They cite, with no apparent irony, some language from the case of United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7 Cir. 2010)(en banc) which purports to interpretth California Penal Code § 1203.4a as an example of a state program that provides for the restoration of rights that would meet comport with 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33) et seq. There are two problems with that argument.

Domestic violence misdemeanants are, by statutory definition, violent criminals. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(I). In Congress’s judgment and as demonstrated by social scientists, domestic violence misdemeanants are prone to repeated acts of intrafamily violence.

(10) As used in this section, a “zip gun” means any weapon or device which meets all of the following criteria; (A) It was not imported as a firearm by an importer licensed pursuant to Chapter 44 (commencing with Section 921) of Title 18 of the United States Code and the regulations issued pursuant thereto. (B) It was not originally designed to be a firearm by a manufacturer licensed pursuant to Chapter 44 (commencing with Section 921) of Title 18 of the United . States Code and the regulations issued pursuantthereto. (C) No tax was paid on the weapon or device nor was an exemption from paying tax on that weapon or device granted under Section 4181 and subchapters F (commencing with Section 4216) and G (commencing with Section 4221) of Chapter 32 of Title 26 of the United | States Code, as amended, and the regulations issued pursuantthereto.

c. According to 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), the federal government must acknowledge that restoration and permit Plaintiffs to acquire firearms. Case 2:10-cv-02911-JAM-EFB Document 12 Filed 04/20/11 Page 24 of 25 Donald Kilmer Attorney at Law 1645 Willow St. Suite 150 San Jose, CA 95125 Vc: 408/264-8489 Fx: 408/264-8487 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Page 25 of 25Enos v. Holder Plaintiffs’ Opposition to MTD 27.

United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 644 (7 Cir. 2010) (en banc). The Seventh Circuit noted that 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) providesth routes to restoration of the right to possess firearms and that: Some of the largest states make expungement available as of right to misdemeanants who have a clean record for a specified time. California, for example, has such a program.

Domestic violence misdemeanants are, by statutory definition, violent criminals. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(I). In Congress’s judgment and as demonstrated by social scientists, domestic violence misdemeanants are prone to repeated acts of intrafamily violence.

Therefore it is not a longstanding doctrine of American jurisprudence that a MCDV should disqualify someone from exercising a fundamental, enumerated right under our Constitution. It is only the federal government’s obstinate insistence on an obtuse reading of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33) et seq., that propels this Court toward a constitutional analysis of the LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT in light of District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 3025 (2010). If the Court is required to pursue that analysis, it should apply (almost) strict scrutiny and require the government to bear the burden of producing evidence that forbidding misdemeanants with a 10-year history of law-abiding citizenship from exercising SECOND AMENDMENT rights serves a compelling government interest, and that the means used (a complete lifetime ban on exercising the right) is necessary to achieve that interest.

26 Case 1:10-cv-01736-RMC Document 8 Filed 03/11/11 Page 37 of 54 A person convicted of an otherwise disqualifying offense becomes exempt from the federal firearms ban if his or her civil rights are restored by the convicting jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). This exemption is available “unless such . . . restoration of civil rights expressly provides” that he or she will continue to be subject to a firearms disqualification.

First, the Assault Weapons Ban specifies that “copies or duplicates” of the Enumerated Weapons, “of any caliber,” are prohibited. G.L. c. 140, § 121 (emphasis added); see also 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30)(A) (1994). Redesigning an Enumerated Weapon to accept a different caliber bullet—that is, a different sized bullet—can, however, require a different sized barrel, firing mechanism, and bolt carrier to accommodate the larger or smaller bullet.

That term is statutorily-defined to include (among other things) any offense that “has, as an element, the use . . . of physical force . . . committed by a [domestic partner].” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A). Defendant Hayes—who had been convicted in West Virginia of battery against his spouse—attempted to argue that a predicate offense must have, as a discrete element, the requirement of a domestic relationship.