs ask the Court to draw. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 (2004) (holding that a discriminati

4. Attempted Extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) Plaintiff’s pleading is unspecific as to the kind of extortion the Lonstein Defendants allegedly committed, and again does not allege that any such attempt at Case 3:15-cv-08194-MAS-DEA Document 131 Filed 10/22/18 Page 11 of 21 PageID: 3218 8 extortion occurred. Even if the pleading were sufficient, Plaintiff fails to rebut the Lonstein Defendants’ showing that she cannot prove that she had an existing right to be free of the alleged economic fear, as required by the Hobbs Act.

"The Hobbs Act defines the term Case 3:15-cv-08194-MAS-DEA Document 120 Filed 09/21/18 Page 14 of 39 PageID: 2759 -13- 'commerce' broadly to include 'all . . . commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction." Id. at 179 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(3)); see also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215, 80 S. Ct. 270, 4 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1960) ("[The Hobbs Act] speaks in broad language, manifesting a purpose to use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with interstate commerce by extortion…"). Mr. Siegel attempted to extort money from Mr. Desmond through fear. Specifically, On June 15, 2010, Mr. Siegel sent a letter on Globecon letterhead… stating that one of Mr. Desmond's companies stole intellectual property from Globecon and that "while I am not a speck as successful or powerful as you, I wager I am certainly one of the most tenacious people you would ever meet.