See Grassie, 237 F.3d at 1210; Corum, 01-236, 2002 WL 1285078, at * 3. The Fourth Circuit and other circuits have likewise held that the activities of a church may be sufficiently connected to interstate commerce to satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), the federal arson 2:15-cr-00472-RMG Date Filed 07/25/16 Entry Number 279 Page 22 of 79 20 statute that requires proof that the building at issue was “used in” interstate commerce.8 See United States v. Terry, 257 F.3d 366, 369 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that church’s operation of daycare facility satisfies the statutory requirement that the church be “used” in interstate commerce); see also, e.g., United States v. Renteria, 557 F.3d 1003, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Gillespie, 452 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Rayborn, 312 F.3d 229, 234 (6th Cir. 2002). Such activities unquestionably may be sufficiently tied to interstate commerce to satisfy the Commerce Clause.

12 The term “affect” is likewise interpreted broadly in other governmental regulatory and enforcement contexts. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001) (explaining that when Congress uses the phrase “affecting commerce,” it “indicates Congress’ intent to regulate to the outer limits of its authority under the Commerce Clause”); Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 862 n.8 (1985) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) arson statute and finding that the reference to “any building . . . used . . . in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce” expresses an intent by Congress to exercise its full power under the Commerce Clause”); Hudson Riverkeeper Fund v. Yorktown Heights Sewer Dist., 949 F. Supp. 210, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Congress, in affording the statutory right to sue under the Clean Water Act to any ‘person or persons having an interest which is or may be affected’ by any violation of any state order setting an effluent standard or limitation . . . seemingly intended to confer standing on as broad a range of affected persons as is consistent with the dictates of Article III of the Constitution.”) Case 1:12-cv-01422-JSR Document 59 Filed 04/01/13 Page 48 of 59 40 Id.

It does not necessarily meet the other prongs, all three of which must be satisfied for there to be primary civil liability under the ATA. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 2339A(a) (prohibiting material support to violate, inter alia, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (arson), which requires neither the objective terrorist intent nor the international dimension of “international terrorism” under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331(1)(B)-(C)). (D.E. #1) (same), with Compl.

This element would be established, for example, if a defendant caused bodily injury by firebombing a gay bar that participates in the interstate market for goods and services. Cf. Baylor, 517 F.3d at 901-903; United States v. Rayborn, 312 F.3d 229 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that church had sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to satisfy the interstate commerce element of the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. 844(i), which requires that the building be used in an activity affecting interstate commerce). Because proof of one of these interstate commerce elements in every case will ensure that the prosecution “is in pursuance of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce,” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613, plaintiffs’ facial challenge must be rejected.